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ABSTRACT
2
This thesis rejects the current definition of hhakti 
and seeks a reorientation of the present academic opinion 
about hhakti and the Bhakti Movement. It questions the basic 
assumptions responsible for the existing views, and points 
out the error of treating bhakti as a cult and a doctrine, 
and of its identification with Vaishnavism.e
The present study suggests that bhakti cannot be 
confined to Vaishnavism and that a personal concept of God, 
a dualistic view of Reality, and an antagonism to jfiana are 
not its necessary concomitants. It brings forth evidence to 
show that the concept of an impersonal God, a non-dualistic 
view of Reality, and an emphasis on jftana can also be the 
legitimate constituents of a bhakti tradition. Taking this 
position it prepares the ground for a re-evaluation of the 
Bhakti Movement and suggests a new approach to the study of 
Kabir and his nirguna school.
Chapter I examines the existing opinion on the 
subject. Tracing its origin, growth, and perpetuation It 
shows the western bias which shaped it. Pointing out the 
inapplicability of the western standards of judgement in 
the Hindu context, the nature of Hindu Theism and Monotheism 
has been reassessed and a new approach to bhakti is suggested.
3Chapter II is a study of the classical texts which 
are invariably cited to substantiate the current theories.
It shows that the hhakti of the Bhagavad*G-ita, the Bhagavata- 
Purana and the Bhakti~Su.tras of Narada and £>andjl$ya is in 
fact incompatible with the present definition of bhakti.
Chapter III shows that the difference between 
Sankara and the Vaishnava acharyas does not rest on bhakti, 
but is caused by Sankara’s challenge to Vaishnavism and the 
Vaishnava loyalties of the Vaishnava acharyas.
Chapter IV re-evaluates Kabir and attempts to trace 
his antecedents.
The conclusion sums up the main arguments advanced 
in this thesis.
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PREFACE
The present work on hhakti was originally undertaken 
as an introduction to the study of the social, political and 
religious implications of the Bhakti Movement. In this 
connection we wanted to concern ourselves chiefly with the 
mutual interaction of Islam and Hinduism and the changing 
opinions and attitudes of the two in relation to each other. 
We were particularly interested in Kabir’s nirguna school 
and its contribution to medieval thought and religion.
Because of the universally accepted views on bhakti 
and the Bhakti Movement, our initial approach was determined 
by certain basic assumptions about the subject. We had 
naturally to start therefore with the initial premises that 
the doctrine of bhakti was opposed to the idea of an 
impersonal God, and that it was based on a loving faith 
towards a personal Deity. We had to regard bhakti as a 
special religious tradition antagonistic to the Advaita 
Vedanta and the path of jfiana. Also, in accordance with 
existing opinion, we had to view the Bhakti Movement as an 
assertion of the bhakti religion against the path of jfiana 
and the ideology of the Advaita Vedanta. We had to accept 
the Vaishnava acharyas, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva, and 
Vallabha as the prophets of bhakti, and ganakaracharya as
their opposite pole. In the light of such a representation 
of hhakti and the Bhakti Movement, a common ideology of 
hhakti had to he attributed to all the medieval bhaktas.
Their connection with the Vaishnava-acharyas had to be 
recognised and their difference from Sankara and the Advaita 
Vedanta had to be taken for granted.
But in the course of our research we soon became 
aware of the inherent errors of these assumptions. They 
obviously placed serious limitations on the study of the 
medieval religious movements. It was clear that the approach 
of the medieval bhaktas was not always the same, that there 
were serious ideological differences between the saguna and 
the nirguna bhaktas, and that the teachings of the nirguna 
bhaktas like Kabir had more in common with the Advaita 
Vedanta of Bankaracharya than with the theology of the 
Vaishnava acharyas. Going through the works of Kabir we 
could not avoid the conclusion that his devotional ism did 
not at all conform to the present technical and academic 
definition of bhakti. Obviously there was something 
inherently wrong with the current views about bhakti and the 
Bhakti Movement,
In order to resolve these inconsistencies a clearer 
understanding of the concept and doctrine of bhakti was 
necessary. But the study of the religious texts which are
generally cited to support the existing definition only 
increased our doubts. Neither the Bhagavad-Gita nor the 
Bhagavata Purana, nor the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and 
Jsaridilya corroborated the current definition of bhakti. An 
approach from the doctrinal standpoint of Sankara and the 
Vaishnava acharyas did not help either, but only gave rise 
to further questions. We did not find Gankara’s position 
antagonistic to bhakti nor did we find in the bhakti of the 
Vaishnava acharyas a uniform conceptual system or doctrine 
opposed to the path of jfiana. On the contrary, bhakti was 
present in Gankara, and the bhakti of the Vaishnava acharyas 
did not exclude jfiana.
There were reasons to believe therefore that the 
current views on bhakti were artificial and erroneous. But 
since they are universally accepted in academic circles 
today and have the sanction of the scholarship of more than 
a century, it was not easy to uproot them. Nevertheless, 
the study of the growth of the current opinion showed us the 
way and gave us the confidence to contradict it. A closer 
examination of the works of the 19th century on Hinduism 
established clearly that the current definition of bhakti 
was. of gradual growth and was based on certain western 
standards of judgement.
Once the artificial nature of current opinions was 
revealed, it was possible to formulate a more consistent 
approach for a re-examination of bhakti. If the original
'V£.connotation of the word bhakti could be^covered, fresh 
grounds could be established for a more correct evaluation 
of the medieval religious currents which are collectively 
known as the Bhakti Movement. We have carefully examined 
certain fundamental texts with this in view, and our study 
has confirmed our hypothesis.
We have therefore confined this thesis to the 
refutation of the existing views about bhakti and the Bhakti 
Movement by suggesting an alternate approach. Perhaps the 
position taken in this work can provide the right framework 
for further studies in the Bhakti Movement and Kabir.
CHAPTER 1 
A NEW APPROACH TO BHAKTI
i. The Existing Opinion on Bhakti : Its Nature and 
himitations
Bhakti is a generic term, hut it has acquired a 
technical meaning which is both artificial and erroneous.
1
The current theories about bhakti describe it as a religion 
2
and a cult. They define and analyse it as a doctrine and 
a theology.^ In the light of these theories, bhakti is 
viewed as a special religious tradition of India, and is 
completely identified with Vaishnavism.^' It is studied and 
explained strictly from a Vaishnava standpoint, and its 
history is traced on the basis of the earliest known antece­
dents of Vishnu worship.
1. R.C. Majumdar, The History and Culture of the Indian 
People, Bharatiya Vidya~ Bhavan, Bombay ^ 195o,~ Vo 1.IV, p„U7« 
Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, 
Allahabad, 19 3"6, ppT25” 2 S.
2. Yusuf Hussain, "Islam and the Cult of Bhakti’*, in:
Glimpses of Medieval Indian Culture, Asia Publishing 
House, Bombay, 1957*
3. Munshi Ram Sharma, Bhakti Ka Vikas, Chaukhamba Vidya 
Bhavaft, Varanasi, 195§.
i\.0 I-KCo Raychaudhuri, Materials for the Study of the Early 
History of the Vaishnava Sect, University of Calcutta,
Calcu11a 1*920, p . 6. ”**
But disengaged from its present standardized 
definition, the term hhakti means nothing more than a loving 
devotion to God* By itself it indicates only an attitude of 
mind and heart, and not a set of specific ideas and beliefs. 
Considering the wider implications of its meaning, bhakti in 
the sense of religious devotion therefore can neither be 
defined as a doctrine nor can it be restricted to any one 
particular sect of the Hindus* It has found different modes 
of expression in their different religious traditions and 
has been emphasised by thinkers and poets belonging to 
different schools of thought.
The existing academic conceptions about bhakti are 
of very recent formation and can be traced back to the last 
guarter of the nineteenth century* They are the direct 
result of certain artificial theorisations by western 
scholars who wrote about Hinduism during that period and saw 
the real signs of a true monotheism in Krishna-worship and 
Vaishnavism, and called it the Bhakti Religion. Their 
writings, which were to serve as the basis of all future 
researches on the subject, have restricted the general 
meaning of bhakti and have lent in its present technical and
1academic definition.
As a result of the theories offered by them, and 
the subsequent researches undertaken to substantiate them, 
a personal conception of G-od and a belief in the truth of 
the ever-existent duality between the Deity and the devotee 
are understood today as the essentials of the bhakti 
religion. Loving praise and adoration of a personal God
A.-
as the Lord and father and an absolute dependence of Him as 
the Saviour are described as the path of bhakti as different 
from that of knowledge (jhana) and self-realisation. Moreover 
the worship of a personal God is recognised as an indication 
of a theistic religion and as a reaction against the 
impersonal explanations of God as the nirguna Brahman.
Keeping in line with these postulations, bhakti is summed
up as "a personalistic faith, a reaction against the
- 2imp er sonali stic monism of a dominant Vedanta tradition”
1 . The present theories about bhakti were initiated by 
Albrecht Weber, and were later supported by many western 
scholars, although some of them differed from Weber on 
the question of the influence of Christinaity on the 
Bhakti Religion of India. The most prominent of them are 
Auguste Barth, Sir Monier-Williams, Edward Washburn 
Hopkins, Richard Garbe, L.D. Barnett and George Abraham 
Grierson, The basic concepts related to the nature and 
meaning of bhakti have not been questioned by the Indian 
scholars. Sir R.G. Bhandarkar, the first to write on 
bhakti on the modern lines from the Indian side had 
concerned himself with the question of the antiquity of 
bhakti and its pre-Ghristian origins only.
2. Herbert H. Farmer, Revelation And Religion, Nisbet & Co., 
London, 195b 9 P .158'.
and as a religion of Love and Grace juxtaposed to the 
Brahmanical intellectualism and an antithesis of classical 
Vedanta,
The character and definition assigned to the religion
of hhakti were further explained and elaborated by western
scholars through their special observations on Vaishnava
beliefs and practices. Applying the concept of a personal
God as an essential test of true theism they fixed the Hindu
monotheism in Vaishnavism and in its elevation of Vishnu to« #
the position of the supreme deity. In Vishnu they found 
God as a personality, in his exclusive selection from amongst 
the numerous Vedic deities, a true monotheism, and in the 
Vaishriava modes of worship a religion of simple love and 
devotion. It must be mentioned here that whenever 
Vaishnavism was so described as a monotheism, every other 
evidence of monotheism in the religio-philosophical thought 
of the Hindus was set aside either as pantheism or as 
philosophical monism. A single strand, that of Vaishpavism, 
was pulled out of the intertwining threads of Hindu theism 
and was named the Bhakti Religion.
This representation of bhakti and its equation with 
Vaishnavism was sustained and given a rationale through 
certain other generalisations about Hinduism. Ignoring the 
underlying unity of the vast complex of Hinduism, a division
was made "between Brahmanism and Hinduism, and "between the
1Vedic Religion and the Hindu sectarian traditions. Their
formal differences were regarded as more fundamental than
their common ground in religious thought and their identifi-
cation in the theistic unity of Hinduism. Without giving
full recognition to the free intermixture of philosophy and
religion in Hinduism, the true elements of religion were
thus sought "by the western scholars in areas outside
philosophy. As a result of this, theism was associated only
with sectarian Hinduism, and the classical thought of the
2
Hindus was set apart as pure philosophy.
The above postulations about the nature of bhakti, 
its identification with Vaishnavism, and the relevant 
generalisations about Hinduism which support them are 
universally accepted in every discussion on the subject of
1* Auguste Barth, The Religions of I n d i a Keg an Paul, London, 
1906.
Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism or Religious 
Thought and Life in India, as based on the Veda and other 
sacred books of the Hindus, John Murray, London 1891*
2. This approach to Hinduism was so well established that 
Macnicol had to introduce his study of Indian Theism with 
the following remark: ,!India has always been recognized 
as so determinedly pantheistic in its religious thought 
that Indian Theism will seem to many an unnatural collo­
cation of words,” Nicol Macnicol, Indian Theism from the 
Vedic to the Mohammadan Period, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1915* pll.
bhakti. To the extent that the medieval religious 
renaissance is called the Bhakti Movement, they are held 
valid for the purposes of the study of the thought and 
religion of that period. But as explained earlier, bhakti 
or religious devotion is not something which can be 
restricted to any one denomination of the Hindus. Since the 
medieval period was a time of great religious upsurge, and 
since Hinduism consists of a multiplicity and variety of 
sectarian and philosophical traditions, the devotional 
expressions of Hinduism in that age were also varied and 
manifold. But ignoring both the wider meaning of bhakti, 
and the multiple and variable aspect of devotional manifest­
ation possible within Hinduism, the different religious, 
currents of the medieval period are studied collectively as: 
the Bhakti Movement and are interpreted in the light of an 
artificially fixed definition of bhakti.
Due to the basic errors in the hypotheses which have 
shaped the present definition of bhakti as a religion and a 
doctrine, its application in the study of medieval religious 
movements has also led to many misconceptions and mis­
judgements. In spite of the evidence of personalities like 
Kabir and Nanak and of their movements in favour of nirguna 
bhakti aimed at popularising the impersonal and the nirguna 
conception of God, the medieval Bhakti Movement is described
as a religious effort which strengthened the forces of 
monotheism by laying emphasis on the personal nature of God 
against the impersonal representation of Him. In the total 
context of Hinduism it is represented mainly as a reaction 
against the Advaita Vedanta of Sahkaracharya. To substantiate 
this, the entire expression of Hindu devotionalism of the 
medieval period is collectively viewed as an assertion of an 
emotional religion of love and grace in which reasoning and 
knowledge (jfiana) had no share.^ furthermore, since bhakti 
is completely identified with Vaishnavism, the whole of the 
Bhakti Movement is approached from a purely Vaishnava angle 
in spite of the variations existing in it. Consequently 
the Vaishnava acharayas, Ramanuja, Nimbarka,Madhva and 
Vallabha are regarded as the apostles of bhakti and their 
systems of Vedanta as its doctrinal foundations. The 
difference of their Vedanta from that of Sankara is inter­
preted as the difference between the path of bhakti (devotion) 
and jfiana (knowledge). In the light of an artificial and 
restricted definition of bhakti, a uniform view is taken of 
the medieval saints and poets in spite of the fundamental 
differences noticeable amongst them* As a result of this,
1. Tara Chand, ibid.. pp.H3ff.
Yusuf Hussain, ibid., pp.3ff., 27.
2. R.C. Majumdar, ibid., Vol.VI, p.3^8.
the hhakti of Tulsidas and Chaitanya who were the devotees
of personal deities, Rama and Krishna, is wrongly coupled
with that of Kabir and Nanak who were clearly the worshippers
1of the Nirguna Brahman«
On account of the obvious limitations placed by the 
present definition of bhakti a similar ideology is attributed 
to both these groups of saguna and the nirguna bhaktas and 
the difference of their approach Is not fully weighed and 
acknowledged. But a monolithic view can be taken of the 
medieval Bhakti Movement only if bhakti is understood in its 
wider meaning. If on the other hand it is accepted in its 
present restricted and technical sense, the ideological 
differences existing within the medieval religious movements 
must be fully recognized.
In short, the term bhakti is accepted today as a 
designation of "a type of religion1' which is alleged to have 
had "a long history in India alongside the prevailing monism
p
of philosophical. Hinduism." The present views on bhakti 
and the Bhakti Movement carry with them the sanctity of
1. Kshitimohan Sen, Medieval Mysticism of India, Luzac & Go., 
London, 1930* ftiAstw
H.G. Raychaudhuri, ibid., p.l.
R.C. Majumdar, ibid., Vol.IV, p«60.
2. Nicol Macnicol, Foreword in W.G-. Orr, A Sixteenth Century 
Indian Mystic, Lutterworth Press, London’19I47* p\£.
about one century of scholarship related to this subject.
But although they are very firmly rooted in our academic 
thinking today, there are some valid reasons for questioning 
them. A sound assessment of the medieval religious movements 
of India is not possible without a correct understanding of 
bhakti. It is necessary therefore to re-examine the exist­
ing academic theories about bhakti which are fallacious and 
are artificially conceived.
But the initial acceptance of bhakti as a special 
religion is in itself a mistake* To explain it as a 
doctrine is equally misleading. The current concepts about 
bhakti, which are chiefly the creation of western scholarship, 
are the result of the initiation and development of an 
opinion with regard to Hinduism which assigned the whole of 
Hindu devotionalism or bhakti to the Vaishnava sect and 
ascribed the Hindu understanding of the oneness of God to 
the selection of Vishnu from amongst the numerous Hindu 
deities for the supreme position of the single Divine 
Personality.
No such exclusive definition of bhakti can be found 
in the Hindu religious texts which can completely corroborate 
the present conception of it in its full implications. Nor 
is the subject of bhakti found restricted to any one body of 
sectarian literature. On the contrary, texts such as the
Bhagavad G-ita, the Bhagavata Purana, and the Bh ah ti-SQ.tr as
Harada and £>andilya, which are invariably quoted to
uphold the present academic stand, have obvious possibilities
1
of different and wider interpretations of bhakti*
The origins of the present associations of ideas
related to bhakti can be traced back to the later half of
the nineteenth century. They received a more definite and
technical formulation during the last quarter of it. By the
end of the first decade of the present century, the theories
about bhakti had assumed a fixed character and were generally
current* But they had evolved gradually and the early stages
of their formulation show them in a more nebulous and less
positive form.
It was H.H. Wilson who first mentioned bhakti as a
religion. He had done it in a very casual and general
manner without implying any of the ideas which are associated
with bhakti today. Writing on the religious sects of the
Hindus in 181^ 6, Wilson had made a stray observation about
2bhakti in connection with the Vaishnavas of Bengal. But 
he did not define it in the manner in which it is defined
1. Bhakti in the Bhagavad Gita, the Bhagavat Purana, and
Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and SlnSiiya are discussed 
in Chapter II.
2. H.H. Wilson, Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus* 
Bishop College Press, Calcutta l8iji>, pp.100-102.
today* Nor did he identify it with Vaishnavism as a whole, 
which became an accepted rule in the later stages. This is 
an evident fact since Wilson mentions bhakti only in connect­
ion with the Vaishnavas of Bengal and does not mention it
again in his treatment of the other Vaishnava sects of the 
1Hindus* But later, and not too long after Wilson, certain 
academic theories about bhakti started taking shape in the 
hands of scholars like Albrecht Weber and Sir Monier 
Williams. By 1909 however, Bhakti was incorporated in the 
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics as a religion and a 
doctrine, fully equipped with all its present technical 
implications.2
Although the modern theories of bhakti are equally 
well established in Indian scholarship today, they were 
initially formulated by western scholars. They were shaped 
by them in the light of their own concepts of God and 
religion, and were not based on any axiomatic, evidence 
provided by Hinduism. The basic material for the construction 
of the bhakti theories has been provided by western conceptual 
categories of theism, monotheism and pantheism, and a purely
1. Wilson gave a list of 2.0 sects of the Vaishnavas, ibid. 5 
see p.21, But he had mentioned bhakti in connection with 
only the Gosvamis of Bengal.
2. George A. Grierson, ,,Bhakti-Marga,f, Encyclopedia of 
Religion and Ethics, (ERE) edited by'” James Hastings, 1909> 
Vol.II, pp.539-551*
personal concept of God and a clear line of division between 
religion and philosophy have guided the entire course of their 
formation. The strict adherence by the western scholars to 
certain preconceived notions and fixed attitudes, rooted in 
their Christian thinking, made it difficult for them to under­
stand and judge Hinduism on its own terms.
The application of conceptual categories which derive 
their character not from the Hindu but an alien background, 
the treatment of Hindu religion and philosophy in isolation 
from each other, and the rejection of all impersonal explana­
tions of God as. non-theistic, are largely responsible for the 
artificial nature of the present theories about bhakti. The 
fundamental error of treating Vaishnavism as a specially 
theistic and devotional religion, and naming it as bhakti can 
also be traced back to the initial mistake of regarding faith 
in a personal deity as the only true indication of religious 
feeling and theism. It must also be mentioned here that when­
ever Hindu theism is evaluated on these lines, certain 
essentials of Hindu thought, such as Vedanta, are always set 
aside as merely the philosophical and intellectual activities 
of the Brahmins, and their actual religious significance is 
very often minimised and misinterpreted.
However, the concepts and standards of judgement 
which mark the attitudes and writings of scholars who
initiated the present theories on hhakti were formalized in
the west. As will he shown at a later stage, they were the
result of the Christian reaction against the growing tendency
in modern European philosophy to disregard the Christian view
of God and to explain Him as the Ultimate Reality in abstract
1and impersonal terms. Since they were shaped strictly in the 
light of Christian beliefs and the Christian concept of the 
Deity, they could have no validity in the context of Hinduism, 
in which philosophy and religion have not had separate develop­
ments and an impersonal view of God has characterised religious 
thinking from the very start. But in spite of their obvious 
limitations, it is these concepts and attitudes which have 
shaped the entire development of the bhakti theories, and can 
account for their artificiality.
Our understanding of bhakti is bound to get more con­
fused when bhakti is described as a monotheism and a special 
"theistic expression’' in the midst of the intellectual panthe­
ism of the Hindus. But the conceptual theories and categories 
of Theism, Pantheism and Monotheism, which are the real cause 
of all such assessments, are of recent and purely western
p
origin. They carry with them a strong bias of isolation of
Vi tie Infra. p. €6-3*
2. A.E, Taylor, "Theism", ERE, ed. 1921, Vol.XII, p.26l. 
Taylor also says that a "certain vagueness about the 
meaning of the word in current English" exists, ibid.
religion and philosophy and of a personal conception of the 
Deity. Theism, as different from mere philosophical 
explanations of the Ultimate Reality, and monotheism as 
different from philosophical monism and pantheism became 
sharply defined as conceptual categories in the west to 
distinguish between the religious and the philosophical 
thought* The association of ideas which accompany these 
terms are easily understandable against the background of 
Christianity and the evolution of the clear distinction 
between religion and philosophy in the west 0
The above theories however, can be of no assistance 
in ascertaining the nature of Hindu theism and monotheism 
because the evolution of Hindu thought and religion 
constitutes a pattern of its own, very different in character 
from that of Christianity. Their application therefore can 
further confuse, but cannot clarify the complex pattern of 
Hinduism. But since bhakti is described as a monotheism and 
a theistic religion different from the intellectualism of the 
Brahmins and their philosophical pantheism, a further 
explanation of the concepts of Monotheism and Pantheism might 
help us in gaining a clearer idea of a part of the current 
fallacy related to bhakti.
Theism, as a name for a "philosophical theory as 
distinct from a practical religious faith" is a thing of
"purely modern formation" distinguishing a technically
correct definition of belief in God from the indefinite
1generality of faith in God* The theoretical representation 
of theism today generally presupposes an acceptance of the 
idea of a personal God and a rejection of all impersonal 
and philosophical representations of Him* Making faith in 
a personal God its basic content, theism is distinctly 
marked out as different from belief in the oneness of God, 
and as a theory, it is carefully distinguished from all 
philosophical ideas of the unity of God. The latter are 
included in the category of pantheism which is kept distinct 
from monotheism, a term, the technical use of which is 
always kept confined to the belief in the oneness of a 
personal God. Monotheism is described as "sharply opposed 
to a very wide range of beliefs and teachings", and a demand 
for an abandonment &  "often with contempt or aversion,
fit o
many older beliefs, fears and customs...". The Deity as a 
person is regarded as the central point of true monotheism, 
and it is argued that if "we mean by deity nothing more 
than the ultimate independent substance, whatever may be 
its nature, then every monistic theory of the universe
1. A.E.Taylor, ibid.
2. J'osiah Royce, "Monotheism", ERE, ed. 1915# Vol.VTII, p.817*
"becomes pantheistic and indistinguishable from materialistic
monism and other philosophical theories of singularism.
Pantheistic thought, which goes hand in hand with monism, is
further understood as mere "intellectual craving for unity"
1and a "vague apprehension of God as theism conceives Him."
As suggested earlier, the above conceptual theories 
have received their present formulation essentially from a 
Christian standpoint. The use of these categories in discuss­
ions on Christianity and other religions of a common Semitic 
background may be completely valid but their application in 
the study of Hinduism is not only unwarranted, but has led to 
errors of judgement. The study of Hinduism through the medium 
of these theories has been largely responsible for interpreting 
Vaishnavism as Hindu monotheism, and Vishnu-worship as Hindu 
devotionalism or bhakti. However, the nature and evolution of
Hindu theism and monotheism must be understood in their own 
terms. Similarly, the nature of the different manifestations 
of Hindu devotionalism can be correctly ascertained only in 
relation with the characteristic pattern of Hindu theism and 
monotheism. The failure to do so, and the free application 
of the conceptual categories of theism and pantheism, which 
are irrelevant in the Hindu context, can account for the 
artificial nature of the present theories about bhakti. A
1. Frank Thilly, "Pantheism", ERE, ed. 1917# Vol.IX,pp.6l3ff.
closer examination of the growth of the bhakti theories, and 
of the western bias which has conditioned them, will explain 
this more clearly.
ii* The Artificial Formulation of the Bhakti Theories
The artificial nature of our present understanding 
of bhakti becomes more glaring when the whole process of their 
gradual formation and establishment in academic works is fully 
taken into account. Western observers in the earlier stages of 
Indology showed a very different approach to Hindu monotheism 
and Vaishnavism, the two themes which later constituted theo 9
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very basis of the bhakti theme-s. The same subjects however, 
were understood and judged very differently by the later 
scholars. Those who were writing at the end of the eighteenth 
and the first half of the nineteenth century showed a greater 
tendency to accept Hindu montheism on its own terms. They did 
not take any special notice of Vaishnavism as a monotheistic 
or bhakti cult, as was done by scholars who wrote during the 
later half of the nineteenth century.
Neither the present definition of bhakti nor the 
supporting theories which go with it find any mention in the 
earlier studies on Hinduism. While referring to the totality 
of Hinduism the earlier writers on Indian history and culture 
did not draw a sharp line of division between Indian religion
and philosophy. The later* writers however, clearly separated 
one from the other in a fundamental manner. At the same time, 
unlike the latter, the earlier authors do not make use of any 
standardised and technical theory of theism as a measure of 
their judgement of Hinduism and Hindu monotheism. Although 
some of them show a keen awareness of the absence of a parallel 
of the Christian deity in Hinduism and of the uniqueness of 
the Christian approach to God as compared to the Hindu, on the 
whole they clearly accept and acknowledge the state of inter­
mixture of religion and philosophy in Hinduism and the 
individual nature of the monotheism known to the Hindus.
The later scholars on the other hand, not only treated 
the Hindu religion and philosophy as two different compartments 
of Hinduism but also went to great lengths to prove the exist­
ence of the true element of religion in Hindu sectarianism 
and in the worship of personal deities, such as Vishnu and his 
avatar as, Rama and Krishna. They not only made a free use of 
the technical definitions of theism and monotheism as 
conceived in the west to an alien and unidentical situation, 
but they went further and constructed their own theories about 
Hindu monotheism, which lie at the root of the existing 
theories about bhakti. They suggested, and then laboured to 
prove, that Vishnu worship was the most outstanding theistic 
expression of Hinduism, and that Vaishnavism alone possessed
"the essential elements of a genuine religion", and that Hindu 
monotheism could he traced in the worship of the single 
personal deity, Vishnu.
A survey of the sequence of opinions expressed by 
western scholars on the relevant aspects of Hinduism will show 
more clearly the artificial nature of the accepted views on 
bhakti, particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental 
change caused in the approach to the totality of Hinduism in 
course of time, and of the gradual and laboured process of the 
formulation of the present theories about bhakti. Both the 
change of attitude and the growth of new opinion can be traced 
and can explain the present certainties, which have remained 
unquestioned till now in spite of their artificiality.
At first the Hindu pattern of monotheism was duly 
recognized on its own terms. It was duly acknowledged'by 
earlier writers like J.Zo Ilolwell and Luke Scrafton that "the 
Hindus were aware of one supreme God", Holwell had gone to the 
extent of describing Hinduism as one of the three religions uKteK 
&S0L believed in "one supreme being", which "manifestly" 
carried the "Divine stamp of God". Dow, writing the History
1. J.Z. Holwell, A Review of the Original Principles^
Religious and Moral of the Ancient Bramins: comprehending 
an Account of the Mythology, Cosmology, Fasts and Festivals 
of the Gentoos, D. Steel, London 1779# P*31*
Luke Scrafton, Reflections on the Government of Indostan, 
London, I763, p.5.
of Hindustan in 1768, said that the "Brahmins, contrary to the 
ideas formed of them in the west, invariably believe in the
unity, eternity, omniscience and omnipotence of God" and that
the polytheism of which they had been accused was "no more
than a symbolical worship of the divine attributes" of God.'1'
A similar view was expressed by Charles Wilkins in his
introduction to the translation of the Bhagavad-Gita. He also
described the Brahmins as Unitarians who believed"*., but in
2one God, an universal spirit." Summing up the theism of the
HindusjH.T, Colebrooke suggested that "if the doctrines of the
Veda and even these of the Puranas "were taken into account,0 7
"the Hindu theology will be found consistent with monotheism 
though it contains the seeds of polytheism and idolatry."-'* 
Writing the history of India in 181+1, Elphinstone made a clear 
and categorical statement that the "primary doctrine of the 
Vedas is the unity of God" and that the Hindu texts repeatedly 
state that there is "but one Deity, the Supreme Spirit, the
1. Alexander Dow, The History of Hindostan, London 1803, 
Vol.Ij p.LXII.
2. Charles Wilkins, The Bhagvat Geeta; or, dialogues of 
Kreeshna and Ar.ioon. in eighteen lectures with not_e.s.. 
Translated from the original in Sankreet, London, 1785* 
p *2l+o
3. II.T. Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays, 3 Vols., Trtlbner &
Co., London 1873, Vol.II, pp.209-210.
1Lord of the universe, According to Elphinstone the
doctrine of monotheism prevailed throughout the Hindu
p
Institutes. Even a man like William Ward, who untiringly 
continued to point out the idolatrous practices of the 
Hindus, and who had very little respect for the views of 
those "apologists for Hindoo ism" who pleaded that Hinduism 
should not "be judged by "present appearances"*^ "It is true 
indeed", he said, "that the Hindoos believe in the unity of 
God" and that "one Brumhu, without a second is a phrase very 
commonly used by them when conversing on subjects which 
relate to the nature of God..,."^
None of these early writers^ saw the elements of true 
monotheism| in the Vaishnava sect - a thing which was commonly 
done by the later scholars. The attitudes which so 
predominantly characterised the later approaches to Vaishna­
vism are completely absent in them. On the contrary, 
Vaishnavism was viewed very often by them as a source of
1. Mounts-tuart Elphinstone, The History of India, John 
Murray, London l8ifL, Vol.I, p*72*
2. Ibid•, p •73•
3* William Ward, A View of the History, Literature and
Mythology of the Hindoos: including a minute description 
of their manners and customs, and translations from their 
principal works, London 1822, 3 Vols., Vol.I, p.CLXV.
U. William Ward, ibid., Vol.Ill, p.l.
idolatry and polytheism. They neither found an essential 
theism nor a fully developed image of a personal God in it.
No special religion of "bhakti is mentioned in connection 
with the Vaishnavas by the earlier writers, nor are Vishnu 
and the incarnations, Rama and Krishna, given any pre­
eminence as the more adequate representations of God as a 
person in the total context of Hinduism. On the contrary 
they saw nothing more than the worship of inferior 
divinities in sectarian religions like Vaishnavism, and 
regarded the Vaishnava deities Rama and Krishna as deified 
heroes only. The higher theism of the Hindus and their 
belief in one God, they freely attributed to their "philoso- 
phical heritage upheld by the learned Brahmins.”
Dow noticed that the "learned Brahmins with one voice 
deny the existence of inferior divinities” and that "all 
their religious books of any antiquity confirm this 
assertion.”"^ Sir William Jones did not see a special or 
separate doctrine in Krishna-worship, isolated from the total 
Hindu view of religion and God. Speaking of the "figurative 
notions” of the Hindus, he explained that they consider God 
"in three characters of Creator, Regenerator and Preserver” 
and suppose that "the power of Preservation and Benevolence
1. Alexander Dow, ibid., Vol.I, p.LXIII.
1to have become incarnate in the person of Crishna*"' 
Colebrooke saw nothing more in the Vaishnava religion than 
the worship of "deified heroes" William Ward took a 
similar view of the Vaishnavas and described them as those
o
"who choose Vishnoo for their guardian deity", but he did 
not mention them as the votaries of a special religion of 
bhakti* Referring to Rama and Krishna^ Ward described them 
merely as "deified heroes"^* and saw neither in them nor in 
Vishnu any indication of the fulfilment of the religious 
truth of a Personal God* In spite of his strong Christian 
bias for a personal conception of the Deity, Ward did not 
attribute any higher ideas of a personal God to the Vaishna­
vas but stated instead that "speaking of God in His abstract
state, some of the Hindoo sages could express sublime
6conceptions though mixed with error*" KLphinstone
1* William Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones with the 
Life of the Author, edited by Lord Teignmouth in thirteen 
volumes, John Stockdale, London 1807? Vol.IV, p*221.
2 * H •T * Colebrooke, ibid., Vol*II, p.211.
3. William Ward, ibid* * Vol. III, p.8.
k* Ibid., Vol.I, p.LXXlV.
5* In spite of taking note of the wide popularity of Vishnu 
worship, Ward could not see anything more in Vishnu than 
an "image of a black man with four arms a creature
half bird, half man."
William Ward, ibid*, Vol.I, pp.LXXVII f£*
6, Ibid*, Vol.I, p.XLIV.
described the sectarian Vaishnava deities. Rama and Krishna
• * s o
as "deified mortals" and saw in their worship only a negation
1
of the Hindu principles of monotheism. Although he described 
the Vaishnavas as the most popular religious group, he did not 
see in the worship of these personal deities anything more than 
a corruption of the "more sublime" parts of Hinduism which 
were already "corrupted by the introduction of deified heroes
1 2• . © O
Some of the later Indologists, those who evolved the
bhakti-theories, took a very different view of the situation.
They made a new approach to the study of Hinduism which became
a standing model for the subsequent scholarship in that field.
Starting with the initial premises of an essential and
inevitable difference between religion and philosophy, they
used the two measurements separately and classed the major
bulk of the religio-philosophical thought of the Hindus as
Brahmanism, and their sectarian religious manifestations as 
3Hinduism.
1 . Mountstuart Elph ins tone, ibid., Vol.I, p.lSl.
2* Ibid., Vol.I, p.l6U.
3. Monier-Williams described the religion of "the higher, 
cultured, and thoughtful classes as Brahmanism", and "of 
the lower, uncultured, and unthinking masses as Hinduism". 
Brahmanism And Hinduism, ibid., p.XI. He also acknowledges 
that "these names are not accepted by the Hindus, ibid., 
p.XVIIIc
See also Auguste Barth, Bulletin on the Religions of 
India, Reprint, Indian Studies Past and Present,
Calcutta I960, p.l.
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Regarding the religion of the Vedas as a mere 
expression of "reverential awe of the foroes of Nature and a
p
desire to propitiate them",' and Brahminism as "simply an
2Indian variety of pantheism", Monier-Williams forwarded the 
theory that "Vaishnavism alone" possessed "the essential 
elements of a genuine religion."^ According to him it was the 
only Hindu system worthy of being called a religion "notwith­
standing the gross polytheistic superstitions and hideous 
idolatry to which it gives rise*"^ The main argument behind 
Monier-Williams* thesis was that "there can be no true religion 
without personal devotion to a personal God.,,",^ "Who can 
doubt that a God of such a character was needed" he explained, 
"a God who could satisfy the yearnings of the heart for a 
religion of faith, love, and prayer rather than of knowledge 
and works? Such a God was believed to be represented by 
Vishnu,
1. Monier-Williams, ibid,t pp*96~7.
2. Ibid*, p.97.
3* Monier-Williams, "The Vaishnava Religion, with special 
reference to Sikshan Patri of the modern sect called 
Svami Narayana", in: The Journal of the Ro.yal Asiatic 
Society of Great Britain and Ireland, (JRAS) Trttbner 5c Co., 
London 1882, pp,295-6*
2|, Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, ibid,, p.98.
5* Monier-Williams, "The Vaishp.ava Religion", ibid,, p*296,
6* Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, ibid*, p.97.
In his judgements, Monier-Williams was obviously-
guided by the orthodox and formalised Christian concepts
of God and religion. No description of God and His unity
other than their representation through a Divine Personality
could satisfy him, since philosophical explanations of God
and His unity could not be truly regarded as religion from
1a Christian standpoint. Therefore in spite of acknowledging 
in his earlier writings that even "the most profound forms 
of Indian pantheism rest on the fundamental doctrine of 
God1 s unity" and that "even the ordinary Hindu, who 
practises the most corrupt form of polytheism is never 
found to deny the doctrine of God's unity", in his later 
works, Monier-Williams saw the true ingredients of a 
monotheistic religion in Vaishnavism only. In that alone 
he saw an "abolition of the triune equality of Brahma 
Sava and Vishnu in favour of Vishnu, especially as 
manifested in his two human incarnations Krishna and Rama"
o 0
1 , The Christian bias of Monier-Williams stands out quite 
clearly in his studies of Hinduism, He had recommended 
that the knowledge of Sanskrit must also be used for the 
"elucidation of Indian religious systems with a view to 
their refutation". Monier-Williams, Bpahmanisrn and 
Hinduism, ibid*, p.VII.
2 . Monier-Williams, "Indian Theistic Reformers", The Journal 
of the Royal Asiatic Society., (JRAS) Trtlbner & Co., 
London, 1881, p«la
and described it as ”the only real religion of the Hindus”.’*' 
He found in Vaishnavism an. ’’approximation towards the 
Christian idea of God’s Unity and Personality”,^ for ”it must 
be admitted” he said, ”that it has more common ground with 
Christianity than any other form of non-Christian faith.
These opinions were expressed by Monier-Williams during the 
period 1875 to 189 -^.
The earlier background of these theories- about 
bhakti and Vaishnavism can be found in the works of H.H.
o
Wilson and A. Weber. As pointed out earlier, Wilson was the 
first western scholar to mention bhakti as a religion and a 
doctrine in his ’’Religious Sects of the Hindus”, published 
in 1.6k6. He had mentioned it in connection with the K^ishna- 
cult of the VaishrLavas of Bengal, the followers of Chaitanya. 
He pointed out that ”in opposition to the Vedanta belief of 
the negative properties of God” the followers of Chaitanya 
believed in His ’’real attributes”.^ According to Wilson 
their ”whole religious and moral code” was ”comprised in
1. Monier-Williams, ”The Vaishnava Religion”, JRAS, ibid., 
1882, p.295.
2. Monier-Williams, ’’Indian Theistic Reformers”, JRA.S,
1881, p.2.
3. Monier-Williams, Brahmanism and Hinduism, p.96. 
k* H.Ho Wilson, ibid., p.100.
the one word, Bhakti, a term that signifies the union of 
the implicit faith with incessant devotion..*"* Wilson saw 
in their doctrine of the efficacy of bhakti", an "important
1innovation upon the primitive system of the Hindu religion."
The Yedas, the very source of Hinduism had no attraction
for Wilson. He described their object as the same "that
was defused throughout the old pagan world", and stated
that "the fervent adoration of any one deity superseded all
this necessity, and broke down practice and speculation,
2moral duties, and political distinctions." Wilson made a
special mention of the Bhagavat Purarxa also, pointing out
its teachings that worship is more efficacious than
abstractions and knowledge of the Divine Nature. Religious
Sects of the Hindus, WilsonTs first standard work of its
own kind on Hinduism, was bound to have a far-reaching
effect on western opinion on this subject. Although Wilson
3
did not connect bhakti with the whole of Vaishnavism, the 
way in which he connected it with the Krishna-cult of 
Bengal was in itself significant. Bhakti, a general term,
1 . Ibid.. p.100.
2* Ibid., p.101*
3* Wilson had given a list of 20 sects as Vaishnavas but
had mentioned "bhakti" only in relation to the Vaishnavas. 
of Bengal. H.H.Wilson, ibid., p.21.
was now equated with Krishna-worship and was thus to assume
a very restricted meaning.
This equation between Krishna-worship and bhakti
was further strengthened and perpetuated by the German
1Indologist, Albrecht Weber. His main aim, however, was to 
trace the influences of Christianity on Krishria-hhakti. He
pointed out many parallels between the two. He saw in the 
exclusive emphasis on Kfishpa!s personality and in the 
fervent and emotional worship of Krishna, a pattern similar 
to Christianity. He even pointed out the similarities 
between certain incidents of the life of Christ and the facts 
of the Krishpa legend. Weber did this in order to prove 
that the elements of monotheism and of fervent faith, 
noticeable amongst the worshippers of Krishna, were in 
reality borrowed from Christianity. He also suggested that 
the later developments in the direction of monotheism among 
those Indian sects which worshipped a personal God were due 
to the same influence.
In his discussions on the similarities between 
Krishpa-worship and Christianity, Weber had also made a 
special reference to bhakti in relation to Kpishna-worship,
1. Albrecht Weber, IJber die Krishnajanmashtarni (Krishna's 
Geb^rtsfest), Akademie der Wissenschaften, l86t ; see in 
particular pp.321ff.
and had translated it as Kraft des Glaubens or the power of
faith and belief in God. He had explained the term further in
the sense of "begging for His grace" to bring it nearer to the
Christian parallel. Although Weber's theory of Christian
influence in Krishna-worship was refuted by many scholars,
both European and Indian, the links created in his writings
between Krishna-worship and bhakti and monotheism, were to
assume a lasting significance. Krishna being the incarnation
of Vishnu, a wider view of Krishna-worship as the worship of
Vishnu,and of Krishna-cult as a form of Vaishnava religion,
strengthened the connection in the minds of the western
scholars between bhakti, monotheism, and Vaishnavism. Thus the
writings of Weber were mainly responsible for the formulation
of the bhakti theories. His observations on bhakti marked out
the lines for the subsequent growth of the academic opinion
1on that subject,
Bhakti, now described as a distinct devotional 
religion of grace identified with and restricted to Krishna 
worship, was later associated with the Bhagavad-Gita. Since 
Krishna whose worship and personality provided scope for
1. Auguste Barth, a contemporary of Weber, can be quoted here 
as a clear testimony to this. Barth stated that the bhakti 
theory "in its scientific form belongs entirely to 
Professor Weber and which that scholar has developed from 
time to time...." Auguste Barth, ibid., p.220.
initial theorisation about bhakti occupied a central position 
in the Gita narrative, the western scholars found it easy to 
connect it with their speculations on bhakti. If Gita could 
be connected with Krishna-worship, it could be connected with
the Bhakti Religion^ too. At the same time, certain points of 
similarity between the teachings of the Bhagavad-GIta and 
those of Christianity were also attracting the attention of 
some scholars. The theories propounded by Weber coupled with 
this new approach to the Gita, added a greater significance 
to the connection between the bhakti theories and the Bhagavad- 
Gita. The latter was soon to be recognized and referred to as 
an authoritative text of the Bhakti religion.
Soon after Weber's paper on Krishna's Geburtsfest or 
.Krsnajanmastami, delivered to the Akademie der Wissenschaften 
in I867, Dr. Lorinser in an appendix to his translation of the 
Bhagavad-Glta showed traces of the "Christian writings and 
ideas" in that text. This created a still more new and special 
connection between the Bhagavad~Gita and the bhakti theories 
which were taking shape in the west at that time. Whereas 
Weber had referred to only the legend of the. white island or 
£>veta-dvipa in the Mahabharata, the Nar ada- Panchar a tr a and
1, The German translation of the Bhagavad Gita by Dr.
Lorinser was published in Breslau in 1869. The English 
translation of the above mentioned Appendix appeared in 
the October issue of the Indian Antiquary, 1873*
1
Svapnesvara's commentary on Sandilya-Bhakti-Sutra in 
connection with his explanations of the bhakt^i doctrine, 
Lorinser’s indications with regard to the Bhagavad-G1ta now 
made it the focal point of the bhakti theories. The Gita 
which in fact is acknowledged as an authority by both the 
so-called "philosophical Brahminism" as well as the 
"sectarian Hinduism" was now represented as a special 
Vaishnava text and as the most outstanding exposition of 
the bhakti doctrine.
It must be noted here however, that a representation
of the Bhagavad-Gita mainly as a Vaishnava text was also the
result of the growth of an artificial opinion about the nature
of that work* The Hindus have never regarded the Gita as a
sectarian work* On the contrary** as a religious text the Gita
is always placed in line with the Up an i shads and the Vedanta
sutras. The three together constitute the final source of all
Hindu theological opinions. Aj)art from this Hindu position,
amongst the western scholars themselves, the earlier opinions
expressed about Gita stand out as very different from the later
ones. Sir William Jones has described the Bhagavad-GIta as "a
work containing all the grand mysteries of the Brahminical 
2Faith...". Charles Wilkins, the first English translater of
1. Albrecht Weber, ibid., pp.319-21.
2. William Jones, ibid., Vol.II, p.23.
the Bhagavad-Gita had clearly observed, that the Brahmins
esteemed that work as the source of their religion, and that
the "principal design" of the Oita was "to unite all the
prevailing modes of worship" and to show the unity of God as
1Universal spirit* The earlier western opinion was thus
inclined more to accept Gita as the first scientific and
allegorical "systematisation of the scattered tenets" of 
2
Hinduism.
However, the habit to represent Gita as a purely 
Vaishnava text is clearly the result of the change in 
western opinion* The changing opinions, here again, had 
followed a gradual and artificial course. This is clearly 
noticeable in the works of Sir Monier-Williams. In 1875, he 
described the Bhaga~vad-G11a as an eclectic work which
■3
"abounded in sentiments borrowed from the Upanishads". In 
1882 he described it as the Bible of the Vaishnavas.^ This 
gave more weight to his theory that Vaishnavism was a
1. Charles Wilkins, ibid., P*23*
2. Charles Wilkins, ibid., pp.5-6.
3. Monier-Williams, Indian Wisdom or Examples of the
Religious,Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the
Hindus: with a brief History of the Past and Present 
Condition of India, Moral and Intellectual, 2nd ed.,
H,Allen & Co •, London, 1875, P*135*
Monier-Williams, fiThe Vaishnava Religion", ibid*,pp.296-97»
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religion in itself, that it was a religion of bhakti, and
that its theology was clearly enshrined in the Bhagavad-GIta.
The Bhagavata Purana was also treated as an authoritative
text of the bhakti religion for the same reasons.
The academic theories describing bhakti as a religion
were thus worked out in a gradual fashion. Gradually, but
surely bhakti was equated with Vaishnavism and Krishna-
worship, and the Bhagavad-G11a was fixed as the earliest
authoritative source of the bhakti religion. These theories.
were finally bound together in a neat system by George
Grierson who now spoke of a "Bhakti Church of India", and
described bhakti as a "school of religion", a cult, and a
doctrine.1 Grierson defined the bhakti religion as- the
"descendant of the noble thoughts found in the Bhagavad-
Gita",2 strongly opposed both to the^Advaita Vedantist
doctrine of salvation by knowledge and to the Mimamsa
tJb
doctrine of salvation by works." He explained^ in more 
definite terms as a religion of "devoted faith directed to 
a personal God", a thing "essentially typical of monotheistic 
religion".^ Grierson now described bhakti more clearly as
1. G.A. Grierson, The Modern Hindu Doctrine of Works, JRAS,
1908, po337•
2. Ibid.
3. George A. Grierson, Narayania and the Bhagavatas,
Reprinted from Indian Antiquary, British India Press, 
Bombay 1909* P«l*
1''the monotheistic religion of ancient India" "in contra-
2.distinction to the pantheistic Brahmanism" , He attributed 
the conception of God, a monotheos, to the Bhagavatas and 
designated that as the true Hindu religion and monotheism. 
According to Grierson the worshipper of Vishnu was 
"essentially a monotheist"^ and Vedanta was nothing more 
than a "belief in a passionless, impersonal, supreme Deity, 
unmoved by prayer and adoration,*,".
Equipped with more crystallized theories about the 
bhakti religion, Grierson went a step further than the 
earlier scholars and constructed a history of it, seeking 
evidence of the spirit of bhakti in the classical literatures 
and putting forward his own theories about the processes 
through which the Bhagavata or the Vaishnava religion had
1. George A, Grierson, The Monotheistic Religion of Ancient 
India and its Descendant, the Modern Doctrine of Faith, 
read at the Third International Congress for the History 
of Religions, held at Oxford in September 1908, (A, 
Bradford, Printer, Yorktown, Surrey),
2, George A, Grierson, Narayania and the Bhagavataa, ibid,,
p •/+,
3* Ibid,, p,6.
George A* Grierson, The Monotheistic Religion of Ancient 
India, ibid,, p ,4*
5* George A. Grierson, "Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the 
ITestorians", JRAS., 1907, Pt.I, p.313.
formalised its distinct theology as different from the
1pantheistic Brahmanical philosophies.
To the list of the textual authorities quoted so far 
to e^splain the nature of the hhakti doctrine, Grierson now 
added his careful study of the Narayania section of the 
Mahabharata, hoping "it will not be difficult to separate the 
kernel of bhakti" from "the Brahmaist shell in which it has 
been enclosed#"2
Grierson gave yet another dimension to the theories, 
of bhakti by concentrating on its medieval manifestations in 
the Vaishnava acharyas of the south as well as. the devotional 
poets of the north. He could speak with authority on the latter 
on account of his special knowledge of the medieval Hindi 
literature in general. To a great extent it was the medieval 
bhakti which served as the starting point for him, whence he 
took off to build and elaborate his more definite and advanced 
theories which have survived to this day. The retrospective 
and artificial nature of his approach can be clearly seen 
sometimes in his writings# For instance, describing the 
medieval bhakti movement he says: "suddenly, like a flash of 
lightening, there came upon all this darkness a new idea. No 
Hindu knows where it came from nor one can date its appearance,
1. George A, Grierson, "Bhakti-Marga", ERE. Vol.II, pp*539-551.
2# George A# Grierson, The Narayania and the Bhagavatas, 
ibid,, p.l.
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"but all the official writings which describe it and which 
can he dated with certainty were written long before the 
Christian era. This new idea was that of bhakti. Religion 
was. now no longer a matter of knowledge. It became a matter 
of emotion. It now satisfied the human craving for a supreme 
personality to whom prayer and adoration could be addressed 
in as much as bhakti, which may be translated by faith or 
devotion, requires a personal not an impersonal God.”
The general theories initiated by the western writers 
in connection with bhakti have got well established in Indian 
scholarship/' too• Although in the beginning some differences 
of opinion were registered by men like R.G. Bhandarkar on 
certain aspects of these theories, but the basic definition of 
bhakti, as formulated by the western orientalists, and its 
total identification with Vaishnavism was never questioned by 
the Indian scholars. In their initial speculations on the 
subject on modern academic lines provided by the west, the 
Indian scholars had devoted their attention to only one thing 
in particular - the question of the Christian origins of the 
Bhakti religion. The theories advanced by Weber and others to 
prove the Christian influence in bhakti had to be refuted, and 
the indigenous character of bhakti had to be established on a 
sure footing.
1. George A. Grierson, "Modern Hinduism and its Debt to the 
Nestorians", ibid., pp.313ff*
. Bhandarkar !s approach was obviously dominated by
these considerations. Therefore without examining the full
implications of bhakti against the background of Hinduism,
and without paying attention to the extremely restricted and
improper usage of the term by the western scholars, Bhandar-
kar proceeded on to establish the indigenous nature and
antiquity of bhakti with the support of epigraphic and
1literary evidence. But in so far as he did not question 
the artificial nature of the modern academic definition of 
bhakti, and to the extent that he used it as his premises 
to prove the antiquity of bhakti, Bhandarkar was also 
responsible for perpetuating its current usage in Indian 
scholarship,
To prove that bhakti was older than Christianity 
Bhandarkar sought every possible evidence of the worship of 
Krishna-Vasudeva in the period before the birth of Christ. In 
this connection he drew attention to the inscriptions of 
Ghosundi and Nanaghat belonging to the 2nd and the 1st 
centuries B.C. Similarly he pointed out the significance of 
the Garudadhvaja, the emblem of Vishnu in the column of 
Heliadora at Besnagar belonging to the second century B.C.
1, R.G. Bhandarkar, Vaishnavism., Gaivism and Minor Religious 
Systems, J . Trttbner, Slrassburg, 1913/ PP * 3 t " 29> 3$•
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Bhandarkar referred to the occurrence of the name of Vasudeva
in Panini^ too, and argued that the worship of Vasudeva
1must he regarded as old as Panini. He identified Heracles 
mentioned by Magasthenes as the God worshipped hy the 
Sifaurseni dynasty of Mathura/ with Vasudeva Krishna and 
quoted this as a proof of Vasudeva worship in the fourth 
century B.C. Thus in his own words Bhandarkar had brought 
forth ’'irrefragable evidence of the existence, three or four 
centuries B.C., of a religion with Vasudeva as its central 
figure and a school of his followers, known by the name of 
Bhagavatas.’’^
The main purpose of Bhandarkar was to establish the 
indigenous nature of what was being called the Bhakti 
religion. But in his attempt to do so, he had succeeded in 
proving the antiquity of Krishna-worship only. Since 
Bhandarkar did not question the equation of Krishna-worship 
and bhakti as fixed by the western scholars, his arguments 
were taken as a proof of the antiquity of bhakti in general 
and provided a stronger base for the future writings on the
1. R.G. Bhandarkar, ibid., pp.3~^-*
2. Ibid., p.9*
3. Ibid., p.4.
1subject •
Wot only did Bhandarkar accept the word bhakti in the 
restricted sense of Krishna-worship and Vaishnavism, but he 
also accepted it as a designation for Hindu monotheism as 
assigned by the western scholars. Accepting the concept of a 
personal God as an essential characteristic of monotheism, he 
traced the equivalent of it in the Ekantika—dharma mentioned 
in the Narayania section of the Mahabharata. He described it 
as the religion of the Satvatas*^ and connected it with the 
Panchratras and the Bhagavatas*^ This description and analysis 
of the Ekantika-Dharma was quite compatible with Vaishnavism, 
a sectarian religion which had become identified with bhakti 
in current scholarship, Bhandarkar ■.**» traced the history of 
the Ekant ik a-Pharma, as manifest in the Panchratras and 
Bhagvatas, from its earliest representation in the Narayania. 
section to its more mature manifestations in the Bhagavad-GIta. 
He now described the Bhagavad-Glta as the ,fearliest exposition
i ■      vi. . ■
of the Bhakti-system or the Ekantika-T>harma,,. Bhagavad-G-ita,
!• According to Grierson the paper read by Bhandarkar in 1886 
at the Vienna Oriental Congress, had opened the way for all 
subsequent researches in the subject, G-.A.Gr ierson, JRAS., 
For the First Half Year of 1910, p.172.
2, R.G-, Bhandarkar, ibid., pp.U-8.
3. Ibid., pp.8-13.
Ibid., pp.38-Ul.
5* Ibid,, p.liu
which is an amalgam of many philosophical influences and is 
recognized as an authoritative religious text by all denomina­
tions of the Hindus, and which throws enough weight in favour 
of an impersonal view of God, was thus represented by Bhandarkar 
as a Vaishnava text, and as a work chiefly devoted to a person­
alisation of the impersonal Brahman.
Through this particular approach to the Gita,
Bhandarkar was trying to show that a monotheistic religion, 
having a personal deity as its nucleus, was promulgated in the 
Bhagavad—Gita. Here the impact of western opinion on Bhandarkar 
is quite clear. In attributing a special religion of that 
nature to the Bhagavad-Gita, Bhandarkar was only trying to 
build up his case to refute the western opinions directed 
towards showing the Christian influence on the teachings 
contained in that text. He was. able to show the Hindu ante­
cedents of that religion in the earlier evidence of Krishna- 
worship, and in the Ekant ik a-Dh arm a of the Narayania section 
of the Mahabharata. But in so doing, Bhandarkar had stuck to 
the western definition of monotheism. Without going into the 
question of the fundamental nature and indigenous pattern of 
Hindu monotheism, he had confined himself to the areas 
initially explored by the western writers in their search for 
the monotheistic element in Hinduism. In spite of expressing 
his doubts about the western understanding of the nature of
Hindu theism he continued to follow the established patterns 
and spoke of Hindu monotheism in terms of Vaishnavism and 
Krishna-worship. Thus Bhandarkar's observations on bhakti 
were based entirely on the premises of an artificial 
definition of bhakti as provided by western scholarship. He 
had accepted Vaishnavism as bhakti, and bhakti as- Hindu 
monotheism. He had also accepted the western postulation 
that bhakti and monotheism were possible only in relation to 
a personal God.
Since the days of Bhandarkar a lot more has been 
written on Vaishnavism and bhakti by Indian scholars, but 
without any effort for a fresh start. Every subsequent 
study of bhakti, therefore, has turned out to be a study of 
Vaishnavism and vice versa* The history of Vishpu-worship 
and the evolution of Vaishnavism has been treated as ao
historical development of bhakti, and bhakti is examined
1invariably from a Vaishnava viewpoint. However, sometimes, 
along with this general concentration on Vaishnavism, the
1. See for example:
H .C . Raychaudhuri, ibid.
Munshi Rama Sharma, ibid.
Baladeva Prasad Upadhyaya, Bhagavata Pharma, Nagari 
Prach'ar^nifeabha, Benanas, 1953*
Mrinal Dasgupta, "Graddha and Bhakti in Vedic Literature", 
Indian Historical Quarterly. 1930? PP«315~333 and ^87-513. 
Mrinal Dasgupta, "Early Visnuism and Narayania Worship", 
Indian Historical Quarterly! 1931? pp .93-115? 3^-3~358, 
655-735, ibid., 1952, p-p.bIl.-8U.
spirit and doctrine of bhakti itself is made the focal point
in its study. The spirit of bhakti is then traced back to
the Vedas^particularly to such hymns as addressed to the
1deity Varuna in the Rig-Veda. But in all such contexts 
bhakti is invariably understood as a religious feeling, 
possible only in relation to a personal God. Therefore, 
although certain passages of the Upanishads are also some­
times pointed out as eloquent expressions of theistic 
devotion, great hesitation is shown at the same time to 
acknowledge them as expressions of bhakti in view of the 
absence of a supreme image of a personal Deity in the 
Upanishads. It is argued that there was no scope for a 
bhakti system in the purely abstract and intellectual 
language of the Upanishads. "The anticipation of later 
bhakti doctrines", for this reason, are sought in the 
sectarian doctrines which conceive Brahman in more human and 
emotional terms. It is explained that the earlier 
"indefinite" and "incb^ate" spirit of bhakti was laterJ
defined and systematised in the Bhagavad-Gita and the Bhakti-
1 . "If bhakti means faith in a personal God, love for Him, 
dedication of everything to His service and the attain­
ment of Mok§a or freedom by personal devotion, surely we. 
have all these elements in Varuna worship." S. Radhak- 
rishnan, Indian Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
London 1923? p.108.
2. Vide infra, p . lo^
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1Sutras of Narada and Efandilya. Thus the original hypothesis 
enunciated hy the western scholars, that bhakti is possible 
only in relation to a personal God, and the initial equation 
made by them of bhakti with Krishna-worship and Vaishnavism, 
have persisted in Indian scholarship.
In spite o.f this fixed and definite approach to 
bhakti, certain vagueness and ambiguity of opinion is some­
times detectable in scholars with regard to its exact nature 
and origins. But such instances however do not indicate any 
deviation from the established viewpoint on bhakti. Never­
theless they are a proof and an indication of the initial 
errors involved in treating bhakti as a special religious 
doctrine that had assumed a definite shape through a contin­
uous process of development. This can be well illustrated 
by the following observation made by Radhakrishnan* ^Bhakti 
is a vague term he states^extending from the lowest form of 
worship to the highest life of realisation.” At the same 
time he adds that it '’has had a continuous history in India
p
from the time of the Rig-Veda to the present day.”
&  J ---
Similarly, K. De who otherwise accepts the current
academic theories about the meaning, origin, and history of
1 . Mrinal Dasgupta, "£>raddha and Bhakti in Vedic Literature”, 
ibid., p.332.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p.70U.
bhakti remarks that the origins of bhakti ,!are lost in far
off antiquity” and that ,!its spread over centuries of
obscure religious, cultural, and literary influences has
1made the stages of its growth erratic and undefined.”' But 
on the whole, both Radhakrishnan and Be assiduously adhere 
to the established technical definition of bhakti and accept 
it as a definite and continuous religious tradition standing 
distinct and separate in the general mass of Hinduism.
However, the current technical definition of bhakti 
is universally accepted by both the Indian and the western 
scholars, although it is completely untenable from the stand­
point of the wider meaning and implications of the term 
bhakti in the total context of Hinduism. We have already 
discussed the errors and limitations of the present approach 
to bhakti. We have also shown in the preceding pages that the 
existing ideas about bhakti were artificially conceived by 
certain western scholars in the nineteenth century, and that 
they were formalised in the light of an alien bias.. To a 
great extent the approach of the western scholars was 
determined by certain preconceived notions and value judge- 
ments derived from their own western background. A better 
grasp of their basic measures of judgement and their
1. Sushil Kumar De, Barly History of the Vaishnava Faith 
and Movement in Bengal, Calcutta 1942, p.2.*'
inapplicability to Hinduism, can help us in seeing more 
clearly the artificial aspects of the theories propounded 
by them.
iii. The Main Bias Behind the Bhakti Theories and Its
Western Background
As shown above, the existing theories about bhakti 
rest mainly on two principles and are the result of a total 
reliance on them as the basic measures of judgement for 
evaluating the nature of Hindu theism. One is the recognition 
of an essential division between religion and philosophy. The 
other is the acceptance of a personal conception of God as the 
only adequate proof of theism. The distinctions of the 
conceptual categories of Theism, pantheism, and monotheism 
which lend a more definite character to the present ideas on 
bhakti also rest on an unequivocal acceptance of these two 
principles..
But neither these basic principles nor the fixed and 
current technical distinctions of theism, pantheism and mono­
theism are applicable in the Hindu context. Philosophy and 
religion have never stood apart as two separate entities and 
have not followed separate courses of development in the 
evolution of Hinduism0 Judging from the Hindu standpoint, an 
impersonal view of God can hardly be regarded as an indication
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of an atheistic or non-theistic approach. The standardized 
distinction of pantheism and monotheism also cannot hold its 
ground in the Hindu situation^ since in Hinduism the idea of 
the oneness of G-od and that of the oneness^ of Reality do not 
exclude each other, hut are always found as intertwined and 
inseparahle.
Thus the concepts and standards of judgement which 
have shaped the bhakti theories have in fact no relevance to 
Hinduism, Their application hy western scholars in their 
analysis of Hinduism was not caused hy any direct deductions 
made hy them on the hasis of their acquired knowledge of the 
Hindu religion, hut was a direct result of a hias derived 
from their own western background to the study of an entirely 
different situation. The academic principles of making a 
strict division between religion and philosophy, and of 
explaining both religion and theism in terms of a belief in a 
personal God had taken shape in the west as a result of the 
Christian reaction against the growing trends in modern 
European philosophy to disregard the Christian view of God, 
and to explain Him instead^, in purely abstract and impersonal 
terms. They were inspired by Christian thinking, and were 
formulated in the light of Christian beliefs and the Christian 
conception of the Deity,
In the nineteenth century the two forces of religion
and philosophy had reached their final parting of ways in
Europe and the definition of religion was given now a more
formalised character in isolation from philosophy* Technical
and academic explanations about the true nature of theism
strictly from a Christian standpoint of a personal concept of
God was a significant outcome of these developments. The
nineteenth century Indologists whose names we have connected
with the initiation of the bhakti theories were clearly under
the influence of the contemporary Christian opinion on the
subject of theism and religion, particularly in relation to
philosophy. Therefore, seeking in the Hindu religion/ a pattern
which would fit their own concepts of God and Religion, and of
Theism and Monotheism, they perhaps saw their most fitting
example in Vaishnavism and Vaishnava forms of devotion, and
1named it the bhakti religion,,
The origins therefore, of the main principles on 
which the current ideas about bhakti are based lie in the 
history of the development of modern philosophy in Europe and 
the Christian reaction to it. Although they can be clearly 
understood in relation to Christianity, they can have no 
intrinsic validity in the context of a religion which is 
totally dissimilar and has had a different mode of development. 
Principles which are a direct outcome of a European situation,
1. Vide i
caused by the struggle of religion and philosophy in the 
west, need not be accepted in the Hindu context. But they are 
freely applied in the study of Hinduism, and it is the un­
questioned adherence to them which has resulted in the 
perpetuation of an artificial definition of bhakti.
A detailed study of the conflict which arose in Europe 
between religion and philosophy is undertaken in the following 
pages to explain the origins of the bias inherent in the 
principles which have shaped the current technical definition 
of bhakti. A closer examination of certain developments in 
western philosophy and their challenge to Christianity shows 
more clearly the reasons for the growing bias in the west in 
favour of a strict division between religion and philosophy. 
Similarly, a careful observation of some of the salient 
features of Christian thinking in defence of religion against 
philosophy shows how and why the concept of a personal God 
got finally established in academic deliberations as the sole 
criterion for determining the presence or absence of theism 
in any system of thought or set of beliefs.
The main purpose of the following discussion is to 
substantiate our stand that the principles and measures of 
judgement responsible for the formulation of the existing 
ideas about bhakti are of purely western origin and background. 
It is to show that since they are a direct outcome of a very
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different situation and are conditioned by dissimilar 
factors, they are not relevant in the context of Hinduism. 
Such an analysis is necessary to prove our thesis that the 
current definition of hhakti has been artificially conceived 
in the light of certain alien standards, of judgement. A 
clearer understanding of the western bias against the- total 
background of the European conflict between religion and 
philosophy should provide us with the necessary freedom to 
break away from the present academic position and make a 
fresh approach to bhakti and to Hindu theism and monotheism.
In the seventeenth century, the beginning of modern
philosophy in Europe/ marked a clear break from medieval
Christian scholasticism and ushered in a long period of
conflict between religion and philosophy and between faith
and reason. Whereas earlier it had been possible for men like
St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to demonstrate the harmony
1and compatibility of the two, it was now becoming increas­
ingly difficult for the Christian thought to maintain a 
similar position in the face of the modern intellectual 
developments. The development of the modern schools of
1. As a thinker Augustine had become the norm in every 
department of philosophical enquiry for the succeeding 
centuries. Warfield, ’'Augustine", ERE, Vol.II, 1909>P«222. 
Thomism had become a substitute of AristotS&i'^&u
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philosophy in Europe in the eighteenth century and its 
dominantly rational and empirical trends later created a 
gulf he tween philosophy and religion in western thought 
which continually grew wider throughout the nineteenth 
century.
This resulted in a period of long trial for Christ­
ianity, the like of which had not heen witnessed before.'*" 
Christianity which had guided and controlled European thought 
for so long, and was accepted as a revealed truth, was now 
in danger. So far the Christian truths had been regarded as 
perfect in their revelation, but now a new bias of truth was 
being discovered in philosophy, which to a new class of 
philosophers was of deeper significance than the revealed 
truths of Christianity. Reason was now installed by them as 
the new criterion of truth. Reason, which dwelt in man and 
was self sufficient. It did not require the authority of 
revelation, for no revelation could be totally complete from 
the standpoint of reason. Truth could be discovered through 
human effort and investigation for man was endowed with the 
faculty of reason/ and could formulate his discoveries without 
the aid of divine revelation. Christianity which rested on the
1. Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 
Translation by J.Lewis May, Hollis and Carter, London,
195k9 see in particular "Christianity on Trial”, pp. 3-93*
truth of a divine revelation and was upheld hy faith was hound
to he the first casualIty in this new age of reason. Nothing
could remain exempt from the final tests of reason and nothing
could he accepted as a final mystery, not even the Divine
Revelation embodied in the Christian religion. The mystery of
God also could perhaps be solved by an intellectual enquiry
and a correct application of reason unaided by the authority
of the Gospels and of revelation. But to question the Biblical
revelation was the same as questioning the truth of the
Biblical God, the God of Moses, the God of David. Thus not
only the institutional Christianity, but the Christian God
1himself was now on trial•
The incompatibility of Faith and Reason became grow- 
ingly apparent with the growth of modern European philosophy 
in view of the incompatibility of philosophical explanations 
of God and the Biblical representations of Him. The concept 
of a personal God, fundamental to Christian beliefs, was being 
constantly assailed by the philosophers, and Revelation and 
Divine Mediation were now exposed to the glaring light of 
Reason, Not the dependence on God and obedience to His will 
and laws, but the development of subjective life with the aid 
of Reason and Morality inherent in man, were held forth as a
1. Paul Hazard, ibid., see "The God of the Christians 
Impeached", pp.4U-59•
new value. Not the God who had made His covenant with Adam 
and had re-affirmed it in Jesus Christ, hut Consciousness, 
the Soul, and Spirit were heing described as the Ultimate 
Reality# The new prophets of Reason had not been slow in 
their efforts to understand and explain God, They were 
describing Him in terms of abstractions such as. " infinity” 
and "perfection", as the "Absolute" and the "Ultimate", as 
a "cause" and a "substance". The God of the philosophers 
had no personality. He was not the author of the Divine 
Revelation embodied in the Bible. How could this impersonal- 
ised God, an$ intellectual abstraction, be the true object 
of Christian worship.
From the standpoint of orthodox Christianity, all 
these developments had resulted from the indifference and 
disregard for the authority of the Bible. Christian thinking 
therefore had been suspicious of modern philosophy from the 
very early days of their mutual confrontations. It had become
1, The nature of this dilemma which now confronted the
Christian thinkers stands out very clearly in Pascal (16231 
62). The following words are a part of the "memorial" 
found stitched up in his doublet after his death:
God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,
Not of philosophers and savants 
* * #
He is only found by the ways taught in the Gospel
• o. that they may know thee 
The only true God and him thou has sent 
Jesus Christ 
W.J.Cobb, "Pascal", ERE IX, 1917* P.65U.
increasingly imperative for Christianity to reassert its old 
certainties with a fresh vigour. Biblical truths were fixed 
truths. The advance of philosophy could not be allowed to 
tamper with the personal notion of God whose true nature, the 
truth of whose perfect revelation, and whose mediation in 
human affairs were so clearly conveyed in the Bible. The 
philosophical explanations of God and the intellectual 
reasoning which supported them could be combated only with 
the force of the Christian faith in the Biblical God, who was 
not an Idea or Spirit, but was Personal in character. He was 
the God who had revealed Himself in history, who had sent His 
Son Jesus Christ for the redemption of the sins of man, and 
who had made His will known to mankind.
Thus in the light of Christianity, religion could 
mean only faith and trust in a personal God. Attempts to 
understand Him on other grounds were only deviations. 
Explanations of God in abstract and impersonal terms could be 
regarded only as philosophical speculations, but not as 
religious truths. If faith and reason, and religion and 
knowledge failed to attain a workable compatibility, the 
division between religion and philosophy must be clearly 
marked out.
Reasoning and knowledge might serve a faith fixed in 
a Personal God, but could not supersede it, for religion and
God were matters of the heart and not of the intellect. Not 
knowledge of God hut love for Him as a Person was the very 
essence of religious devotion. The Christian truth of a 
personal God therefore was not to he compromised with the 
philosophical advances. Religion was a different realm from 
philosophy and the God of the philosophers could not he the 
God of religion, the personal God that the Christians had 
known and revered. Nineteenth century Evangelism and theology 
were able to establish all this on a doctrinal basis through 
Christian reasoning. It was finally proved that religion was 
a realm separate from that of philosophy and was self-suffic- 
ient and true in itself.
The following analysis of the challenge of philosophy 
to Christianity, from Descartes to Hegel, brings out certain 
salient points of attack on Christianity. At the same time it 
broadly outlines some characteristic features of Christian 
defence showing its main strongholds and essential objectives 
the fundamentals for which Christianity fought its battles 
and the grounds on which it gained its lasting victories. It 
is also shown how by the nineteenth century the Christian 
thinking was able to isolate religion from philosophy, faith 
from reason, and the personal representation of God from the 
impersonal speculations about Him.
Descartes, who represents the central position of the
new rationalism did concern himself with questions related to
the existence and nature of God, "hut did not formulate his
answers in accordance with the Christian faith* Although he
continued to he a Catholic, he did not recognise God in his
thought system in the light of Christian beliefs* He laboured
to prove instead, the existence of God on grounds of his own
categories of "innate ideas’1 and through an analogy of
mathematical truth* According to him, the innate awareness of
the finite man of his imperfection was in itself a proof of
1something infinite and perfect* Though he did not attack the 
Christian God, Descartes subjected God to mathematical logic, 
and in so doing impersonalised Him* "You can substitute the 
mathematical order of nature for God, whenever I use the
Q
latter term", said Descartes, Descartes' recognition of an 
"innate idea", God, however, was a departure from his logical
(Xc.fcovehl'WJ' ifc Ware
position^frhat. all truths self-evident, and which otherwise
did not allow for any assumptions in reasoned thinking* At 
the same time Descartes did not conform to the Christian 
acceptance of God on the basis of faith and revelation. Thus
1. Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy", 
Meditation III in: The Discourse on Method and Metaphy- 
physical Meditations. Trans, by Gertrude Burford Rawlings, 
Walter Scott, London, 1901.
2. Descartes, quoted, Crane Brinton, Ideas and Menf 
Jonathan Cape, London 1951* p»350.
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neither did he keep God outside his logical system (which 
would have at least maintained a division “between religion 
and philosophy from the start), nor did he work out a 
concept of God completely consistent with the totality of 
his thought and logic* He left behind a philosophical 
situation which was uncertain either way.
The Cartesan explanation of God however was later 
questioned “by Locke, whose rigid empiricism did not allow for
*1
any "innate ideas". Locke was against all a priori methods, 
and was not concerned with the question of spiritual substance, 
whether of the individual self or of God. According to him, 
certainty could be brought to knowledge only by studying the 
source and origin of an idea. As ideas could be derived only 
on grounds of sensation and reflection, no idea could ever
p
exist outside human experience. If there was a substratum,
"a something" which was the cause of ideas, Locke did not wish 
to probe into it. Philosophy^suggested Locke, should not 
concern itself with enquiry into realms which cannot be 
explored by scientific methods of observation.
Since Locke treated philosophy as completely inde­
pendent of religion it could.now push forward without
1. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Book I, Clarendon Pre ss, Oxford 192k.
2* Ibid*a Book II.
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necessarily concerning itself with the questions related to
the nature and existence of God, At the same time Locke
could separate Christianity from his philosophy and could
discuss it on its own terms on grounds of its own scriptural
evidence without its interfering with his otherwise empirical
stand. He saw no need to work out their compatibility, for
according to Locke, the one necessary article of faith for
a Christian was to regard Jesus Christ as the Messiah and
Saviour, and to follow the path shown by Him and His 
1apostles, A similar stand of viewing religion in separation
from one’s general intellectual attitude had been taken
earlier by Hobbes, "The scripture”, according to Hobbes,
’’was written to show unto men the kingdom of God and to
prepare their minds to become His obedient subjects, leaving
the world and the philosophy thereof to the disputations of
2men for,the exercising of their natural reason,"
The ideas of Descartes on God were picked up in a 
different spirit by Spinoza, Taking a stand very different 
from Locke, Spinoza tried to establish the idea of God in 
philosophy through a consistent and logical process. Working
1, John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, as 
delivered in the Scriptures, Awnshawn John Churchill, 
London 1695 •
20 Hobbes, quoted by E,J,E0 Woodbridge in: "Hobbes",
ERE, VI, 1913.
with the concepts of mathematics like Descartes, hut avoid­
ing his dualism of mind and matter, Spinoza managed to 
arrive at a new metaphysics* According to Spinoza, God and 
nature were two different names for the same substance, and 
there was no need of proving either of them. For him God 
was "eternal existence" and could he known through the
science of intuition (scientia intuitiva) which was for him
1a higher category than perception and reason. All things
flowed from eternal existence, and the things known as. well
as the knowing mind shared in it*
Spinoza clearly rejected the anthropomorphism of
Christian theology and the Christian belief in Revelation.
His God could not he explained as a personality because hy
God he meant, "... a being absolutely infinite a
substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
2
expressed eternal and infinite essentiality." According to 
Spinoza, things were not created by God at a certain point 
in history but they flowed from His nature from eternity to 
eternity. The ultimate end of man in relation to God lay 
not in the attitude of obedience and surrender to His will
1. E.E.Kellet, "Spinoza", ERE, XI, 1920, pp.776-77.
See also Spinoza*s Ethics, Part II, prop.XL note ii, 
Everyman*s Library, London 1910.
2. Ibid., Part I, def. VI.
and His defined laws, but in the efforts to gain knowledge 
of Him. Man oould gain knowledge of God only through
Knowledge of his own eternity. This knowledge and conscious­
ness of God constituted for Spinoza a loving attitude towards
God. He described this love as amor intellectualis Del, or
1the intellectual love of God. The concept of a personal 
God was not^necessfJc^B' in Spinozafs doctrine. According to 
him, "God in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and 
consequently the love of God towards men and the intellectual 
love of the mind towards God are identical."
The position taken by Locke and Spinoza, so different 
from each other on the question of God and religion were 
bound to have an impact on the subsequent philosophical 
speculations on the themes. Spinoza was essentially a meta­
physician and God occupied a central position in his thought 
system. Locke on the other hand was a staunch empiricist 
who did not occupy himself with philosophical questions 
related to the. subject of God. Spinoza made no compromises 
with theological ideas of a personal God, and had no 
respect for the traditional faith in the Revelation. Locke 
whose philosophy did not entertain speculation on that
1. Ibid., Part V, proposition XXXII (corollary), proposition 
XXXIII and XXXIV.
2, Ibid., Part V, proposition XXXVI, corollary.
subject could view religion in isolation from bis intellectual 
conviction and could thus endorse the "Reasonableness of 
Christianity".
Both these attitudes - to explain God in terms of an 
Absolute in philosophy, and to keep Him out of philosophical 
speculation - can be seen in the later philosophers. Whereas 
new queries were posed, and new answers were elicited in 
metaphysics on grounds of the former attitude, the latter 
type of approach opened up the possibilities of a complete 
segregation of religion and philosophy, as well as of 
scepticism regarding the validity of God and religion as they 
could not fully withstand the tests of empiricism. If on one 
hand, Leibniz and Berkeley struggled with the metaphysical 
questions, David Hume, on the other, raised a new and 
meaningful voice of scepticism on the subject of God and 
religion, which influenced the whole of the eighteenth 
century thought.
Both Leibniz and Berkeley, through pure rationalism 
and empirical reasoning respectively, tried to repudiate the 
position of Spinoza by placing God outside the universe. 
Leibniz, in his scheme of harmonious, self-sufficient, and 
active monads, thought of a sufficient reason, existing out­
side the universe, which alone could explain its creation and 
harmonious functioning. This reason was the God of Leibniz-—
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a God/was the author of the "pre-established harmony1® of the 
monads, and the creator of the universe« But though existing 
outside the universe, and its primary cause, philosophically 
the God of Leibniz was not very much more than an "original 
simple substance11 The God of Berkeley, on the other hand 
with His position fixed as separate from the universe, was 
more active than the God of Leibniz.. Berkeley conceived God 
as the "Eternal Invisible Mind"^ who produces and sustains 
all things, and who can affect man "every moment with all the 
sensible impressions" he perceives. Ideas are not self- 
sufficient. They require an entity in which they can abide. 
Although Leibniz too had emphasised the nature of God as the 
creator and His entity as separate from the Universe, it was 
the philosopher-priest Berkeley, who succeeded in explaining 
God in terms more acceptable to Christians, for he was able 
to formulate an idea of God in the field of metaphysics which 
was, compatible with the Christian beliefs. He described God 
as the Divine Creator and Guide who alone could sustain and 
lend meaning to the human phenomenon.
1. G-.W. Leibniz, The Monadology and other Philosophical 
Writings, transl. by R.Latta, Clarendon Press, London 
1898, Section U7.
20 George Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge", section 
Skf in: Essays, Principles, Dialogues with Selections from 
Other Writings, edited by M. Whiton Calkins, Charles 
Scribners & son, London 1929•
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But even the "spiritual Realism" of Berkeley could
not stop the rising tides of doubt and unbelief on subjects
pertaining to God and religion. Hume, a contemporary of
Berkeley suggested that metaphysics of God and soul did not
constitute rational knowledge. Although Humefs stand was that
of a sceptic, and not of an atheist he had no sentiment or
respect for the Christian religion. The scepticism of Hume,
armed with his theories of human nature, causality, and belief;
brought the greatest damage to Christianity. Through his
analytic method Hume tried to reach the very source and nature
of religion and analysed it as an aspect of human nature. "An
opinion or belief", according to Hume was only "a lively idea
1
related to, or associated with, a present impression". Sure 
belief could be formed only through an apprehension of the 
content of an impression or our immediate experience* Beliefs 
based on indirect evidence and hearsay were only vague and 
uncertain ideas, the mystery of which could be solved by 
tracing the original impressions which caused them* Hume 
therefore wanted to subject religious beliefs to drastic, 
abstract, and experimental reasoning. Speaking of Christianity, 
he said, "Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on 
reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to
1, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part III, 
Section VII, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1888.
such a trial as it is hy no means fitted to endure."^-
Hume's "grand academic design", The Natural History 
of Religion, was a psychological and historical analysis of 
the phenomenon of religion, which had no relevance to 
Christianity, and was the opposite pole of all ideas about 
God Derived from a basic faith in Divine Revelation. Hume was 
not concerned with an enquiry into the nature of philosophi­
cal religion, but was to probe into "the religious beliefs 
and behaviour of the masses of mankind, viewing them 
clinically as a widespread reality of conduct and not as an
p
approach to truth." He had clarified his aim at the very 
outset. His Natural History of Religion was an enquiry into 
the foundations of religion in reason, and its origin in 
humanrnature. This was a position far-removed from the 
simple but unfailing trust in Divine Revelation and the 
conception of a personal God, the two factors of great 
significance for Christian belief.
1. Hume, quoted, Basil Willey, The 18th Century Background, 
London, 1957* p.129.
2. Frank E. Manuel, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods., 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass,., 1959> p.170.
3- David Hume stated "As every enquiry which regards religion 
is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in 
particular which challenge our attention, to wit, that 
concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning 
its origin in human nature." David Hume, Four Dessertat- 
ions By David Hume, A.Miller, London 1757 > p«l»
The guestions concerning the nature and existence of 
God were finally brought to a blind alley by Hume!s scepticism* 
His approach not only made a mockery of Christian faith and 
theology, but also raised doubts about the efficacy and 
validity of all speculative attempts at a cognition of God*
In view of Hume’s approach to religion and metaphysics not 
only the Christian God but also the God of the philosophers 
stood in need of further justification on fresh grounds* It 
was Emmanuel Kant, who finally found the way out of Hume’s 
scepticism and placed European philosophical thought on a new 
and more definite track* But Kant was not concerned with the 
question of the ultimacy of God as. an entity existing outside 
of man* Although in his earlier works, Kant had spoken of "an 
unconditionally necessary being1' and of a ,fnecessary extra- 
mundane substance1', and had sought rational proofs for the 
"Being of God", in the more vital years of his philosophical 
career he declared that all questions connected with the
existence of God fall "outside the legitimate limits of
1speculative investigation". He examined the rationally 
possible proofs of the existence of God and dismissed them as 
mere fallacies.
The forces of reason now, in the newly fashioned garb 
of Kantian philosophy, reasserted their former challenge to
1* A.E. Taylor, "Theism : Kant", ERE XII, 1921, pp.275-276.
traditional Christianity. In his Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant marked out a new way of reasoning, which by its very 
nature was. to prove detrimental to every form of faith 
derived from authority, every concept of the ultimacy of 
God as the power residing outside the human, and all beliefs 
in divine intervention* For Kant, not God, but the human 
mind, was the centre of all things. According to him all 
causal relations could be found in human reason, which was 
capable of operating alone, without resorting to anything 
other than itself. For Kant the unconditioned, the real, 
and the positive could reside only within man, in his reason 
and in his moral sense.
God as an acting agent separate from man, His will 
and mediation, had no significance in Kantian philosophy. Kant 
believed in an "intelligible realm of spirit", which, carrying 
the force of a moral law within it, vindicated itself as, a 
moral agent. The only possible religion, according to him, 
was that of "Duty" and "morality". Not the divine will, but 
principles capable of universal application, and the moral 
sense innate to man, were regarded by Kant as the foundations 
of such a religion. Kant explained this as the R^eligion 
within the Limits of Mere Reason*. This was a very different 
position from that of Christianity.
£-
The new vistas thrown open by Kant s transcendent
reason for metaphysical speculations found a rich expression 
in the German Idealists during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were all concerned with 
the ultimate nature of existence and made "mind" the pivotal 
point of their thought. They evolved a philosophy of the 
’spirit’ and ’self’, the Absolute, which Hegel tried to make 
compatible with the God of religion.
Fichte formulated a metaphysical viewpoint on the 
basis of Kant’s epistemology and logic. Accepting the Kantian 
principle of the.unity of self-consciousness, Fichte developed 
his idea of the "ego", a unity which could include everything
in existence and knowledge. Fichte described the principle
of self-consciousness as self-luminious which required no
proofs, but could be known through intellectual intuition.
Schelling developed the idea of the ego still further by
removing the difference between the ’ego ’ and the ’non-ego’
of Fichte. Rejecting the dualism of nature and spirit, he
explained the universe as an organism dominated by a common
soul. Schellingfs philosophy was a philosophy of identity, in
which reason or intelligence was the self-identical absolute,
and self-consciousness, the highest form of intelligence. The
philosophical position of both Fichte and Schelling was far
1removed from the Christian ideology.
1• History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, edited by
S. Radhakrishnan, 2 Vols. George Allen & Unwin, 19539 
Vol.II, pp.263-268.
It was Hegel who finally made out a rational and 
confident case for an agreement between religion and philosophy 
over the fundamental question of the Ultimate or the Absolute* 
Religion according to him was not a sphere of reality, hut 
was an attitude towards it as "the object of the religious- 
attitude is the Absolute in its unity, in its completeness, 
in its truth". Philosophy, he pointed out, was concerned with 
the understanding of the same reality* Both deal with the 
same content, though the way they grasp it assumes different 
forms* The Absolute of philosophy was not different from the 
G-od of religion, Hegel stated, since there could not be two 
truths about the Absolute, which is the Supreme Truth and is 
One• ^
Although Hegel showed some eagerness in pointing out 
the common ground between religion and philosophy, as is 
understandable in the light of his early theological training 
and his Christian sentiments, he never compromised the ultimacy 
of philosophy and its innate superiority over religion. Only 
the former, as a system of pure reason, could serve as the 
final repository of truth. Religious forms were only symbolical 
representations, and were therefore inadequate in explaining 
the essential nature of God as Absolute Spirit. Hegel
1. J.B. Baillie, "Hegel”, ERE VI. 1913, pp.5&+-87
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explained that a symbolical representation of truth was com­
pelled by its own dialectic to pass on to the supreme form of 
the "notion", which alone could embody the finality of truth. 
According to Hegel the realm of !notions! was philosophy, and 
not religion.
On grounds of a similar logic, Hegel forged ahead to 
establish the finality of the Absolute of philosophy in 
relation to the God of religion. Hegel viewed Reality as a 
development of the Absolute mind going through the unceasing 
process of dialectic. The Absolute of Hegel, in other words, 
was a self-evolving spirit - the Absolute Idea of his Logic - 
which was infinite and self-determinant in character. Only a 
spiritual and an idealistic relationship could be sustained 
between this Absolute and the universe. The Absolute was 
grasped in religion only through "symbolical representations" 
and "pictorial thinking", but its true essence lay in the 
Idea. The description of God in religion as the Creator, the
King, and the Father, were only pictorial representations 
of the Absolute and were therefore limited explanations of 
reality.'*'
According to Hegel, though the modes of realisation 
were essential to both religion and philosophy, it was. in 
philosophy and not in religion that the highest expression
I* Ibid.. p.566.
of the self-conscious spirit could he found. Speculation was
the final stage and crown of the life of spirit. Feeling,
essential to religion, and the Idea, essential to speculation,
led to the same end according to Hegel, because the self-
manifestation in religion as well as the self-articulation in
speculative science proceed from the same spirit. When spirit
realises itself by recovering itself from its self-alienated
otherness, it becomes the Absolute* Thus the "revelation of
God to man in religion and God's revelation of Himself to
1Himself in infinite spirit" were one and the same thing. 
Although Hegel accepted the notion of religion as real in its 
essence, and as an expression of the Absolute Spirit, he also 
pointed out that in religion "the real is cast in the mould 
of history and is bound up with the course of time", making 
the evolution of the notion of religion also an evolution of 
a historical reality,
Hegel's philosophy came as a fresh challenge to 
Christian thought. The earlier philosophers had either 
rejected the traditional ideas on God and religion, or had 
cautiously questioned their validity. Some of them had not 
concerned themselves with these questions, whereas some others 
had formulated their own ideas on them. Hegel on the other 
hand clearly recognized the validity of religion and the truth
1. Ibid,. po585o
of God represented in it* But he created a crisis by asserting 
the superiority of philosophy over religion, and of the 
Absolute of philosophy over the God of religion. This was 
perhaps a greater danger for Christianity than those which it 
has confronted before.
Faith in the Biblical God was fundamental to Christ­
ianity. From the Christian standpoint therefore, philosophy 
could not be allowed to tamper with the personal notion of 
God whose true nature, the truth of whose perfect revelation, 
and whose mediation in human affairs were so clearly conveyed 
in the Bible. The Biblical truths were fixed truths and must 
be held as sacrosanct in spite of the advances made in human 
knowledge and reasoning. This was the attitude which 
determined the line of Christian defence against the dangers 
caused by the new trends in philosophy. Both the Christian 
image of a personal God and the authority of the Bible were 
now freshly emphasised.
But the attempts made by Christian thought in that 
direction could ignore neither the new intellectual climate 
nor the two great watchwords of the age, "Reason" and "Nature". 
For a long time scriptural exegesis and religious publications 
aimed at arguing out the case for Christian beliefs, through 
the accepted norms of reasoning, to prove their compatibility 
with the new found laws of Reason and Nature. The old Christian
8 2
certainty of* faith were cast in the new mould of reason with 
the free application of "both the rationalism of Descartes and 
the empiricism of Locke, as a result of which, soon a new kind 
of Christian scholarship took shape which relied more on 
methods of intellectual explanation and rational persuasion 
than on appeals to faith and innate religious feelings of the 
heart
Although an intense intellectual activity of this 
kind was a predominant feature of the Christian response, 
the greater and more effective support for the Christian 
certainties however came not from them, hut from another 
source, the main inspiration of which was rooted essentially 
in faith and religious feelings. Movements such as that of 
John Wesley contributed much more towards religious revivalism 
than the rational efforts of the theologians and Christian 
intellectuals. For Wesley the true Christian faith was not 
an intellectual acceptance of the orthodox opinion hut was a 
vital act of faith and a hahit of soul trusting in Christ and 
abiding in Him. This habit of Christian devotion could be 
cultivated only through a constant awareness of the personal 
and Biblical God, and the eternal hope of salvation in Christ, 
His Son. Belief in God as a person and in His revelation 
through the person of Christ was therefore a fundamental
1* I?u^Ka21aIl(3-> ibid.« pp.73-86.
characteristic of the more powerful movements of religious 
revivalism.
Another important feature of religious revivalism of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a greater and a 
more strict adherence to the Gospel. A complete acceptance of 
the Scriptural authority, as an act of faith, was declared 
essential for Christian devotion. Intellectual explanations 
and understanding of the Scriptural truths had not proved 
sufficient and could never serve as proper substitute for the 
blessedness of a fervent faith. On the contrary, theological 
activities in that direction had confused the true nature of 
faith, which by its very nature could be self-sufficient and 
needed no support from the intellect. The Gospel must be 
approached in the spirit of faith and not in that of 
intellectual enquiry. The latter path had shown many pitfalls 
and had led some theologians to exercise so much freedom in 
interpreting the Biblicab text that finally they had lapsed 
into expounding views which were far removed from the basic 
position of the Christian faith.
The Evangelical movement of the nineteenth century 
which contributed so much towards religious revivalism was a 
vigorous affirmation of the completeness of the Biblical 
truths and the value of a fixed religious faith. It clearly 
pointed out the "divine inspiration, authority, and the self-
sufficiency of the Holy Scriptupes" and was primarily 
dedicated to the promotion of the interests of ”Scriptural 
W  » .  of in « .  ~ntt„
depravity of human nature”, the incarnation of the Son of 
G-od and His atonement for the sins of mankind, and the 
Trinity of the Persons in the unity of Godhead, were some 
of the points which served as the doctrinal basis of the 
Evangelical .Alliance of 181+6.
Both the eighteenth century Methodism enunciated by 
John Wesley and the subsequent expression of Evangelism in 
the nineteenth century show the same spirit. There is an 
evidence in both of the Christian keenness to uphold the 
personal image of God and to emphasise the value of simple 
faith and religious feeling as against the intellectual 
approach to religion and doctrinal theology. The emphatic 
assertions of Methodism and Evangelism in these directions 
i^ere a culmination of similar assertions made by Christianity 
at the very outset of its trial against philosophy. In the 
seventeenth century, the same attitudes were reflected in the
p
development of the "Covenant Theology" and the contemporary 
movement which is generally referred to as "Pietism". The
1. David S. Schaff, ".Evangelical Alliance", ERE V . 1912, p.601.
2. W. Adams Brown, "Covenant Theology", ERE IV, 1911, pp.216-
22k.
3. E.S. Waterhouse, "Pietism", ERE X, 1918, pp.6-9.
emphasis on the idea of the Covenant in theology was at the 
same time an equally strong assertion of the idea of a 
personal God. Similarly, seventeenth century Pietism was an 
expression of the Christian awareness of the incompatibility 
of "Faith” and "Reason”. Spener, the leading figure of the 
Pietist movement had explained that neither "correct 
knowledge” nor the "illumination of understanding” was so 
important to religion as; the feelings of the heart and the 
"stimulation of the will”.
Another important development of the nineteenth 
century deserves our attention in the present context. A new 
basis for modern Protestant theology was. now offered in an 
academically reasoned manner by the German philosopher-priest, 
Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher explained feeling as the most 
fundamental part of religion. Although he stated that the 
different religions of the world represented different forms 
of "Fundamental religious consciousness”, he closely connected 
his theory of religionjas feeling^with Christianity. Christ­
ianity, according to him was not a body of doctrine, but was 
a "condition of heart" - a mode of consciousness making itself 
known in a devout feeling of dependence on God. In this 
reliance on feeling, we find in Schleiermacher a continuation 
of the Pietist Stand of Spener and others who had earlier
1, W.B. Selbie, "Schleiermacher”. ERE XI, 1920, pp.236-239*
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explained the nature of religion on those lines. He further 
fortified that Stand and gave it the status of a doctrine 
and a philosophical theory.
Although Schleiermacher was inclined towards 
philosophy, he was essentially a Christian theologian and 
never denied the necessity of a personal G-od as the object 
of devout religious feelings. He saw in Christianity a 
religion of redemption and reconciliation - the ’'action of 
God in response to” the strivings of man, and in Jesus Christ 
’.'the one Mediator to men”, Schleiermacher sought a philoso­
phical basis for religion, opening up possibilities of 
reasoning in theology, he always accepted the Christian 
premises of a personal Cod, Revelation, and Divine mediation. 
His theological efforts were in fact directed towards 
reforming and re-stating Protestant theology by ’’making 
religious experience or the sense of dependence on Cod 
mediated through Jesus Christ, the norm of dogmatic theology 
rather than the Creeds, the fathers or the unaided human
p
reason”. Modern Protestant theology, subsequent to 
Schleiermacher, reflects his basic attitude of reasoning and 
philosophical theorisation about religion, accompanied by 
strong affirmation of the Christian certainties.
1. Ibid,, p ,238•
2, Ibid., p.237.
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Thus not hy pure reasoning hut hy upholding the 
authority of the Gospel, Christianity was ahle to win its 
final victories through an assertion of its old certainties 
on grounds of faith and religious feeling* Only a personal 
concept of God could trulyvindicate the truth of the Biblical 
God, who was not to he confused with the God of the philosoph­
ers, Religion and philosophy had to he recognised as two 
clearly separate Only a fixed faith in a personal
God and the doctrinal feelings caused hy such a faith could 
he accepted as the true ingredients of Religion'and Theism, 
Intellectual enquiry and reasoning ahout God and the
descriptions of Him in impersonal and abstract terms, could 
he viewed only as philosophical speculations.
As discussed earlier, the academic attitudes based 
on these considerations have played a great part in the 
shaping of the bhakti theories, identifying it with Vaishna- 
vism, and explaining Vaishnavism as Hindujfcheism and monotheism. 
But whereas the division between Religion and Philosophy can 
he easily understood and accounted for in the Christian 
context against the background of the long struggle between 
the two in the west, generalisations on its basis to regard 
Religion and Philosophy as exclusive of each other in a 
completely dissimilar situation can hardly he justified. The 
treatment of philosophy and Religion as two different and
separate areas of thought may he perfectly valid in the 
former case, hut the extension of the same principle and its 
application to the Indian situation, where the two are always, 
found interlinked, has led only to misconceptions. It is 
necessary therefore to make a fresh reappraisal of bhakti and 
of Hindu theism and monotheism in isolation from these 
considerations.
iv• A Re-assessment of Hindu Theism and Monotheism
The formulation of the present ideas of bhakti as a
Hindu archetype of monotheism, its complete identification
with Vaishnavism, and its further elaboration in terms of a * 7
theistic religion of loving devotion to a personal God as 
opposed to the intellectual approach and exclusive character 
of Brahminism, could he possible only through an evasion of 
the real nature and indigenous pattern of Hindu monotheism.
We have argued that such ideas could take shape only with the 
assistance of certain technical theories about the essentials 
of theism, and with the guidance of a line of division between 
philosophy and religion. Only in the light of these considera­
tions could monotheism be placed in the Vaishnava sect and 
the true characteristics of religion, as different from 
philosophy, attributed to it, to make it stand apart from the 
Brahminic thought.
It was the search for a Hindu pattern which would fit 
the western definition of monotheism, which resulted in 
interpreting the exaltation of the personality of Vishnu to 
the highest position hy the Vaishnavas, as an expression of 
true monotheism.^ But if Vaishnavism is regarded as a 
monotheistic expression of Hindu religion on these grounds, 
all similar Hindu sectarian phenomena for identical reasons, 
must also he regarded as the same. Paradoxically enough, on 
the hasis of the same argument, Hinduism can appear as an 
amalgam of many monotheisms - a position, which can hardly he 
regarded as tenahle. Hindu monotheism however must he 
examined in its proper perspective without preoccupation with 
non-Hindu definitions of monotheism.
1. Grierson's exposition of Vaishnavism as the monotheistic 
religion of India was clearly inspired hy this considera­
tion. He introduced his study "The Monotheistic Religion of 
Ancient India and its Descendant the Modern Indian Doctrine 
of Faith" as a refutation of the following view expressed 
hy an eminent English divine: "One of the greatest 
obstacles to the spread of Christianity amongst educated 
men in India is the fact that a false philosophy has gone 
far to undermine and destroy the presuppositions of natural 
religion which render the evidence for the truth of Christ­
ianity credible. When the idea of a personal God, Who has 
created and rules the world and Who cares for and loves the 
creatures whom He has made, has been obscured and lost, it 
is difficult to bring home to men the probability of a reve­
lation or the reasonableness of the Incarnation." - Grierson 
explained that the above view pertained to the "pantheism of 
the Vedanta school of Indian philosophy" which was "pro­
fessed only by a certain number of learned Brahmans" and 
that "monotheism could be traced in Vaishnavism, which as a 
religion was as monotheistic as Christianity»" George A. 
Grierson, The Monotheistic Religion of Ancient India, 
ib id.. PP*3"Uj see also pp.11-12.
It is important to recognize that Hindu monotheism 
has not taken shape through the denial of gods for God, hut 
has been the result of the identification of all gods in God. 
It is equally important to bear in mind that Hindu philosophi­
cal monism, which is described as Hindu pantheism by the 
western scholars, can in no way be regarded as an antithesis 
of monotheism in the Hindu context.
It is not possible to define Hindu theism in terms 
of a single dogma or doctrine. Hor can its nature be clearly 
outlined on grounds of any one scriptural text, as is possible 
in the case of the Christian and Islamic theisms which are 
directly rooted in the Bible and the Quran. Hindu theism can 
be properly ascertained only in the light of some central idea 
or belief, common and essential to every practising sect and 
every articulate expression of Hindu religious thinking. In 
spite of the wide, scope of Hinduism and its multiple doctrinal 
aspects, it should not be difficult therefore to define its 
basic theism without resorting to the fixed western theories 
about religion, and the line of division between religion 
and philosophy. But this new ground cannot be discovered 
without abandoning the present academic habit of applying 
ready-made theories of western origin to the Indian situation 
and without directing our attention to the indigenous 
classification and distinction of the astika and nastika 
religions, which the Hindus have always known and recognized.
The true nature of Hindu theism must he sought in 
those bonds of common belief which were responsible for 
holding together numerous thought systems and sects in the 
larger unity of the astikas and by asserting which, the 
astikas were always able to maintain their theistic unity 
against the atheistic or the nastika trends of thought. The 
strongest link uniting all the astikas was the common belief 
in the ultimate Reality of the Atman or the soul and in its 
eternity and immutability. On account of this, every astika 
explanation of God, irrespective of its particular source of 
origin, could make Him consonant with the principle of the 
Atman. This holds true of both the diversity of the religio- 
philosophical speculations of the astika systems and of the 
worship of the numerous deities by the various astika sects. 
Thus, amongst the Hindus, the final acceptance of one God has 
taken shape around the understanding of God through an imper­
sonal abstraction of Him in an idea, and through the recogni­
tion of all philosophical speculations concerning God not as 
mere intellectual abstractions but as an integral part of 
religious thinking.
The use of the western criteria therefore, of the 
concept of God of an essentially personal nature and of a 
definition of religion which must isolate it from philosophi­
cal thinking was bound to cau.se some serious errors in the
understanding of the Hindu theism.and 4 strict adherence to 
them has been responsible for the present explanations of the 
total Hindu theism in terms of the worship of personal deities 
such as Vishnu and in terms of some aspecWthe Hindu sectarian 
zeal to maintain the supremacy of the personal character of 
the sectarian deities. The significance, however, of the 
impersonalised idea of God, and the constant identification 
of religion and philosophy in Hinduism must not be under­
estimated in a proper assessment of the Hindu theism, for it 
has a distinct character of its own. Neither the presence or 
absence of a concept of a personal God nor the dividing line 
between religion and philosophy can have any validity in 
judging the nature of Hindu theism.
The Hindu theism does not emanate from any belief in 
a Divine Revelation fixable in historical time, nor is it 
based on a belief in God's declaration of the finality of His 
will and law through any one personality. The beginnings of 
Hindu theism cannot be traced back to a revelation of God 
as an outward cosmic force seeking out man and working for 
his redemption, but can be detected rather in man's awareness 
of Him as the One and only cosmic truth in the human yearning 
to know and understand Him. A contemplative .and philosophical 
approach to God clearly marks the entire evolution of Hindu 
theism, and the authoritative scriptures of the Hindus, for
that reason, are regarded as the works of seers and are not 
viewed as an embodiment of the "revealed will of God". An 
equally important feature of Hindu theism is the abstract and 
impersonal representation of God, accepted by all Hindus in 
spite of their sectarian differences and the different deities 
worshipped by them. Thus in Hinduism, as acknowledged by Renou, 
religion and philosophical speculation "have gone hand in hand
i
from the very outset"* Consequently, an impersonal and 
immanent view of the Godhead has always formed an integral 
part of Hindu theism. It must be fully recognized that the 
Hindu philosophy, in spite of its hair-splitting polemics has 
always been concerned with the religious; and that the Hindus, 
in spi t® of the multiplicity of the vulgar manifestations of 
their religion, have always accepted the speculative approach 
as religious* Thus metaphysics and philosophy cannot be 
separated from Hindu theism* The latter therefore, must be 
determined in the light of the total religio-philosophical 
thought of the Hindus,
As in the case of Hindu theism, a correct understand­
ing of Hindu monotheism also requires a different perspective 
from the one offered by western theorisation in general about 
the true nature of monotheism* As pointed out earlier, the 
present conceptual category of monotheism with its full 
implications can be held valid only in relation to religions
1* Louis Renou, Hindu!sm, London 1961, p#8.
of Semitic origin, and cannot be correctly applied to the 
Hindu situation. The shaping of Hindu monotheism constitutes 
a very different pattern from that of the Christian and 
Islamic monotheisms which had assumed their present shape on 
grounds of revelation, and the subsequent negation of all the 
gods worshipped before in favour of the One true God who was 
conceived as a personality* In the total context of Hinduism, 
however, the final acceptance of the Deity as an Impersonal 
Absolute and the identification of all the gods with it, have 
served as the keystone of monotheism. These factors, and not 
the final emergence of the personality of any one deity as the 
one true God, are the base on which Hindu monotheism rests. 
This must be fully recognized if its nature is to be properly 
understood.
Although a number of gods are mentioned in the Vedas,
they are finally reduced to an Absolute in the Upanishads
1through a process of intuition and analysis. The notion of
the Atman disposed of many gods, as well as the one God
& 2 conceived as somthing different from the human soul. The
speculation and reasoning which is freely used in the
1* Karlo Formishi, "The Dynamic Element in Indian Religious 
Development", Visva-Bharati Quarterly^ 1926-27? April 
1926, pp.16-28, July 1926, pp.113-24, October 1926, 
pp.213-235, 333-350.
2* Ibid.., p.34U.
Upanishads to explain the Absolute cannot be regarded as non­
religious nor can this Absolute of Hindu metaphysics be 
regarded as different from the Hindu concept of God, Here God, 
the Absolute, who supersedes all the other deities, and in 
whom they are all subsumed, does not appear as an outward 
personal force, but is felt and known and takes shape in the 
human mind itself. In the Hindu context, whenever speculation 
and discursive knowledge fail, the understanding of God takes 
shape in human intuition* For example, according to the Katha
Upanishad, "He is framed by the heart, by the thought, by the
1 ' /mind." Similarly Svetas^ivatara Upanishad states that "God
the maker of all, the Great Spirit is fashioned by the heart,
2the understanding and the will." God understood as this has 
been recognized as one, from the very early stages of Hindu 
speculation, in spite of the multitude of gods mentioned in 
their scriptures* The truth of the oneness of God, the 
Ultimate Reality, remains the same, though it is variously 
explained. God as the Absolute and "Ultimate Reality is not 
thought of as a mere philosophical abstraction or a lifeless 
intellectual doctrine, but is mentioned with all the fervour 
and adoration that religion can claim for Him. It is not a
1 o Kathopanishad, VI • 9 •
^vet^s^vat^ra Upanishad IV.17* 
3* Rig Veda I.16U.U6; X.11^.5.•9............. ...
dead and "chilling’' "intellectual abstraction" hut is
fervently regarded as the goal which all the Vedas rehearse
and all the austerities proclaim. It is described as the
Reality which captures affection in changing forms because
2
it is eternal and everlasting.
The Hindu monotheism has thus taken shape around the 
"idea" of the oneness of God, and not through the acceptance 
of any one unique divine personality as God superseding the 
lesser gods. The belief in the oneness of God here does not 
remain only a matter of faith and acceptance of the supremacy 
of the personality of an accepted Higher God, but is linked 
with the knowledge and understanding of Him as an impersonal 
truth. The Hindu worship of personal deities such as Vishnu, 
£>iva and the host of others would have meant nothing more 
than a gross polytheism without the super-imposition of this 
idea of the oneness of God. In the total context of Hinduism, 
it is the identification of these personal deities with that 
idea which lends validity to their worship as God*
The Hindu personalistic polytheism thus converges 
into a monotheism through the acceptance of the truth of the 
philosophical idea of the oneness of God. Manifestations of
1* Kathopanishad 11.15* 
2® Atharva Veda X.8.23*
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polytheism could continue only on the grounds of the universal 
acceptance of the oneness of God in that sense* The sects for 
which the worship of a particular personal deity is of 
fundamental importance, at least in their theology always
? Yidentified the# sectarian deities with this idealised view 
of God. It is only hy doing so that they were ahle to exalt 
a particular deity to the supreme position of exclusive 
significance in relation to the others. Since this is done 
not hy one, hut many sects to uphold the worship of their 
sectarian deities, such an exaltation of a personal deity to 
the highest single status hy one particular sect can hardly 
he accepted as the culminating point of Hindu monotheism.
v. Bhakti Reinterpreted
The word hhakti is derived from the root hha,i hy
adding the suffix ktin (ti). The suffix ktin is usually added
*1to a verh to form an action or agent noun. According to the 
rules of Panini, hhakti indicates a hhava or condition^
( v/Sha j+ti) „ The root hha,j however can convey any of the 
following meanings: - to partake of, to engage in, and to turn 
and resort to, to pursue, practise or cultivate; to declare 
for, prefer, or choose; to serve and honour, and to love and
1 . Panini, Ashtadhyayi, III.3*9U. 
P. Ihid., 111.3,18.
adore. Thus, “bhakti can mean participation as. well as 
resorting to. It can mean experience as well as. practice and
1cultivation. It can also mean reverence, love and adoration.
Bhakti, therefore is a general and a relative term,
which can be used in any of the above meanings in a wide
range of contexts, the object of bhakti remaining a variable 
2factor. Its nature, therefore, can assume a characteristic 
and particular form, only when it is viewed in relation with 
the object towards which it is directed.
Nevertheless, the word bhakti is generally used in
1 . A closer look at the usage of the term bhakti in the 
classical Sanskrit literature can testify this. The 
semantic studies of bhakti by E.Washburn Hopkins, MrInal 
Dasgupta and J. G-onda deserve a mention here. Hopkins 
provides us with a study of its usage in the Mahabharata, 
and M. Dasgupta of that in the Vedic literature. G-onda 
however has chosen a much wider scale and includes the 
writings of the medieval Vaishnava acharyas in his study. 
All these studies show that the word bhakti is not used in 
the classical texts in its present technical meaning. All 
the three authors agree on that and make definite state­
ments to that effect. Nevertheless, none of these scholars 
has. rejected the modern academic definition of bhakti in 
spite of these findings.
E.W.Hopkins, ”The Epic Use of Bhagavat and Bhakti’’, UNAS, 
1911, for second half year, pp.727-73^*
Mrinal Dasgupta, ”&raddha and Bhakti in Vedic Literature”, 
ibid.,
J.Gonda, ”Het Begrip Bhakti”, Tijdschrift voor Philosophic, 
Utrecht, Feb. 19kQ*
2. Panini, ibid., IV.3*95-100.
the context of religion and in the sense of devotion to God.
But even in its particularised religious meaning, as long as 
hhakti is directed to God as the one Ultimate Reality, it can 
mean devotion only in a general way irrespective of the 
variations and distinctions caused in its form and manner hy 
the conceptual difference of beliefs and doctrines regarding 
the nature of God* To the extent that the different traditions 
of the Hindus have conceived and worshipped God in different 
ways, bhakti has found different formal expressions in them.
At the same time in the sense of devotion, it remains common 
to all the theistic religio-philosophical systems of thought. 
Consequently, instances of ready agreement between different 
schools of philosophy on grounds of devotion are also not rare. 
Our understanding of bhakti therefore, must take into account 
its general character as devotion and must recognize the 
possibilities of its different expressions. Similarly, our 
assessment of the nature of bhakti in a particular religious 
tradition must bear relation with the nature of the cognition 
of God found therein.
It is wrong, therefore, to confine bhakti to certain 
sects alone. It is equally wrong to explain that it is 
compatible with only those religious patterns which provide 
the image of a personal God# Bhakti in its general sense as 
shown above has intrinsic possibilities in relation to both,
100
the saguna and the nirguna view of God since "both find recog­
nition in the totality of Hindu "beliefs and Hindu modes of 
worship® To the extent that the devotee accepts and worships 
God in His nirguna aspect his hhakti is towards the nirguna 
Brahman, and he too is a bhakta. Similarly, hhakti cannot "be 
confined to the Vishnu hhaktas alone® Vaish:p.ava devotion 
whether towards Vishnu or towards his incarnations, Rama and
o '
Krishna can he interpreted only as Vishnu-bhakti and not as 
hhakti pure and simple® The different ways of explaining the 
nature of God however, are related rather to the realm of
Siddhanta than to that of Sadahna.
Thus hhakti hy itself does not imply any special
/concept or doctrine pertaining to the nature of God* To
describe hhakti as a kind of religion or a religious doctrine 
is also a fallacy* In the Hindu context the word dharma can 
he regarded as the nearest equivalent to religion. Religious 
doctrines are described as Siddhanta and also as Mata* It 
must he mentioned here that hhakti is never referred to as a 
dharma* nor is it ever called a Siddhanta or Mata* For example 
in the two well known medieval compendia of the prevalent 
Siddhantas and Matas, the Sarva-Siddhanta^Sangraha of 
B'anknacharya and the Sarva-Dar sana~San.gr aha of Madhavacharya, 
hhakti is nowhere explained as a religion or doctrine. Even 
in their treatment of Vaishnavism and of Vaishnava Vedanta,o * 7
1hhakti is not discussed as their particular religion.
But hhakti is usually understood as a marga. Whereas 
siddhanta and mata refer to the doctrinal aspect of religion, 
and dharma to the general principles which ultimately 
assimilate the doctrinal and the practical aspects in one
2
whole, marga indicates the way of the mata and siddhanta.
In other words, it is a particular doctrine which paves a 
particular way. If the siddhanta or mata is concerned with 
explaining the nature of God as the intimate Heality, the 
marga is the path shown for knowing and worshipping Him, 
Bhakti however, is recommended under various matas and 
siddhantas, and is upheld hy groups of varying denominations 
and convictions. Therefore hhakti, even as a marga, cannot he 
given a fixed and limited meaning in the sense of a special 
religious conviction.
In modern scholarship, whenever hhakti is described 
as a marga, it is usually done so in contra-distinction to 
the karma-marga (the path of action) and the jhana-marga 
(the path of knowledge). They are explained as alternatives, 
exclusive of each other, and hhakti in particular is always
1. Gankaracharya, Sarva-Siddhanta-Sahgraha, Chapter IX 
(Vedavyasapaksha prakaranaTT
Madhavacharya, Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, Chapter IV, XX 
( Ram anu j ad ar sanamj*
2. N.Ao Thoothi, The Vaishnavas of Gufjarat, Longmans Green 
& Co., Calcutta, 1935s p*65«
explained as Juxtaposed to the path of jjfiana or knowledge.
The view that they are two different and separate paths must
he of a very recent origin, since we do not find any early
standard and authentic exposition of hhakti setting the two
1
as distinctly apart and exclusive of each other. At the same 
time the Hindu scriptures, which are usually quoted to support 
the aforesaid statements, do not show evidence of such a view. 
Neither in the Bhagvad-G-ita nor in the Bhagavata Pur ana, the 
two texts regarded as the most authoritative in relation to 
hhakti, is such a line of division drawn between knowledge 
and hhakti. On the contrary, they appear in them as completely 
compatible and inclusive of each other. The same is true of 
the Bhakti-Strtras of Narada and 3andilya, which are also so.
1 . In this context, the following fact strikes us as very 
significant. In his Sanskrit English Dictionary, Monier- 
Williams has offered a number of meanings for the term 
hhakti, such as trust, homage, worship, piety, faith, love 
and devotion etc. These renderings of. hhakti are supported 
by illustrations from the classical Sanskrit texts. But 
over and above this, Monier-Williams, translates hhakti 
also as a "religious principle or means of salvation to­
gether with Karman, ’works’ and jhana, ’spiritual 
knowledge’." This particular rendering of hhakti however 
is not illustrated by the usage of the term in that sense 
from any Hindu text, hut is supported by Monier-Williams’ 
own definition of it. Therefore, to illustrate the meaning 
of hhakti as a "religious principle", different from that 
of jhana, Mo nier-Williams refers to his own works Indian 
Wisdom and Religious Thought and Life in India (also called 
Brahmanism and Hinduism. j This should also lend some weight 
to our contention that the present theories about hhakti 
which define it as a special religious doctrine, different 
from that of jftana, are of an artificial nature.
Monier-Wil1iams, Sanskrit English Dictionary*
often quoted to substantiate the current theories about 
bhakti
The treatment of bhakti and jfiana as counter agents., 
has caused some serious misjudgements. For example, bhakti 
is interpreted as an antithesis of the principles of 
classical Vedanta, a thought system held in high esteem by 
the Hindus, and a philosophy which can hardly be pushed
p
aside as non-religious and non-devotional. However, the 
above position is maintained on the ground that the latter 
is only a philosophical system which lays down the path of 
jnana, different from that of the truly theistic religion, 
bhakti. Furthermore, the seeming consistency of this assumed 
position is maintained by interpreting jfiana or knowledge as 
an intellectual and scholastic understanding only, in spite 
of the clear evidence that the Vedantins do not use the term 
jftana in that sense. In the final analysis however, the 
Vedantins always describe jfiana as(knowing in terms of 
spiritual experience. The difference between the knowledge 
derived from personal spiritual experience and the knowledge 
derived from textual scholarship is often made clear and the 
superiority of the former is always acknowledged by them.^
1. Bhakti in the Bh ag avad- Gita, Bhagavata Purapa, and Nar ad a 
and Efahdllya Bhakti.-Sfitraa, are discussed in Chapter II.
2. Vide infra, pp, 127^  WH 
3- Vide infra, pp„ IS*-36*
A misconception thus lies at the base of the related theories 
which explain bhakti as an antithesis of the classical 
Vedanta and the so-called 1 intellectual ism" of the Brahmins .
A similar inexactitude is perpetuated by the 
assertion that bhakti is incompatible with non-dualistic 
explanations of the Ultimate Reality, and with the nirguna 
and impersonal view of God. It is always argued that bhakti 
or loving devotion requires an essential dualism, for there 
must be one who loves, and another who is loved. Also, that 
it is not the unfeeling impersonal Brahman, but God as a 
person, who can arouse the feeling of love and devotion in 
the human heart. Bhakti is thus explained as a kind of 
devotion which has no validity in relation to the philosophi­
cal stand of the Advaita Vedanta, and the belief in the 
nirgupa character of God,
To interpret bhakti or devotion in the above sense, 
in the context of Hinduism, amounts to a negation of a funda­
mental devotional aspect of the Hindu pattern of religious 
and spiritual pursuit. The path of self-realisation through 
self-knowledge is an essential part of the Hindu view of 
religious life and devotion. It would not be incorrect to 
state that it has found due recognition in all the Hindu 
sects, irrespective of the varying degree of its actual 
practice in them. The Advaita^Vedantin of course, is committed
to it the most fully, and upholds it in a more non-compromising 
manner than the others. But the form and manner of spiritual 
pursuit advocated hy the Advaita Vedantin is often explained 
as the exaltation and glorification of the self*and since it 
is explained that bhakti as love needs the "other" to love 
and requires an essential dualism, bhakti is set off against 
this position of the Advaita Vedanta with its emphasis on the 
self.
However, it must be remembered that when the Vedantin 
speaks of self-realisation and self-knov/ledge, he means not 
the empirical self but the self most high, the Atman, the 
Brahman. It is that and not the empirical self which must be 
known and realized. The Vedantin also must need God and 
attachment to Atman to know and realize it. In that respect 
he also requires bhakti in his spiritual quest. For the 
Vedantin, the ever-existent duality exists within himself, 
in the polarity of his higher and his lower self. That in 
itself opens up the possibilities of love and devotion.
The devotee does not love himself1, but loves the Self most 
high. Only the love and yearning for It can result in 
knowing and realizing It. To live In It, is to continue to 
love it. Here too, bhakti is an act of love and surrender, 
although the object of bhakti is not a personal deity. The 
beginning of it is an act of faith, and the culmination of
it, a participation in the Divine* It is the loving devotion 
to God, the ONE Ultimate Reality, as Brahman, which makes 
both the quest and the end possible. This bhakti does not 
require a personal God. The relationship of "I” and "THOU" 
between the devotee and God, as axiologically separate and 
different from each other, is no longer necessary. Both 
"I" and "THOU" exist and function within the devotee in the 
act of devotion. This pattern of Hindu devotionalism can 
be defined as nirguna bhakti, and is fully compatible with 
the ideology of the Advaita Vedanta.
In Hinduism, the genesis of nirguna bhakti can be
traced as far back as the conception of the: nirgupa character
of God. To the degree that the latter is accepted by the
varying groups included in the theistic unity of Hinduism,
nirgupa bhakti is possible within their sectarian limits as
well. Its spirit is evident in the up as an a of the Upanishads
The Atman, though seen as impersonal, is described as the
1"Dear One" in the Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad, and is glorified 
in lyrical rapture in some other Upanishads also. This Atman 
cannot be known through learning, nor through the knowledge 
of Vedas, but it reveals itself to "whomever it chooses".
1 . Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, I V . 22.
2* Kathopanishad 1.2 * 23, also Munftakopanishad III. 2.3 •
Bhakti in relation to God, when conceived of as an 
Impersonal principle, must be understood in its etymological 
meaning of "participation", The nirguna bhakti, in other 
words, can be accepted as a fervent devotion for the soul's 
participation in the Divine. This bhakti is of a different 
order from the simple worship of the person of Vishnu, or his 
avataras Rama and Kpishpa, for it has no need of a personal 
image of God. However, it may be entertained and practised 
by a Vaishnava,a Rama or Krishna bhakta in so far as he
o * o I
conceives Vishnu, Rama and Kpishpa as not different from the 
Nirguna Brahman or Atman. It must be mentioned here that the 
identification of Vishnu, Rama and Krishna with the Nirguna 
Brahman is a common characteristic of the Vaishnava 
scriptural texts. Such- a process of identification in 
itself opens up the possibilities of the transformation of 
the worship of the personal deity into the bhakti for the 
Nirguna.
Thus saguna bhakti, such as Vishnu worship, has always 
recognized and made place for nirgupa bhakti. For example, 
Vallabhacharya, who out of all the medieval Vaishnava acharyas 
did the most to establish on a scholastic level, the super­
iority of Kpishna-bhakti of a personalistic form, recognized
1 • Mahabharata, Bhagavata Purana, and the VishnU-Purana 
testify this.
the distinctive and fundamental nature of nirguna hhakti when
he called his path of personalistic devotion to Krishna' as
Pushti-Bhakti and the one for the Brahman as Maryada-Bhakti
1and accepted the validity of hoth. But nirguna hhakti on the
other hand does not accept the intrinsic validity of the
saguna hhakti in a similar manner. Nirguna hhakti as para-
hhakti or the highest form of devotion may tolerate and ahsorh
within itself every other form of devotion hut it need not
necessarily uphold and recognize the worship of personal
deities such as Rama and Krishna. On the contrary, it may even
deny the latter in the course of asserting itself. This
aspect of nirguna hhakti stands out very prominently in the
medieval nirguna hhaktas like Kahlr who caused a mass-movement
n
in favour of Jtfirguna hhakti and who represent its most popular 
and widespread manifestation. They neither recognize nor 
tolerate the worship of personal deities and demand an
p
uncompromising adherence to hhakti for the Nirguna.
As shown ahove, nirguna hhakti has a character of its 
own and it has certain aspects which openly clash with our 
standardized ideas ahout hhakti. But as it does not completely 
conform to the current accepted definitions of hhakti, the 
recognition of nirguna hhakti on its own terms has heen
1 • Vide infra, pp ^ *7 -fsj-
Vide infra, pp tf"%
largely evaded. For this reason eminent scholars like 
Bhandarkar and Radhakrishnan are unable to identify it with 
hhakti in spite of their recognition of the theistic and 
devotional aspects of the Upanishads. Bhandarkar, though he 
points out the "germs of hhakti" in the upasana of the 
Upanishads, is reticent ahout calling it hhakti. Tracing the 
indigenous character of hhakti he quotes from the Brihadaran- 
yaka Upanishad hut describes the relevant passage only as
the nearest approach to hhakti with the substitution of
1Impersonal Atman for a Personal God , Similarly, Radhakrish­
nan, taking note of the devotional fervour of the same 
Upanishad, feels the need for explaining it as "spiritualised 
hhakti" and is unable to give it the status of hhakti. These 
evaluations by Bhandarkar and Radhakrishnan are obviously the 
result of the application of the modern standardized definition 
of hhakti, which as suggested earlier is artificial and not 
free from errors. Bhakti for that reason can not assume a 
consistent form for Bhandarkar without a Personal God, and 
Radhakrishnan cannot help noticing a marked difference between 
hhakti and hhakti spiritualised „
1 . R.G. Bhandarkar, ibid., p c23.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol.I, p.233*
Vi« Bhakti Theories and the Bhakti Movement
Both the current academic definition of bhakti and 
the consequent inhibition to recognize nirguna bhakti on its 
own terms, place a serious limitation on the understanding of 
the medieval religious currents which are collectively known 
as the Bhakti Movement, The fixed monolithic view of medieval 
bhakti, current in the academic circles today, is obviously 
the result of regrading bhakti as a special religion^Its 
initial identification with Vaishnavism^and of the unqualified 
acceptance of a personal conception of God as its necessary 
condition.
But the medieval Bhakti Movement however, has two 
distinct facets to it, one laying emphasis on the worship of 
personal deities. Rama and Krishna, and the other which regards
1
Nirguna Brahman alone as the sole object of devotion. Whereas 
one represents the medieval neo-Vaishnava movement which can 
be connected with Vishnu bhakti, the other is an expression of 
an equally powerful movement to popularise the teachings of 
classical Vedanta, the belief in an impersonal God, and the 
path of nirguna-bhakti. Bhakti of Tulsidas, Surdas and Mira 
is a constituent of the former, that of Kabir* Nanak and Dadu 
of the latter. The two groups stand for different ideologies 
and convictions, although spiritualism and devotion is common 
to both. As the leading figures of the Bhakti/*Movement they
can be treated as a single group in spite of their differences 
only if the word bhakti is understood in its general meaning 
of religious devotion. But if bhakti is regarded as a doctrine 
in its present academic meaning then they must be recognized 
as two separate groups and their ideological difference must 
be marked out more clearly.
The teachings of nirguna bhaktas like Kabir and Nanak 
cannot be connected with the Vaishnava traditions and Vishnu-0 o
bhakti. They believed not in a personal but an impersonal 
God. Not a dualistic but a non-dualistic view of Reality 
characterises their religious thinking. Their bhakti is not 
opposed to, but is in complete harmony with the spirit of 
AdvaitafVedanta. All this stands out in clear contrast with 
the present academic definition of bhakti. The devotionalism 
of Kabir and other medieval saints of the nirguna school can 
be understood only if nirguna bhakti Is understood within 
its own framework and not in accordance with the current 
technical definition of bhakti.
The popular manifestation of nirguna bhakti in Kabir 
is not only incompatible with the accepted definition of bhakti 
but it also disproves some of the current ideas about the 
position of the Advaita/-Vedanta in Hinduism. The authors of 
the bhakti theories had set aside monistic Vedanta as a mere 
philosophy and a system of ideas confined only to Brahmins
and incapable of satisfying the religious needs of the common 
1man. But a movement for the popularisation of the essential 
principles of the Advaita/Vedanta amongst the common people 
constitute a vital part of the Bhakti Movement. Kablr^ oxifi. 
unlettered and low castsman^advocated a religion, the spirit 
of which cannot he understood in isolation from that of the 
Vedanta* KabirTs religious faith is deeply rooted in the 
monistic philosophical tradition of Hinduism. His impersonal 
concept of the Deity, his non-dualistic view of Reality and 
his emphasis on reasoning and self-knowledge confirm this.
Although conceptually we do not find anything new in 
Kabir’s monism his own treatment of it and his contribution 
towards making it a living part of people*s religion on a 
wide scale cannot he minimized. What had been systematised 
and elaborated through erudition and argumentation by the
Brahmin GaAsaracharya was now being said in a simple and 
direct manner by Kabir in the language of faith and 
personal conviction. If £>ahkara Ts main objective was to 
establish the doctrinal infallibility of the Advaitav
1. It may be pointed out here that the Indologists like Max 
Mdller, who recognized Vedanta as a system "chiefly con­
cerned with the soul and its relation to God" and who acc­
epted it both as a philosophy and a religion, did not con­
cern themselves at all with the bhakti theories. On the 
other hand, A.Weber, Monier Williams and G.A.Grierson whose 
writings can account for the current theories about bhakti 
could never view Vedanta as a religion. On the contrary, 
they always represented it as a philosophy which could not 
meet the real demands of religion. For Max MtLller's opinion 
on Vedanta see, Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy 
delivered at the~Royal Institution, London 1694,pp*2,o, 
11-13, 29.
Vedanta, KabirTs mission was to make its essentials a 
matter of common bel-ief. His plain logic and commonsense 
and his direct and sincere appeal to human reason must have 
done more to make them popular amongst the masses than the 
learned commentaries on the AdvaitaM/edanta.
Judged as a bhakta, certain fundamental aspects of 
Kabirfs thought and personality are very often evaded and 
under-estimated on account of the general acceptance of 
bhakti as an antithesis of Advaita^Vedanta. However, whereas 
the historians continue to treat the Bhakti Movement as a 
unity irrespective of the variations existing within it, a 
tradition has taken roots in the historical studies of 
Hindu literature to take into account the distinctive 
features of the Nirguna and laguna schools of bhakti. Hindi
1. The first history of Hindi literature was attempted by
George A. Grierson in 1889. He classified the bhakti-poets 
in two groups, the Rama-bhaktas and the Krishna-bhaktas, 
This classification provided the framework for the subse­
quent works on the subject till 1929, when a more detailed 
study was made by Ramachandra Sukla. The latter pointed 
out the existence of two different currents of bhakti 
saguna, consisting of Rama and Krishna bhakti, and the 
Nirguna, running in two different channels, one dependent 
on jhana as in Kabir, and the other dependent on prema 
as in Jayasi and other Sufi-poets of Hindi. This division 
is now universally observed in Hindi scholarship, but the 
same definition of bhakti is invariably applied to both 
the nirguna and the saguna bhaktas.
G.Ao Grierson, Hindi Sahitya Ka Prathama Itihasa, the 
Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindustan, translated 
into Hindi by Kishorilal Gupta, Hindi Pracharaka 
Pustakayalaya Benar&s, 1957»
Ramachandra^£>ukla, Hindi Sahitya ka Itihasa, Kasi Nagari 
Prachariinl SabhS, 10th ed., 1955.
scholars naturally are more inclined to take cognisance of
the exact nature of KabirTs thought because of their closer
understanding of his verses, which are composed in Hindi.
Nevertheless, they too have not been able to free themselves
of the pre-conceived notions about bhakti, and much
uncertainty still exists in Hindi scholarship over certain
fundamental questions connected with Kabirrs ideology* Even
when the ideological difference between Kabir and Tulsidas
is clearly seen, when it comes to the question of bhakti,
its nature and antecedents the established definition of
bhakti is always adhered to and attempts are made to
1correlate the two personalities in the light of it.
Similarly, though the evidence of the concept of Advaita/- 
Vedanta in Kabir is sometimes duly recognized by Hindi 
scholars, in order to make his devotion consonant with the 
technical definition of bhakti, they try to harmonize their 
understanding of bhakti and their discovery of the nirguna 
quality in Kabir. Such attempts have led to serious 
inconsistencies and misjudgements.
As suggested earlier, the medieval religious currents 
which are collectively known as the Bhakti/-Movement cannot be 
assessed properly without settling the present anomalies in
1* For example, see Munshi Ram Sharma, ibid., p.UlO.
our understanding of* bhakti. A correct assessment of the 
thought and personality of Kabir, and of the antecedents of 
his nirguna school is also not possible without this. An 
attempt is made in the subsequent pages to remove some of 
these anomalies and to prepare the ground for a more 
consistent and unbiased approach to the study of Kabir and 
the other nirguna bhaktas. of medieval India.
CHAPTER II 
BHAKTI IN THE CLASSICAL TEXTS
Certain classical texts are always cited in support 
of the current definition of hhakti. They are the Bhagavad- 
Gita, the Bhagavata Purana and the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada 
and handilya. But a closer examination of the expositions of 
hhakti in these texts does not hear out the existing ideas 
about bhakti and the theories connected with them. None of 
these works provides us with any exclusive, uniform or 
standardised definition of bhakti to confirm them.
Neither a fixed belief in a personal God, nor a 
rejection of a monistic view of Reality appear as the necessary 
pre-requisites of bhakti in these texts. They do not describe 
bhakti as opposed to Jfrana, but recognize and point out the 
interconnection of the two. Bhakti is not represented in them 
as something incompatible with a monistic and nirguna ideology. 
On the contrary, bhakti for the Hirguna is sometimes clearly 
described as a higher form of devotion and is upheld with the 
help of the monistic principle of Vedanta. Both the saguna 
and the nirguna forms of bhakti can be found in the Bhagavad- 
Gita, the Bhagavata Pur ana and the Bhakti-Sutras. They make 
it clear that bhakti can manifest itself in different forms-.
Not a simple faith directed towards a personal God, but an 
active spiritual endeavour on the part of the individual is
very often described as a necessary constituent of bhakti*
The following textual study of the Bhagavad-Gita 
the Bhagavata Pur ana and the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and 
Gand.ilya, explain this at greater length*
i* The Bhagavad-GIta
To establish the antiquity of bhakti in the light of 
its current definition, the Bhagavad-GIta is always cited as 
its earliest literary exposition* Therefore, whenever the Gita 
is mentioned in connection with bhakti, it is. invariably 
treated as a purely Vaishnava text, and a strictly personal 
theism is attributed to it* It is regarded as "an expression 
of the earliest attempt made in India to rise to a theistic
p
faith and theology" and its monotheism is explained as a 
stage different from the pantheism of the Upanishads. It is 
also represented as a vindication of a popular religion 
independent of the Vedic tradition*^
In G-ita Ts exaltation of Krishna is seen the emergence 
of a personal image of God* It is considered unique for its
1. R* Garbe, "Bhagavad-GIta" ERE, Vol.II, ed. 1909, pp.535-533. 
See also S„N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy,
Vol.II, Cambridge 1932, p.532.
2. J.No Earquhar, An Outline of the Religious Literature of 
India, Humphrey Milford,~ 1920, p .86.
3. G.Ae Grierson, Bhakti Marga, ibid.. pp.539-551•
notion of "bhakti which is regarded as 1 almost a new note in
\
Hindu religious speculation*^ and it is suggested that the 
inspiration of Gita Ts hhakti came not from the Upanishads hut 
from certain popular forms of religion. It is also argued 
that the schemes of salvation suggested in the Upanishadic 
speculation were reinterpreted in the G-ita in terms of its 
personal theism, and that it recommended the path of hhakti 
as a counterpoise to the path of knowledge? Consequently, 
the personal theism of the Gita is taken as a result of the 
transformation of the Absolute of the Upanishads into a 
personal God through the identification of the God of the 
Vaishnavas with the Brahman of the Upanishads.
These interpretations of the Bhagavad-Gita are the 
obvious result of the application of the artificial theories 
about hhakti, and the use of the western conceptual categories 
of theism and pantheism in the study of Hinduism. J But if we 
free ourselves of the current approach and judge the Bhagavad  ^
Gita from a strictly Hindu standpoint and evaluate its 
ideology in the light of its text alone, the assessment of 
its position in the Hindu thought and of its theism and
1, F. Edgerton, The Bhagavad-Gita, Translated and Interpreted 
Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge," Mass^. 19U6, p *71 •
2* J.N. Farquhar, ibid., pp.87-88.
3. The general errors inherent in this approach have already 
been pointed out in Chapter I. Vide supra, p.
bhakti are bound to be different.
Gita is recognized by the Hindus as one of the 
prasthantrayi, the three authoritative textual sources of 
all religio-philosophical opinions. The other two placed in 
the same category are the Upanishads and the Bpahma-Sutras..
But for the modern opinions, Gita’s philosophy was never 
placed at variance with that of the Upanishads by the Hindu 
theologians. On the contrary, they usually refer to the 
Gita as the repository of the very essence of the Upanishads.1 
Similarly the theism of the Gita is not viewed as different 
from that of the Upanishads and the Vedanta. That the Gita 
conveys the knowledge of the Brahman, was always recognized 
by the general Hindu opinion, and no new concept of a 
personal God, separate, opposed, and different from the 
Brahman, was ever attributed to it.
But due to the fixity of the modern academic opinion
about bhakti and its relation with the Bh agav ad— Git a» the
total viewpoint and the composite nature of Gita? s philosophy
is easily ignored. Whatever influence of the Upanishads
that is found in it, is explained away as the result of the
imposition of the Brahmanic thought on the Bhagavata 
2religion. Gita is consistently treated as a Vaishnava
■' il. U  ■ 0
1. See for example the colophon of the Bhagavad-Gitao
2. Fo Edgerton, ibid., p,32,
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scriptural text which could draw freely from other 
philosophies "because the latter had not assumed their 
systematic forma at the time of its composition.^ This is 
done in spite of the recognition of the influence of the 
prevailing philosophic currents in Sahkhya, Yoga, and 
Vedanta on the Bhagavad~GIta. The inability to "break away 
from the fixed approach has sometimes led to apparent 
contradictions in scholarly opinions about the nature of 
Gita Ts bhakti and theism.
For example, writing about the bhakti of the Gita, 
Radhakrishnan suggests that devotion to the "Supreme is 
possible only with a personal God, a concrete individual 
full of bliss and beauty". "Personality implies a capacity 
for fellowship", and there is always, the personal need for 
a personal helper, for "we can not love a shadow of our 
minds". In the course of the same discussion however, 
Radhakrishnan states at another place that the Gita 
"recognises nirgupa bhakti, or devotion to the qualityjless, 
as superior to all else", and acknowledges that the absolute
monism is the completion of the dualism with which the
2devotional consciousness starts.
1• Ibid., p .6.
2. S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.I, see pp#559 and
A similar contradiction is noticeable in Carpenter’s
observations on the Gita. He makes it clear that behind the
"worshipper’s adoring love, evoked by the sense of the divine
beneficence of the cosmic scale as well as God’s personal
dealing with the individual soul", there lie only two
fundamental conceptions in the Bhagavad-Gita - the spirit
in man and the spirit in the universe. The highest reality
of the universe is the spirit and it is called by different
names. The highest reality in man is also spirit and has
1kinship with the supreme spirit. It must be mentioned
here that Carpenter, in spite of making this assessment of
the theism of the Bhagavad-Glta, is unable to break away
from the fixed theories about bhakti and accepts them with
2
all their implications.
However the following analysis shows that the bhakti 
of the Bhagavad-Gita does not fit in with the current 
definitions of it and needs understanding in a different 
perspective. The word bhakti is not used in the Gita as an 
equivalent of a simple loving faith. On the contrary, it is-
1. J.E. Carpenter, Theism in Medieval India. London 1921, 
p.253.
2* Ibid. See for Bhakti as a marga p.2kk* Ramanuja as a
systematizer of bhakti p .2^5; bhakti and the Narayainiyct' 
section of the Mahabharata p.265; Narada’s and £>ahdiiya’s 
bhakti p.lfL9.
clearly distinguishable from it. No fixed and invariable 
concept of bhakti is offered by the Gita. It is graded and 
the possibilities of its variations are also indicated. The 
Gita does not install bhakti as a counterpoise to jftana, but 
maintains perfect compatibility between the two. They are 
represented as interdependent on each other. Finally, bhakti 
in the Gita does not suggest any essential and ever existent 
dualism between the devotee and God, nor does it necessitate 
the idea of a personal God.
(a) The Distinction between Bhakti and Sraddha
In the Bhagavad—Gita bhakti is clearly distinguished
from mere faith or sraddha. The latter manifests itself in
numerous forms of religious worship, caused by the difference
of gunas inherent in men. The sattvikas worship the devas,
rajasikas the yakshas, and tamasikas the pretas and the 
- 1bhutas. The sraddha of each is according to his natural
2
disposition. But whether Sattvika, rajasika or tamasika in 
nature, s'raddha is efficacious in every form in winning God’s 
grace. It is necessary for every act of worship. That which 
is practised without it is asat and is invalid. Thus the
1. The Bhagavad Gita, XVII,4,
2. Ibid,, XVII.3; VII.20,
3. Ibid., VII.21,22,
element of faith or sraddha is recognized in every form 
irrespective of the higher or lower categories of the objects 
of worship*
jo cvrix ~
Bhakti-Yoga, however, is coupled only with/sraddha 
or supreme faith* ’’Those who fixing their mind on me worship 
me eversteadfas;t, endowed with supreme .sraddha. they are the
best versed in yoga” says Krishna in the discourse on bhakti-
1yoga* This par a-sradclha which is considered necessary for 
bhakti-yoga, is described as something beyond the three- 
categories of gunas.
Although the Bhagavad^-Gita carries a note of condes­
cending recognition of all forms of worship if they are caused 
and accompanied by faith, the true bhaktas seem to stand 
apart from the worshippers who are led by mere faith. The
3 k
bhaktas are described as virtuous, and noble, and as those 
who cross over the divine illusion caused by the g u n a s T h e y  
are different from the others, who are deprived of discrimina­
tion and therefore follow different rites and devote themselves
1* Ibid., XII.2.
2. Ibid* * VII.21,22. 
3* Ibid., VII.16. 
k. Ibid., VII.18*
5* Ibid* a VII.Ih*
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to different gods, 'bound "by their own nature.1 According to
p
^he G-ita the latter are "men of little understanding”.
Thus although the Gita recognizes the value of faith 
0I* Braddha in all its manifestations, its bhakti-yoga is 
possible only through y ara~dvaddha, which is free of the 
three gunas and is therefore nirguna in character. It 
indicates a greater degree of spiritual involvement than the 
other three categories of sraddha. Although every form of 
worship and every expression of faith and love for God is 
recognized in the Bhaga vad-Gita, hhakti is represented more 
in the nature of an active and passionate search of the self 
for the Divine. It means much more than just an attitude 
of faith, or acts of worship, or a code of conduct to he 
fulfilled, "as heard from the others”
(h) Gradations of Bhakti
Different types of hhakti and its gradations are also 
indicated in the Bhagavad-Gita. ”Dour kinds of virtuous men 
worship me” says Krishna and the four are described by him 
as the distressed (arta) the one who seeks some gain (arthar- 
thl), the one who seeks knowledge (jijhasu), and the one who
1. Ibid.. VII.20.
2. Ibid., VII.23.
3. Ibid., XIII.25.
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1 _is wise (ffla.nl). The jhani bhakta is described by Krishna as 
the highest amongst the bhaktas and as the one dearest to 
him.^
This distinction of four types of hhaktas is not 
hased on any difference of gunas as is done in the case of 
sraddha. Nor is it attributed to the difference in the nature 
of the object of bhakti, for it is clearly recognised that 
all four of them worship the same deity Krishna# It is not 
made on grounds of greater or lesser degree of moral character 
either, for all the four are regarded as virtuous and noble* 
The distinction, seems to emerge therefore from the fact of 
their different attitudes* It lies in their motivation and 
the nature of their emotional involvement with God. The 
distressed seeks solace, the seeker of knowledge wants to 
know, and the man desirous of gain wants the fulfilment of 
his desires. The jfrani alone represents a state of attainment. 
The dhani bhakta of the Gita is the one who knows and has 
attained the state of self-realization.
The bhakti of the Jftani which is regarded as the 
highest form of devotion in the Bhagavad--GIta is different 
from the bhakti of the other three types of bhaktas. It does 
not merely seek comfort from God, nor the fulfilment of any 
desires. Nor is it aimed at gaining formal and intellectual
1° Ibid.. VII.16.
2. Ibid.. VII.17.
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knowledge about Him. It is the hhakti by which, with the mind
ever steadfast, the bhaktfltis established in Him alone and
through which the distinction between the Deity and the
devotee disappears. It is this element of his bhakti which
makes the jfianl different from the other three types of
bhaktas. Krishna says "noble indeed are they all, but the
1wise one I regard as my very self".
Again in his discourse on the bhakti-yoga, Krishna 
points out the superiority of the contemplative bhakti which 
has its base in Jhana and yoga. The fixing of one's mind and 
intellect in God, and the effort to move towards Him are 
considered higher than the effortless act of surrender and 
complete dependence. The worshipful attitude devoid of ;}frana 
and yoga is recommended only for those who are weak and do
v'b
not aspire rqr the highest goal.
Various options are offered for the cultivation of 
the bhakti-yoga in a qualitative gradation. "Fix thy mind in
p
Me only, place thy intellect in Me" says Krishna and adds 
"if thou art unable to fix thy mind steadily on Me, then try 
to reach me through abhyasa-yoga, ^  if thou are unable to
1. Ibid.. VII.18.
2. Ibid.. XII.8.
3. Ibid.. XII.9.
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1practice abhvasa-ryoga. perform actions for my sake, if unable
p
to do even this, then take refuge in Me.H Here the contem­
plative hhakti is regarded as the highest and the one obtained 
through abhyasa yoga as the next in order of merit* Bhakti in 
the sense of surrender is clearly graded as the lowest,
(c) The Trij&logy of Bhakti, Jflana and Yoga
In the BhagavacL~G-ita, bhakti does not stand apart 
from Jftana and yoga. On the contrary, the three are fully 
interwoven into each other. In the discourse on the bhakti- 
yoga, bhakti is clearly connected with o'hana and yoga and both 
the bhakta and the Jftani are described in similar t e r m s T h e  
virtues attributed to the bhakta are the same as those 
attributed to the yogi and the true yogi is also considered
k
a bhakta. Personal excellence, contemplation and detachment 
are demanded of the true bhakta,^ Mere obedience to a personal 
deity and a simple loving faith in him are obviously not 
considered sufficient.
1. Ibid., XII.10.
2. Ibid., XII.11.
3* Ibid., XII,13ff* What is said here of the bhakta is also 
said of the sthitaprarjna, See IX.55*58•
^  Ibid.. VI.Ai7.
5» Ibid., XII.13-20.
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The tendency to regard bhakti and Jlana as essentially
different from each other has influenced the interpretations
of the hhakti of the Bhagavad— GIta in relation to jfiana.
Edgerton tries, to prove that the path recommended hy the Gita
is that of hhakti as against the difficult path of knowledge*
According to him the Grit a was trying to displace *3nana through 
1hhakti* Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta hold similar points of
view as far as the hhakti aspect to the Bhagavad-GIta is 
2concerned. But these interpretations do not seem satisfactory 
The passages quoted hy Edgerton in support of his view are 
taken not only in isolation from the total philosophy of the 
Gita, hut are sometimes cited without due regard to their 
immediate context. Radhakrishnan quotes the Bandilya-Sutra 
to hring out the distinction between knowledge and hhakti of 
the Gita without making any direct reference to the Bhagavad- 
Gita itself.-^
The hhakti of the Gita does not exclude 3'hana* On 
the contrary, jftana constitutes a necessary part of hhakti
1. R 0 Edgerton, ihid*, pp*71,72.
2, S. Radhakrishnan, ihid*, Vol.I, pp.556-565.
S*N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1932, Vol.II, p.532.
3. S. Radhakrishnan, ihid*, Vol.I, p.556.
and the conscious intellect has a full share in it. The Gita
does not lay down a path of hhakti which would exclude the
knowledge of the Upanishads and the Vedanta, hut lends its
full support to them. Knowledge is described as the purifier
1
hy the .Bhagavad^GIta. When ignorance is destroyed hy the 
knowledge of the self, the new knowledge, like the sun
p
reveals the supreme. In the discourse on the Kshetra and the
Kshetrajha Krishna describes the knowledge of the two as the
3highest knowledge. It is this knowledge, he explains; which is 
sung hy the Rishis in the various metres and the passages of
'khe Brahma-Sutra^ "By knowing the Kshetra, jflana and the 
jfleyam" says Krishna "the devotee is fitted for my state.
The Gita views knowledge in a twofold way. A clear 
distinction is made between jfrana and vi .jflana in the Bhagavad- 
Glta. Jflana is better than mere abhyasa and there is also the 
jnana coupled with dhyana which is rated higher than the 
3nana itself. Whereas the knowledge of a philosophical system 
like Sankhya is also sometimes referred to as a means of
!• Bh.G ., V.17,
2* Ihid., V,l6.
3* Ibid., XIII. 12, 17* 
k* Ihid., XIII.U.
5. Ibid., XIII.18.
spiritual knowledge,! vijhana is always mentioned in the sense
2
of self realisation. Jhana and vi jflana in the particular 
sense of the knowledge attained through self realisation, 
constitute an essential part of hhakti in the Gita.
(&) The Gita and the Personal Concept of God
During the process of the formulation of the current 
theories ahout hhakti, the Bhagavad-Gita was specially picked 
out hy the western scholars to illustrate that hhakti is 
possible only for a personal God. They considered it as an 
exception in the Hindu context on account of the supremacy of 
the personality of Krishna in it. They saw in Gita's identifi­
cation of Krishna Vasudeva with the Upanishadfs Brahman the 
emergence of a personal God and the makings of the theistic 
cult of hhakti. In the light of these ideas the presence of 
the impersonal view of God found in the Gita was interpreted 
as a mark of Brahminical imposition. Similarly, accepting 
only a dualistic view of Reality as the true basis of theism 
and hhakti, the presence of the monistic elements in the Gita 
was explained away through the same theory of imposition.
These views ahout the nature of Gita *s theism and of 
its concept of God have been consistently upheld in the
1. Ihid., XIII.2k*
2. Ibid., VII.2.
academic circles since then, particularly in all discussions
related with hhakti* Bhandahkar explained that the Gita
adheres to the philosophical elements of the Upanishads hut
1they are personalised in it* According to Dasgupta, God in
the Upanishads had only majesty hut not the personal form
which He acquired in the Gita*^  Radhakrishnan also interprets
the Purushottama of the Gita in terms of a personal God and
states that tffor those who insist on devotion as the final
nature of spiritual life, the end is not an immersion into
■3
the Eternal Impersonal hut a union with the Purusottama" * 
Edgerton goes to the extent of stating that the impersonal 
Brahman is subordinated to the idea of a personal God in the 
Bhag avad-Git a. ^
But in spite of Krishna heing the central figure in 
the Gita its ultimate representation of God revolves round 
His impersonal and inmanifest nature* It is the unmanifest 
that must he worshipped, says Krishna. In the Bhagavad-Gita* 
the description of the state finally attained through hhakti 
leaves very little room for the idea of a personal God and 
the dualistic relationship hetween the Deity and the devotee.
I* R.G* Bhandarkar, ihid., p.27*
2.. S.N. Dasgupta, ihid., p*53^«
3* S. Radhakrishnan, ihid*, Vol.I, p.565. 
U* E* Edgerton, ihid. . p.1+9*
■* q O.1. HJ
According to the Bhagavad-Gita the bhakta who takes refuge in 
God "attains Him",^ "enters into Iiim",^ "abides in Him",^
and "lives in Him".^ Krishna says in the Gita, "The bhaktas
6 6 are in Me and I am in them", "they enter into Me", "those
7who worship me are fitted for becoming Brahman",1 and "the
8highest yogi sees all in me and me in all."
These aspects of the Bhagavad-Gita are completely 
ignored whenever it is assessed to elaborate the bhakti 
theories. The Gita is then interpreted mainly from the stand­
point of a personal conception of God and a dualistic view of 
Reality. For reasons shown above, such assessments are not 
free from serious contradictions.
To take the examples of Radhakrishnan and Edgerton, 
Radhakrishnan admits that absolute monism is "the completion 
of the dualism with which the devotional consciousness
Q
starts". Similarly, Edgerton also has to point out that
1. Bh ♦ Q •. IV.10.
2. Ibid.. XI.55.
3* Ib id.. VII.23.
Ibid., XII.8.
5* Ibid., IX.29.
6. Ibid., XVIII.55
7. Ibid., XIV.26.
8* Ibid., VI.29.
9* S. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol. I, p.565.
"through its God, Gita seems after all to arrive at an
1
ultimate monism".
The narrative form of the Bhagavad-Gxta and the
position of Krishna in it are the real cause of all the
theories which explain it as the authoritative exposition of
a religion characterised by a personal conception of God. In
the Bhagavad^G 11a Krishna speaks not only as* God but he
directly addresses Ar juna who, in doubt and despair, seeks
guidance and solace from him. The human situation represented
in Arjuna, and the appearance of Kyishna as God provides a
very personal image of the deity which is further strengthened
when Krishna speaks as the God who appears on earth for the
2
protection of the good and the destruction of the wicked.
The personal image of the Deity becomes more vivid when 
Krishna enjoins upon Arjuna to remember him and to follow him 
and ensures salvation and his protection to those who worship 
him.-' As a result of a concentration on those aspects of the 
narrative, with Kyishna addressing Arjuna in the first person, 
the final definition of God offered by the Bh ag avad-GIt a is 
ignored and overshadowed.
1. F. Edgerton, ibid.. pp.kk-kd*
2. Bh.G•, XV.6,8*
3. Ibid.. IX, 26ff.
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The colophon of the Gita however, describes the text
as "the essence of the Upanishads, the knowledge of the
cc
Brahman, the Scripture of yoga, and also as the dialogue 
/ _
Between Sri Krishna and Aryuna". Both these aspects of the
text deserve equal attention • The inclusion of the
personality of Krishna in the Bhagavad~GIta and the dialogue
form of the narrative, should not he allowed to overshadow
its view of God./
Although the utterances of Krishna carry a strong
personal note, Krishna himself states at one place !,the
foolish regards Me, the unmanifest as come into manifestation
1- not knowing my supreme state." ''This deluded world knows
p
Me not, the unhorn, the immutable". Krishpa describes the 
worshippers who try to reach him through wrong methods as 
those who do not know his real nature. As shown below, in the 
final analysis, it is not Krishna, the manifest, but it is 
unmanifest, which is regarded as the Ultimate Reality. This 
constitutes the final view of God in the Bhagavad-GIta. when 
the personality of Krishna is totally merged in the unmanifest 
form.
It is the unmanifest and universal form which is made 
manifest to Arjuna by Krishna through his divine yoga, over-
1* Ibido, VII.24• See also IX.11. 
2* Ibid., VII.25*
3* Ibid.. XI.47.
awed by which Aryuna asks him to come back to his manifest
form. The manifest form which Aryuna asks Krishna to resume
fits in with the image of Vishnu also. "Diademed, bearing a
mace and a discus, Thee I desire to see as before" says
Aryuna "assume that same four armed form, 0 Thou, the
1universal form." Thus both Krishna and Vishnu are representec
as manifest here, different from the unmanifest, the Isvara-
Rupa, the Visva-Rupa, the ancient Purusha. According to
Krishna, it is this unmanifest form which can neither be knowx . # '
through the Vedas nor by austerity, and which is unattainable
2
through sacrifices and gifts, for it can be known by bhakti
alone, and by knowing it the bhakta enters into Him.^
Thus it is not the Absolute or the Brahman which is 
being personalised in the Bh ag avad-G-i ta, but it is the 
deified personality of Krishna which is being raised to the 
status of the Brahman. Krishna, the manifest clearly describes 
his highest state as the unmanifest (Avyakta). Therefore the 
monotheism of the Bhagavad-^Gita does not arise out of the 
final installation of the personality of Krishna as the 
supreme deity or fully evolved idea of a personal God but is 
the result of the identification of the deified hero Gtzz.
1. Ibid., XI.45,46.
2. Ibid., XI.48,53.
3. Ibid., XI.54.
Krishna with the Absolute and the impersonal Atman of the 
Upanishads. It must be remembered that the Mahabharata in its 
present form contains enough evidence to show that Krishna 
was either absent or was regarded only as a human hero in the 
original version of that work and that he was deified at a 
much later stage.^ In some parts Kyishna is represented as an 
ordinary mortal and to a certain extent the evolution of the 
Krishna cult itself can be traced through the various stages 
of the development of the Epic. It is therefore maintained 
by many scholars that Krishiya-worship had either not origin­
ated at the time of the composition of the Mahabharata, or 
was still in its infancy. In view of this, to interpret the 
God of the Gita not in the light of its total thought content 
but only from the point of the personality of Krishna is 
hardly justifiable.
II. The Bhagavata Purana
If the Bh ag avad^Gita is regarded as the earliest 
expression of bhakti, the Bhagavat Purana is recognized as its 
more articulate and exuberant expression. Because of its 
definite Vaishnava bias, its extreme emotionalism and its 
decided concentration on the life and personality of Krishna, 
the Bhagavata Purana could fit in more easily with the modern
1. J.N. Parquhar, ibid., pp.49,78,83,87,89,100.
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definitions of bhakti which have identified bhakti so complete 
1y with Vaishnaism and Krishna-worship.
The preoccupation of the Bhagavata Purana with the
personality of Krishna is more than clear. The purpose of
Vyasa in undertaking to write this Purana is explained at the
very beginning. It is stated that when Vyasa, after having
written the Mahabharata was still not satisfied, Narada gave
him the suggestion to write something exclusively about the
1glories of Vasudeva. The Bhagavata Purana dwells a great 
deal on the life and personality of Kyishna and the whole of 
the tenth book of this Purana is devoted to the Krishna theme« o •
This aspect of the Bhagavata Purana provides an ample scope
for a personal conception of the Deity.
Similarly, acts of worship which can fit in only with
a personal image of God, are recommended and described at
length in Bhagavata Purana. Most of the nine acts of worship
which are named as the navadha bhakti can be conceived only
in relation to a personal deity and the Vaishnava traditions
2
of idol worship. At the same time the loving devotion for 
Krishna is described in highly emotional terms in the 
Bhagavata Purana. In such contexts of personal devotion, 
bhakti is described as a surging emotion ’'which chokes the 
speech, makes the tears flow and the hair thrill with pleasur­
1. Bhagavata Purana, 1.5.1-lU.
2. Ibid., VII.5.23.
able excitement"This state, it is explained, is produced 
hy gazing at the image of Krishna, singing his praises, 
keeping company with his devotees and hearing ahout his might? 
deeds.
These features of the Bhagavata Purina make it a
suitable text for illustrating the current theories about
bhakti. It is therefore universally proclaimed as the most
important text on bhakti and is often described as the
"supreme scripture of devotion". Accepting it as a bhakti
text Dr* Tara Ghand states that the Bhagavata Purana marked
the transition from the ancient religion of works to the
2
medieval religion of bhakti. Although Dr. Radhakrishnan
acknowledges the—faeti that the paths of karma and ;jhana find
due recognition in the Bhagavata Purana he emphasizes the
3
fact that its main stress is on bhakti. These opinions are 
of course stated from the standpoint of the modern definition 
of bhakti. Thus a restricted and single doctrinal meaning is 
attributed to the bhakti of the Bhagavata Purana in spite of
1. Ibid.. XI.Hi.23-26.
2. Tara Chand, Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, ibid. t 
P.13U*
3. S. Radhakrishnan, Foreword to Siddhesvar Bhattacharya,
The Philosophy of £>rimad Bhagavata. Visva-Bharati;
^antia Niketan, i960, pp.vii-viii.
the awareness of its manj^sidedness.
But in spite of its Vaishnava hias and its emphasis
2
on the personality of Krishna hoth the saguna and the nirguna
ideologies are expounded in the Bhagavata Purana through the
personality of Krishna. The Ultimate Reality is very often
explained in impersonal and abstract terms on the lines of
^aftkhya and Vedanta^  Krishna is identified with the Purusha,
Par am atm an. and Brahman.^ He is described as .hahsa* suparna 
*5and avvakta, and also as one who can be attained through
6ghana and yoga. Thus both the saguna and nirguna elements 
co-exist in the Bhagavata Purana. and throughout this 
popular religious text the sagupa is interpreted as the 
nirguna, and the nirguna as the saguna.
Naturally therefore, bhakti is also described in 
both its saguna and nirguna forms in the Bhagavata Purana 
and no single, definite, and exclusive meaning or definition 
can be attributed to it. If it is steeped in deep emotional
1. J.N. Farquhar makes a note of the ’’many-sided devotion of 
the great Purana’*, ibid., p.232-*
2. Bhattacarya, ibid., see pp.5U-128.
3* Bhagavata Purana III. 32.33 .fi**
k* Ibid., III.32.26.
3. Ibid., XI.5.23.
6. Ibid., III.32.30ff.
attachment to Krishna, it also includes jflana and vairagya 
in its contemplative form. If it is in keeping with the 
Vaishnava traditions of the temple ceremonies and idol- 
worship, it is also adjusted to the philosophies of Vedanta, 
Sahkhya and yoga. If the hhakti of the Bhagavata Purana is 
meant for Krishna, it is also directed towards Brahman and 
the Atman.
The hhakti of the Bhagavata Purana thus stands in 
direct connection with the Purana as well as the Vedanta 
traditions of the past. It has the suppor't of the sectarian 
beliefs and practices of the Vaishnava as well as of the 
metaphysical beliefs of the Upanishads. Judging from the point 
of the current theories of bhakti, it is a significant fact 
that the two traditions could be represented simultaneously 
in a Vaishnava text such as the Bhagavata Purana. and that 
both the saguna and the nirguna forms of bhakti could find 
equal recognition in it. Bhakti is not only not confined to 
its saguna form as devotion to a personal deity in the 
Bhagavata Purana but is also not marked out as a path separate
from that of jnana. The most important fact is that the two 
traditions exist together in the Bhagavata Purana. and that 
both the nirguna and the saguna forms of bhakti are mentioned 
in it and no separate path of bhakti is chalked out as 
exclusive of jnana and vairagya.
(a) The Different Categories of Bhakti
Bhakti does not appear in any fixed form in the 
Bhagavata Parana, and its possible variations are sometimes 
made quite clear.
In answer to Devahuti's question about the distinctive
features of the bhakti-yoga, Kapila explains that bhakti
manifests itself in a number of ways and can be of different
kinds. The difference in its expression is caused by the
inherent difference in the natural tendencies and attributes
of people. Kapila then goes on to enumerate three kinds of
bhakti caused by the three gunas# The bhakti caused by pride
or ill will is called tamasika, that caused by some desire or
end in view as rajasika which manifests itself in the worship
of idols, and that by which a man performs the prescribed
rituals and dedicates the fruits thereof to the Lord as
sattvika. To these three, Kapila adds yet another category
that of nirguna bhakti, which is described separately as
1distinct from the other three.
Again, explaining the Sahkhya and the yoga philosophie 
as the supporting factors of the devotional tendencies of the 
mind, Kapila mentions two types of bhaktas. In one group he 
places those who, impelled by the natural tendencies of the
1. Bhagavata Purana, III.29. 7-12.
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mind, bear bhakti for Hari as an emendation of sattva. In the
other are placed those who are engaged in serving the lordTs
feet, whose acts are directed and consecrated unto Him and
1
who delightfully discuss His glorious powers and deeds.
When the Bhagavata Purana dwells on nirguna-bhakti,
it also upholds and elaborates the necessary precepts which
alone can maintain it. Therefore whenever bhakti is mentioned
in relation with self-realisation, the relevant underlying
principles of 3ankhya, Vedanta, and Yoga are used to explain 
2
its nature. The principle of the non-duality of soul is 
stressed, and the recognition of a separate and independent 
existence to the soul is regarded as an error and a delusion 
of the mind. The enquiry after the Self and the tattva is 
described as the real aim of life and the importance of 
religious rites and of the outer forms of worship is minimised 
This is in clear contrast with the pattern of sagunafbhakti 
of the Bhagavata Purana which is directed to the personal 
deity Krishria and expresses itself in externalised acts of 
worship, listed under the requirements of navadha-bhakti.% 
Although the promise of salvation is held out for 
both groups, nevertheless, they do stand apart as different
1, Ibid., 111,25. 32-37*
2. Ibid.> III.32. 23-35*
in character. The common factor which entitles them both to
salvation (mukti) is disinterested or selfless devotion.
(ahaituki bhakti), which can be a counterpart of nirguna as
well as saguna bhakti irrespective of their mutual difference.
However, the distinction drawn between the two groups
of bhaktas makes the difference between the nirguna and saguna
bhakti very clear. The expression of the two is entirely
different. One expresses itself in idol-worship, whereas the
other represents a contemplative approach to God. For the
saguna bhaktas, he is "dear as a son" and "a friend in
confidence"; for the nirguna bhaktas, He is of the nature of
sattva. Thus the yogi and the tinanl on the one hand and the
man who worships Him in the idol, sings His praises and listens
to His glorious deeds, on the other, are both recognized as 
1bhaktas.
(b) Nirguna-Bhakti in the Bhagavata Purana
The presence of saguna bhakti in the Bhagavata Purana 
is duly recognized. But the nirguna bhakti, standing in close 
relationship with the philosophies of Vedanta^ Sankhya and 
Yoga, is seldom suspected in the Bhagavata Purana, although 
bhakti for the nirguna is clearly represented in it as a 
distinct and separate category.
!• Bhagavata Purana, III,25*30~Wn
In the Bhagavat Purana, Sanat Kumar a talks of the 
hhakti unto one’s soul and recommends unflinching devotion to 
the soul which is identical with the nirguna Brahman* He 
declares that when through devotion the soul unifies with the 
nirguna Brahman then the devotee hy virtue of his knowledge 
of truth and through his dissociation from the worldly 
objects of attachment destroys the egoism of his mind and 
feels free from the desires that make the knowledge of the 
real difficult. Through devotion,the devotees disentangle 
themselves from the world. The knowledge of the self or tattva 
jnana then dawns upon them, and with the advent of this know­
ledge of the self, they are ahle to meet their real Self. The 
sense of otherness between God and His devotee disappears in 
such a meeting.
(c ) Bhakti in Relation to Jhana, Karma and Vairagya.
In the 20th adhyaya of the 11th skandha of the
—  _ in
Bhagavata Purana. Karma is recommended for the ahirvinna or1 "■'■ ■ . —     9 M
the attached, jhana for the nirvinna or the detached, and 
bhakti for those who are neither excessively attached nor too
p
detached from the fruits of action.~ Here hhakti serves as a
1. Ibid.. IV.22.18-30.
2. Ibid.. XI.20. 7ff.
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■balance between Karma and Jnana. But later, ^ in the same text, 
bhakti and jTiana are mentioned together as means of salvation, 
3hakti is described as the means through which one acquires 
OHana and Vairagya, which become the objects to be attained 
through bhakti. It is pointed out however, that bhakti can 
exist without knowledge too. Bhakti generates vairagya and 
one who has vairagya cherishes bhakti towards Krishna* Thus 
bhakti is described as an end as well as a means„ In one sense 
it indicates the mental attitude of the aspirant, in the other, 
it stands for an accomplished state of mind.
Hhakti here is not established as a separate category
in relation to jnana and Karma. As far as Karma is concerned,
it is mentioned only in the beginning. It seems to fade away
completely later on and the tri/zflogy under discussion is then 
formed by bhakti jhana and vairagya, the three remaining inter­
linked with each other. It is made clear that all three are 
important for beholding the Paramatman. Aided by the knowledge 
of the self, dispassion and devotion, the jiva is able to 
perceive the supreme soul. Thus irrespective of whether it is 
described as a means or an end, bhakti in the Bhagavata Purana, 
does not stand exclusive of the other two, jftana and Karma, 
Either it leads to them or is their result.
XI.20.29-37*
In the 32nd adhyaya of the 3rd skandha, describing
the characteristics of bhakti to Devahuti, Kapila explains
that through jflana, Yoga and vairagya, the .iiva attains the
highest state* At the end of his exposition, he tells her ”1
have expounded unto you both the doctrine of Yoga and that of
bhakti. By practising one or the other of these, a person
attains divinity.” The Yoginr, says Kapila, must fix his
1thought with unflinching devotion on Brahman. Passages are
also not rare in the Bhagavata Purana where bhakti is stated
to lead to a complete identification of the jlva with the
Brahman, and through which the bhakta attains the state of 
2divinity.
In the Bhagavata Purana, therefore, bhakti is not 
represented as a separate spiritual discipline exclusive of 
jnana and vairagya. Nor is it viewed as a kind of devotion 
possible only in relation to a personal conception of God.
On the contrary, bhakti is supported by jnana and vairagya 
and has inherent possibilities in relation to the Nirguna 
Brahman as well. Knowledge of philosophy and the practice of 
yoga are considered a legitimate counterpart of bhakti in the 
Bhagavata Purana. Even when Devahuti pleads she is a woman
1. Ibid., 111.32.31-33.
2. Ibid., IV. 22.26ff.
and of meagre powers of understanding, and asks Kapila to 
give an exposition of that kind of devotion which would lead 
more easily to salvation; Kapila explains that the ’’sequence 
of the categories of thought of Saftkhya philosophy as well 
as the process of yoga extends the devotional aspect of 
one’s mind”.*L
Thus Jflana and hhakti go hand in hand in the Bhagavata
Purana and its recommendation for hhakti is very often
accompanied with a nirguna ideology also. It is urged that one
2
should contemplate on the Atman with hhakti and Jflana, and 
hhakti is described at one place as a characteristic feature 
of the knowledge of the nirguna (nirguna-Jflana)
III. The Bhakti-Sutras of Narad a and £>andilya
The Bhakti-Sutras of Harada and £>ahdilya are referred 
to as the two most authoritative texts dealing with the Bhakti 
doctrine. This is obviously due to the fact that these two 
works are primarily concerned with explaining the nature of 
hhakti and are thus distinctly different from all other works 
in which the origins of the hhakti ideology are usually sought. 
Here hhakti is not Just one part of some wider philosophical
1. Ihid.. 111.25.28-30.
2* Ihid., III.26.72.
3. Ihid.. III.32.32.
or religious systematisation, "but is the very object of the 
enquiry and analysis. This is made quite clear hy both Narada 
and ^andilya in their opening sutras. Nevertheless, they do 
not treat bhakti as a special religion (dharma) or doctrine 
(siddhanta) in these sutras. They analyse the form, the nature, 
and significance of bhakti, only in its general meaning of 
devotion. Not only is bhakti not treated here as a fixed 
religious doctrine, but even as devotion, it is not approached 
by the two sutrakaras in exactly the same manner and spirit.
Although the Narada and Sandilya sutras are very 
often grouped together on account of their common theme of 
bhakti, there exists an obvious dissimilarity of spirit between 
the two. This shows that at the time of their composition 
different opinions were being expressed on the subject of 
bhakti, and that it could be approached from different points 
of view. In the context of Sanskrit literature however, the 
sutra-form in itself largely pre-supposes the existence and 
currency of certain trends of thought on the subject. Moreover 
£>aMilya mentions earlier interpreters of bhakti also such as 
KasVapa and Badarayana.2 Similarly, Narada, a later sutrakara 
than ^ahdilya mentions the views of Parasara, Garga, and
1. athato bhaktim vyakhyasyamcik,Narada Bhakti '-Sutra» I
athato bhaktiSjhasa; gandilya Bhakti-Sutra I.
2* ^andilyat- Bhakti-Sutra. 29,30.
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£>an&ilya, before stating his own.^ These names however* are 
found repeatedly in many religious texts spreading over a 
wide range of time* and can he connected with a number of 
different traditions. Their occurrence here therefore* does 
not necessarily indicate the existence of different systems 
of bhakti expounded by these men. Nevertheless, it does 
suggest that long before* and also at the time of the composi­
tion of these Sutras, attempts were being made to define and
expound bhakti in the light of different views held by the
2
different schools of thought,
A comparative analysis of the Bhakti-sutras of 
Narada and Bandilya however, indicates the existence and 
acceptance of at least two different points of view on the 
subject of bhakti. Whereas ^andilya's approach is more in line 
with the classical systems of Sankhya and Vedanta* Narada 
shows a greater leaning towards the Puranic tradition and the 
sectarian modes of the Bhagavatas. It has been argued earlier 
that bhakti can in no way be restricted to the Vaishanvas*T ®
alone and that there is no antagonism between bhakti and the 
Vedanta. The difference of approach between Narada and
1 . Narada* Bhakti*-Sutra* 16,17,18.
2. Ibid., 83.
handilya and the nature of Sandilya's exposition of hhakti,
lend further support to these two points.
If the hhakti Sdtras of Narada and ^andilya are to he
regarded as textual authorities on hhakti, there is evidence
here that hhakti need not necessarily have a Vaishnava bias,
and that its inspiration can come from the TJpanishads as well*
If on the one hand Harada draws his inspiration from the
Bhagavata Purana"^ , Sa&dilya looks up to the TJpanishads and
- 2describes the Brahma-Kanda as the Bhakti-Kanda, whereas
_ tu 1. r-nm - c -■ - J__. _ —
Narada attaches great importance to the ritualistic modes of
* . 3Vaishnava hhakti, generally known as the dasadha hhakti, 
Bahdilya does not show the same regard for those observances, 
hut allows them only an inferior position. Acts of worship 
like sravana and kirtana which constitute an integral part of 
the dashdha hhakti and which have an important place in the 
Vaishnava tradition, do not enjoy the same importance in 
^andilya^ exposition of hhakti. He describes them as secondary 
forms of hhakti, which can have value only in so far as they
blead to the primary and essential form of hhakti. Singing of
1. Uarada Bhakti-Sutra. 68,
2* ^andilya Bhakti*-Sutra, 26,
3. Narada, 82.
handily a, 56, 57*
hymns and worship through narration of God*s attributes etc.
could lead to only a secondary form of devotion. £>andilya
defines the primary form of devotion in accordance with the
1
spirit of the Bhagavad**GIta, and describes it as exclusive
self“devotedness. A personal deity is obviously not the object
of his bhakti. Sandilya makes it very clear that his bhakti
should not be confused with Deva-bhakti „ ^  At the same time he
also draws a very careful distinction between Sraddha (faith)
■3
and bhakti„
The bhakti of Sandilya is much more contemplative in 
nature as compared to that of Narada, which is definitely 
more emotional/1* ^andilya defines bhakti as a form of extreme 
attachment to God," and as a state of mind, by attaining 
which, a man lives, moves, and has his being in Him. According 
to ^andilya, bhakti can be cultivated with the help of other 
means such as 'jnana and yoga as well.^ But it is essentially 
a state of mind and an experience. It includes the means and 
is beyond and other than them. According to ^andilya, bhakti
1 . Ibid., 83.
2. Ibid., 18.
3. Ibid., 2k.
k* Narada, 68.
5* handilya, 19*
6, Ibid.t 19.
is an act of recognition and therefore is itself a form of 
knowledge. Just as an act of recognition pre-supposes former 
knowledge and in itself is an expression really of renewed 
knowledge.
Narada also describes bhakti as intense attachment to
1 2 God, but on a more emotional level. On obtaining bhakti or
union with God man does, not desire anything else and thus 
rises above the feeling of pleasure and pain.^ He is over­
joyed, and satisfied.^* For Narada, bhakti has the nature of 
asakti or attachment. He speaks with great fervour about 
acts of worship directed towards the personal form of the 
deity. To adore His greatness and beauty, to worship Him, to
5serve Him, and to love Him is described as bhakti by Narada.
That bhakti is possible only in relation to a personal 
God is an opinion which cannot hold ground when judged from 
the standpoint of Narada and handily a Bhakti-Siitras. Although 
their main theme is bhakti and they are not really concerned 
with the question of the nature of God as such, there are
1. Narada, 2.»
2.• Ibid., 68.
3 o Ibido, 5 .
-^1* * Xb id., 6.
5. Ibid., 82.
sufficient indications in these Sutras to provide us with the 
ideas of the two sutrakaras on this subject. However, none of 
them points out that a personal view of God is a necessary 
condition of bhakti, although Narada Ts bhakti, due to his 
Vaishnava bias, clearly suggests a personal and saguria concept 
of the Deity.1" He is clearly very much inspired by the 
tradition of Krishna-bhakti and the dasadha bhakti as£ 0 i .1 m.iL.ii.
mentioned by him can have meaning only in relation to a
p
personal deity. But if there is such an indication in Narada, 
it is equally evident in Gandilya, that the latterTs view of 
God is more impersonal and is not so close to the Vaishnava 
image of a personal Deity. It is evident however, that they 
both uphold and emphasise the value of bhakti in spite of 
their difference of approach.
^aiidilya-Sixtra is constantly cited in support of the 
general theory that bhakti is not possible without the faith 
in a personal God. It must be pointed out however, that 
£>andilya!s God is not of a personal nature. Although he refers 
to Isvara both as the transcendant Lord as well as an 
immanent principle, his cosmology on the whole, stands very 
close to the dualistic principle of Sankhya. Reality according
1. Narada, 79, 9ff.
2. Ibid., 82.
to him is composed of only TchitT and TachitT. There is 
nothing which exists out of it. Gandilya's God is therefore
of the nature of chit and does not seem very different from
1the Purusha of Sankhya. The difference noticeable between
the two is that whereas the Purusha of Bahkhya is ultimately
removed from, and is independent of Prakriti, 3andilya*s chit
2works through achit and the two remain united. ' He does not
-z
establish God as a third principle. Therefore without 
looking for a separate and distinct entity as God, if 
Efandilya’s bhakti is placed within his own dualism of chit 
and achit, it can be easily interpreted as a unifying 
principle„
Describing God (Isvara) as both a transcendant Lord 
and an immanent principle, does not create any problem for 
GaMilya in defining his ideas on bhakti.^* For him both 
Isvara and the Atman can be the objects of bhaktiP The 
difference of the philosophical points of view about their 
nature do not matter with him, for according to him, their
1 . handilya. 37-40.
2. Ibid., 41.
3* Ibid. 3 4-0.
4. Ibid.. 38.
5* Ibid., 29,30,31*
unity lies in the recognition of one as the other* Recognition
Isvara and the Atman as one, in no way diminishes the
greatness of Isvara. Isvara can never lose His superiority
states ^ahdilya, because of His very nature for He continues
1to work through prakriti as the superior principle* Thus the
immanent nature of G-od and the impersonal principle of the
Atman are fully recognized in Gandilya’s hhakti. The idea of
God's immanence is not absent in Narada either. It can be
seen in his description of the divinity of great souls or
mahatmas* According to Narada, bhakti can be attained through
divine compassion as well as through the grace of the divine 
2
men* He not only describes them as men of God, but also
3
suggests that there is no distinction between God and His men. 
Here the mahatmas or the great souls seem to share His 
divinity.
Neither Sahdilya nor Narada represent bhakti as a 
path separate and opposed to that of jhana or knowledge.
Bhakti is described by both as a state and an attitude of mind 
and heart. Expounding bhakti in these terms they attach the
1. Ibid.* 37.
2. Narada, 38* 
3* Ibid., 14-1.
I4-. ^ndilya, 3*
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highest value to it and describe it as the final spiritual
end to he attained.
In the relative context of jfiana, karma, yoga, and
hhakti, handilya is preoccupied mainly with explanations of
the correct relationship between jnana and hhakti# Bondage
according to Gandilya is due to the want of devotion and not
1
to the want of knowledge# Whereas knowledge is necessary for 
hhakti, the final liberation comes only through the attainment 
of the latter# When hhakti appears it destroys the existing
o
knowledge and leads to new knowledge. &andilyars hhakti thus
X
consists of the experience of this renewed knowledge,*^ which 
is different from knowledge through the intellect alone. It 
is a knowledge caused by the final disappearance of buddhi# 
Narada regards hhakti as higher than karma, ;jnana,
k ^ .
and yoga hut he does not create any antagonism or harrier 
between jhSna and hhakti# When Narada speaks of the superior­
ity of hhakti, he offers two explanations for it. First, it 
is superior because it is its own reward, and does not require 
any other support. Second, because God has an aversion for
1 # Ibid#, 98*
2. Ibid#, 96. 
3* Ibid*, 15. 
k* Narada, 25* 
5* Ibid., 26*
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the egoist, and love for humility. Karma jhana and yoga are
thus set aside as inferior not because they are antithetical
to hhakti, hut because they can never he self-sufficient.
Besides, if devoid of hhakti, they can even generate egoism
and pride. Thus Narada does not lay down an exclusive and
superior path of hhakti as against that of Karma, yoga and
jnana hut emphasises the self-sufficiency of hhakti and points
out the insufficiency of the others without h^Kjti. According
to him, hhakti is superior to knowledge, because it is the
1fruit of its own self* It is spontaneous and it takes shape 
of its own accord.
Although certain points of distinction and difference 
can he found between the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada and &andilya, 
in the final analysis, hhakti remains for both, a "state of 
mind" which is essentially a matter of individual experience. 
According to Sanjilya, it comes as an act of recognition 
based on previous knowledge. According to Narada, through 
the spontaneous attachment which finally results in an act 
of complete absorption.
Even Narada, who shows a greater leaning towards 
Vaishnava and ritualistic modes of worship, while describing 
the ten formal acts of worship (da^adha hhakti), makes it
1. Ibid., 30.
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clear that they are only different manifestations of the 
essential hhakti which is just one. Bhakti in general is 
described by Narada, not as an act of worship, but as a 
state of mind to be attained, and as an experience to be 
experienced. It is in the nature of a subtle experience, 
and is beyond description, as is the taste of a thing tasted 
by the dumb.^
Thus neither the Bhagayad—Gita nor the Bhagavata 
Furana. nor the Bhaktl-Sutras of Narada and SaAdilya provide 
us with a definition of bhakti which would corroborate its 
technical meaning as it is current in the academic circles 
today. The above analysis of bhakti in these texts, their 
concept of God in relation to the different gradations of 
bhakti provided by them and the recognition of an interrelation 
between bhakti and jfiana substantiates this. Bhakti for the 
impersonal God is very often described in these texts as a 
higher form of devotion, and a monistic ideology accompanies 
all such descriptions of nirguna bhakti. A strictly personal- 
istic devotion is attributed to these texts only on account 
of the accepted artificial definition of bhakti. It must be
1. Ibid.. 82.
2. Ibid., 5k*
3* lb id.» 52, see also 51 *
mentioned here again that there is no indication in these 
texts to suggest that hhakti is possible only in relation to 
a personal God and within the doctrinal framework of a dual- 
istic view of Reality# They do not represent hhakti as an 
antithesis to the religio-philosophical position of the 
Vedanta and the Upanishads. On the contrary, ^aAdilya for 
example has clearly described the ^ahma-KSnda as the Bhakti-
Kanda#
$"
1 # Gandilya, 26#
CHAPTER III 
BHAKTI IN THE MEDIEVAL CONTEXT
i. The Existing View of the Bhakti Movement
When the great religious resurgence of the medieval 
period is summed up as the Bhakti Movement, the epithet 
hhakti is not understood in its general meaning of religious 
devotion, hut is used as a name for a specific pattern of 
religious devotionalism, possible only within the ideological 
framework of the concept of a personal God, a non-monistic 
view of Reality, and man’s reliance on emotion rather than 
reason in religious life.
Furthermore, hhakti so defined, is viewed in the 
medieval context chiefly as an antithesis of Sankara’s 
monistic vedanta, his impersonal view of God, and his 
insistence on knowledge. The doctrine and religion of hhakti 
is then attributed to points of view opposed to that of 
£>ahkara, and the medieval development of Vaishnava Vedanta is 
described as its chief theological expression. The Vaishnava 
acharyas, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva, and Vallabha are thus 
represented as the apostles of hhakti, and their systems of 
Vedanta, as its doctrinal base. It is also argued that this 
was an assertion of an emotional religion of "loving 
devotion", and that it was very much needed at this time 
because of the vacuum created by the "cold intellectualism" 
of Gankar acharya.
Since this is how the Bhakti Movement is generally 
approached, the Vaishnava acharyas are always accepted as the 
inspirational source of the religious thought and beliefs of 
all the medieval bhaktas, of both the nirguna and the saguna 
schools. Because of the same approach,the total expression 
of religious devotion of that age, irrespective of the 
variations so clearly seen in it, is interpreted as a reaction 
against the religious values upheld by &ankaracharya. 
Consequently, the Bhakti Movement as a whole is studied as 
an expression of Vaishnavism as opposed to the influence of 
^aAkaraTs Advaita Vedanta.
But this position can hardly be accepted as correct. 
What is known as the Bhakti Movement shows evidence of both 
a flowering of neo-Vaishnavism, and a remarkable popularity 
of the nirguna ideology of the Advaita^edanta. The 
Vaishnava movement, in the light of which the Bhakti 
Movement is always assessed, constitutes only one part of 
the religious resurgence of medieval India* But during the
h
medieval period,^Vaishnavism found its poets in Tulsidas, 
Surdas, and other Rama and Krishna^bhaktas, the bhakta-poets 
like Kablr and Nanak advocated nirguna ^bhakti with equal 
fervour. If theologians like Ramanuja were adding new 
philosophical dimensions to the simple and popular faith of 
the Vaishnavas by evolving Vaishnava systems of Vedanta, theo o
more obstruse philosophical principles of the classical 
Vedanta were now reaching the common man through poets like 
Kab'Ir, in a simple, spontaneous, and non-scholastic language.
Both these currents had flowed into the bhakti- 
stream of the medieval period, although they were different 
in origin and inspiration. Vishnu-worship and a personal 
conception of God was essential in one. An impersonal view 
of God and the concept of the Nirguna Brahman was of primary 
importance in the other. Whereas the Vaishnava movement of 
Rama and Krishna bhakti can be easily connected with the 
Vaishnava acharyas, the nirguna school of bhakti is not 
related to them in any significant way. There is nothing in 
common between the Vaishnava acharyas and the Nirguna 
bhaktas like Kabir, Nanak and Dadu. In fact their respective 
positions strike us as basically different. Whereas the 
former established a personal image of God in their theology 
and emphasized on saguna-bhakti, the latter, like 
Sankaracharya, took a strictly impersonal view of God and 
advocated bhakti for the Nirguna Brahman.
But in spite of the evidence of complete harmony 
between &ahkara and the nirguna bhaktas who constitute a 
vital part of the Bhakti Movement, the latter is invariably 
described as a reaction against SankaraTs Advaitavada. It 
is always represented as an assertion of bhakti‘against
jnana* In all such contexts, hhakti is attributed to the 
Vaishnava acharyas, and. jhana to Sankara. The present 
position however, implies and. rests on the following 
factors. Firstly, it is implied, that hhakti was absent in 
Sfetnkara. Secondly, an intellectual ism incompatible with and 
devoid of religious devotion, is attributed to Sankara, and 
the emphasis he laid on Jhana is misinterpreted as his 
emphasis on abstract and scholastic knowledge * Thirdly, the 
difference between Sankara and the Vaishnava Acharyas is 
described as the difference between the path of Jnana and 
the path of bhakti* Lastly, it is assumed that the 
Vaishnava acharyas had evolved a definite and uniform 
doctrine of bhakti which was opposed to the principle of 
jfiana and a monistic view of Reality* It is also suggested 
that their ideology made room for the dualism and distance 
between the devotee and the deity, necessary for bhakti*
But these arguments which sustain the existing views 
about the Bhakti Movement in relation to Gankara and the 
Vaishnava acharyas need a more careful examination, A reass­
essment of the position of Sankara and that of the Vaishnava 
acharyas is undertaken here to clear some of the mis­
conceptions mentioned above* The following study shows that 
bhakti is not absent in &ahkaracharya* It explains, though 
briefly, what Sankara meant by jhana and proves there is no
antagonism between SankaraTs jnana and bhakti» The points 
of difference between Saiikara and the Vaishnava acharyas 
are also reviewed here to show that their difference did not 
arise from the difference between jhana and bhakti but were 
caused by the challenge of Advaita^Vedanta to the Vaishnavao
tradition of the worship of personal deities. We have also 
analysed the various definitions of bhakti provided by the 
Vaishnava acharyas to point out the absence of that fixed 
and uniform concept of bhakti which is so often attributed 
to them. Neither their collective approach to bhakti nor 
their individual views on it fit in with its current 
technical definition.
ii. Bhakti and Jflana in ffankaracharya
•ESahkara’s position can in no way be regarded as the 
opposite pole of bhakti. In fact, he eulogizes bhakti, and 
attaches great importance to it as a means of salvation. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Sankara*s Vedanta 
is usually viewed as an absolutism, and in contradistinction 
to it, the Vaishnava Systems of Vedanta are regarded as 
theistic. Bhakti is considered incompatible with the 
absolutism of Sankara, and is attributed to the theism of 
the Vaishnava acharyas.
This method of explaining hhakti in relation to
Efankara is the result of the misleading application of an
alien concept of theism in the study of Hinduism, the
limitations of which have "been discussed in Chapter I. From
the Hindu point of view however, &aftkarafs position is
neither non-theistic, nor non-devotional. On the contrary,
Sahkaracharya is revered for the part he played in
strengthening the forces of theism against those of atheism.
A man whose entire life was devoted to religious pursuits,
whose religious fervour was responsible for the rise of many
monastic orders, and whose inspiration had led to the
now
estahlishment of the four religious centres/sacred to the 
Hindus in the far corners of the Indian sub-continent, can 
hardly be regarded as a man opposed to theism and religious 
devotion.
But Sankara's theism rests on an impersonal view of 
Cod and his bhakti remains constantly in line with his 
nirguna ideology and exists within the framework of his 
monistic beliefs,, EfeiAkara is not only not opposed to 
bhakti, but has provided us with his own definition of it.
Bhakti according to Sankara is an enquiry and a 
search after the real form of one's own self (Sva-svarupa).
1. Svasvarupanusandhanam bhaktirityevabhidhiyate
Viveka-Chudamani Of Sa&karacharya, ed. by Swami Madhavan 
anda, Advaita Astirama, Calcutta, oth ed., 1957> v*39*
To support this, EfaAkara mentions the opinion of those who 
maintain that 'bhakti is a quest for the substance and reality
n
of o n e ^  own self (Svatma-tattva)» The difference between 
the terms sva-svarupa and svatma-tattva is only that of 
phraseology* Sankara therefore regards them as one and does 
not distinguish one from the other, for they stand for the 
same Reality, the Atman, which is sought by bhakti,
Sankara places bhakti in line with graddha and yoga^ 
and describes the three as the necessary means of salvation.^ 
But out of them, Efaftkara rates bhakti as the highest in a 
very positive and emphatic manner* It sustains the 
aspirant in his search after the self, and culminates in 
that state of self-realisation, or Atmafl-3ftana, which is 
described by Sankara as the only way to salvation or moksha. 
Here we can take graddha as the faith with which the quest 
begins, Yoga as the active will, and bhakti as the emotional 
involvement which arouses the passion and the longing for the 
quest. Sankara fs bhakti constitutes the emotive part of the 
act of self-contemplation.
&ahkara regards bhakti not only as a means but also 
as an end in itself. The highest form of bhakti according
1 . svatmatatvanusandhanam bl^ctirityapare jaguh, ibid., v. 32.
2. sraddhabhaktidhyanayogamiumukshoh, ibid0, v. •
3. mokshakaranasamagryam bhaktireva gariyasi, ibid., v. 31•
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to him, is jnana-nishta or the state of abiding in the
■a'
1knowledge of the self. Thus bhakti which acts as a means
in the initial spiritual endeavours, finally becomes an end
in itself when it culminates in the experience of the self,
for it exists both in the search for the Self as well as in
the state of abiding in It.
These views of Saftkara on bhakti are in complete
harmony with his impersonal conception of God. Therefore,
the suggestion that Sahkara made room for bhakti by putting
forth a dual definition of Brahman as para and apara, one
as the object of knowledge and the other as that of devotion,
is unwarranted. Although Sankara provides us with two
concepts of parjt and apart! Brahman, the nature of his bhakti
does not need the support of their distinction and difference.
We do not find any incompatibility between his Para~Brahman
and his bhakti, Sankara has his own concept of bhakti in
relation to Nirguna Brahman and therefore does not require
the help of an extra conceptual category for its sake. On
the contrary Sankara mentions bhakti-bhava in relation to
phis apar^i or Nirguna Brahman and enjoins that his verses
1 . 'jnananishtha para bhaktirityu^safee,
Sahkaracharya, Gita Bhashya, XVIII. 55 >
2 • Br ahm a ~S u t r a ank ar a ■ -Bh a shy a e d .  by Anant Krishna Gastri, 
Nirhaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1938* 1.1.31•
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1on self contemplation should be sung with bhakt i-bhava,
Again, according to Sankara, the devotee should worship Om 
with £>raddha and bhakti,^ as it is not possible to grasp 
the Nirguna Brahman without it.
What Efaftkara means by bhakti becomes still more 
clear through the distinction he makes between bhakti and 
up a sana. SaiikaraTs definition of bhakti is entirely in 
keeping with his idea of the Nirguna Brahman, but his 
description of up a sana is related with the concept of the 
Saguna Brahman. Sankara explains that the gunas are 
attributed to the Nirguna Brahman for the purpose of upasana. 
Whereas Upasana is regarded by Sankara in its dual aspect, 
both as meditation and as outward acts of worship, bhakti 
is always described by him as an internalised attitude of 
mind and heart. According to Saftkara, upasana can lead only 
to nearness (samipata and salokata) with the ultimate
1 . sva-svarupanusandhana-rupam stutim yah 
pathed-adarat-bhaktibhavo manushyah, see ’’Vijnana Nauka", 
v.’9, ins Minor Works of £?ankaracharya, ed. by Hari 
Raghunath Bliagavat, Ashtekar" & Co., Poona, 1925* P« 3 « 
For the devotional attitude advocated by &arkaracharya 
towards Nirguna Brahman, see also his Para Puja and 
Nirguna-Manasa-Puja, ibid., p.363 and 360-1.
2. s'raddha-bhaktibhyam bhavavis'eshena cha omkare avesayati, 
^ankaracharya, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad Bhashya, V .I .I.
3 * The Brahma-Sutra Bha. shya, III02.12-15 •
Reality, but bhakti results in that feeling of oneness and 
identification (sayulvata and svarupata) which alone can 
lead to Atman- ;jhana and m ok ska ♦
The Nirguna Brahman of Sankara is not juxtaposed 
to the saguna, but includes it within itself.'*’ The Reality 
is only one and rests within one's own self. The formal 
difference of the categories of thought and names which are 
used to explain it are immaterial since they are all 
indications of the same thing. Adhering to this position, 
Sankara does not find it difficult to accept different 
names for God in spite of his strictly qualitiless view of 
it. It is in this spirit that he deals with the Bhagvatas, 
their bhakti, and their deities. He interprets their 
concepts in his own language, and in the process, he 
sometimes attributes his own ideas of bhakti to them. For 
example, he explains the devotion for the Sagup.a Idvara as
_ O
bhakti for the Isvara who dwells within one's own self.
When Sankara is described as an exponent of the 
path of ‘jnana as opposed to that of bhakti, not only is his
1. V.H. Bate, Vedanta Explained. 2 Vols,, Booksellers Publish­
ing Co., Bombay,~ 195^, Vol'Y II, p.515*
2. sva-karmana antaryaminam Idvaram pujayitva kevaljhana- 
nishthanushthana-yogyata-lakshana-siddhih bhavati, quoted, 
Swam! Atmanand, £>ri Gadkara^s Teachings in His own Words, 
Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, "i960, p . m .
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own concept of "bhakti not taken into account, hut his idea 
of Jnana is also misinterpreted and he is viewed as a 
champion of intellectual and abstract knowledge* But there 
is no contradiction between bhakti and Jnana in 3ahkaracharya, 
for he does not recommend the path of Jfrana as opposed to 
bhakti, nor does he uphold Jnana in the sense of learning 
and intellectual excellence* Whenever Sankara uses the 
term Jnana in an absolute sense, he means by it, the 
spiritual knowledge of the self through experience, and not 
knowledge through intellect* This stands out very clearly 
in Sankara for he does not attach any final value to
1scholastic knowledge and to intellectual attainments.
According to £>ankara, the highest knowledge lies in
the experience of the Brahman (Brahmanubhava)> which
2transcends all empirical knowledge* This knowledge has no 
reference to human intellect, but is rooted in the self.
It can be attained only through personal experience, and 
not through the help of learned man*^ £>ankara views all 
other forms of knowledge as merely instrumental in nature*
1 * The Brahma-Sutra -Bhashya, 11 6 0
2, YoH* Date, ibid.* Vol.II, pp*U52ff. 
3® Brahma-Sutra-Khashya, 1.1.2.
Z-U Yiveka-Ghudamani * v. 5k*ua»n iw «^i^m *in i i. in. i i i j i u m hunrtiiii myn Q  ... u *
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They have value only in so far as they purify the soul which
1is stained by ignorance/
The scriptures also lose their pre-eminence when
2Sankara speaks of jftana as personal spiritual experience.
The Sastras or Scriptures can guide and render knowledge 
of the practical aspects of religion (dharma-.jhana), hut 
not of the Brahman (Br ahm a- ffiana) ♦ ^ Whereas in the case of 
the dharma-.jhana, the knowledge derived from the Sruti can 
he useful, in the case of Brahma-Jftana, the fact of experience 
alone can he taken as authoritative# The study of Scriptures 
without the knowledge of the highest tattva is of no use, 
and with the attainment of the knowledge of that tattva, it 
no longer remains necessary.^ The network of words can
jr
lead to useless wanderings says Sankara.
Thus the path of knowledge upheld hy Sankara is the 
path of Self-realisation and of Self-knowledge. It does not 
stand for the pursuit of intellectual attainments and
3** Atmahodha, v in Minor Works..., ibid., p.13*
2. Swami &tmananda, ibid., pp.^Sfi**
3* Brahma^Sutra-Bhashya. l.l.U#
U. avi jfiate pare tatve ^astradhltistu nishphala, vij ftate
pare tatve sastradhitistu nishphala, Vivekakhudamani, v ^9.
r -r ■ 1 , 1,1 " <# s
5. ^ahda^alani-maharanyam^chittahhramanakaranam, ibid., y 60*
scholastic knowledge. Sankara makes a distinction "between a
man of experience and a man of learning. He calls the former
1a mahatma, and the latter a vidvan, and regards the mahatma 
as. greater than the vidvan. To describe Sankara as an 
exponent of the path of Jnana, without giving sufficient 
importance to these factors, amounts to stating a half-truth.
iii. £>ahkara and the Vaishnava Acharyas
The hhakti of the Vaishnava acharyas and the jhana 
of Sankara are not counterpoised to each other. In fact, 
hhakti in the sense of devotion, and Jhana in the sense of 
self-knowledge, are common to hoth Sankara and the Vaishnava 
acharyas. This does not imply however, that there are no 
serious differences between them. The Vaishnava systems 
of Vedanta, the Visisfcljiadvaita of Ramanuja, the Dvaitad’vaita 
of Nimbarka, the Dvaita of Ivladhva, and the Guddhadvaita of 
Vallabhacharya were definite deviations from the Advaitavada 
of Sankara, and the Vaishnava acharyas had put forward 
very different views from his on questions of the nature of 
God, the relationship between God and man, and the
1. Ibid., v 160.
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relationship between God and the phenomenal world# But the 
real cause of disagreement between Gahkara and the Vaishnava 
acharyas does not arise out of any existing controversy 
between ;jnana and bhakti#
The disagreement of the Vaishnava acharyas with 
Sankara’s Vedanta can be easily explained on grounds of 
their primary loyalty to Vaishnavism. The growing popularity 
and general acceptance of Sankara's Advaita^Vedanta had 
created special problems for the Vaishnavas# In his efforts 
to combat the nastika influences, 3aftkara had worked for 
the unity of the different astika traditions. He was able 
to achieve it by concentrating on those aspects of their 
beliefs which alone could serve as their meeting ground.
But Sankara had explained the fundamentals of the astika 
beliefs in terms of Vedanta, and had interpreted Vedanta in 
strictly monistic terms. The Advaita Vedanta of Sankara, 
which takes an impersonal view of God was bound to create 
problems for the Vaishnavas who belonged to the astika group, 
but whose characteristic religious modes could lose their 
pre-eminence if they were to be constantly exposed to the 
influence of Sankara’s Advaita and its emphasis on the 
impersonal nature of God# Vaishnavas viewed God primarily 
as a person, and the worship of the personal deity Vishnu 
and his avataras Rama and Krishna was of fundamental
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importance to the Vaishnava religion. An impersonal concept
of God and the idea of the Nirguna Brahman on the other
hand was the very essence of the Advaita Vedanta of
&ankaracharya. Vaishnavas, as an astika group, were now
faced with the task of upholding their traditional faith
and practices, and also of reiterating their astika Beliefs.
In the post~£>ankara period however, the latter could he
ifo
achieved only through the language of,xVedanta.
As £>ankara Ts influence Became more Broad Based, the
need for evolving a Vaishn.ava thought-system in terms of
Vedanta must have Become more and more apparent. If this
popular religion, Vaishnavism, was to retain its traditional
Beliefs and modes of worship, it was necessary for it now,
more than ever, to have a status of its own in philosophy
and metaphysics and to have its own theological sanctions
intellectually explained. The Best way to achieve this was
to interpret Vedanta from the Vaishnava viewpoint. The
four great theologians of the medieval period, Ramanuja,
NimBarka, Madhva, and VailaBhacharya were to fulfill this
need of Vaishnavism, each in his own manner. The four0 *
systems of Vaishnava Vedanta, as evolved By them, were in 
the nature of a reasoned and a scholastic response of 
Vaishnavism to the challenge of Sankara. They were an 
expression of the Vaishnava efforts towards the preservation
and re-orientation of their thought and "beliefs.
The main difference between Sankara and the Vaishnava 
acharyas lies in the Vaishnava sympathies of the latter who 
laid great stress on the personality of Vishpu and his 
avatar a Krishna in their systems of Vedanta, As Vaishnava^ 
it was very important for the Vaishnava acharyas to establish 
this aspect of their faith in the Vedanta. Therefore, even 
when most of them were able to make certain adjustments with
*L
Sankara !s Vedanta, on the question of the unity of the 
Brahman, none of them showed any compromise with his Nirguna 
or impersonal Brahman. Although we find different shades of 
opinion amongst the Vaishnava acharyas on the question of 
the Advaita and the Dvaita, there is perfect unanimity 
amongst them regarding the Saguna or the personal nature of 
God. Thus the emphasis laid by the Vaishnava Acharyas on a 
personal God was caused by their Vaishnava faith, and need 
not therefore, be interpreted as a counterpart of any special 
religion or doctrine of bhakti propounded by them.
Some major misconceptions about the Bhakti Movement 
can be removed if the differences between Sankara and the 
Vaishnava acharyas are studied on the lines suggested above. 
In the following pages therefore, the position of 3ankara- 
charya is examined against the total background of Hinduism
d* Vide Infra, pp.|£|l-*T§*
and that of the astika unity* His achievement of the astika
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unity is explained here in the light of his formulation of 
the Advaita Vedanta* The repercussions of this 011 Vaishna- 
vism are duly weighed, and the position of the Vaishriava 
acharyas in relation to Sankara is reviewed mainly from the 
standpoint of the Vaishpava cause.
(a) The Place of gahkara and His Vedanta in Hinduism, and 
the Problem of the Astika Unity
^ahkara occupies a very unique place in the history 
of Hinduism. This is not entirely on account of his 
brilliant academic exposition of the Advaita-Vedanta, but 
is also due to the significant role he played in the revival 
of Hinduism in its struggle against the Buddhist forces, 
^ahkara was not only a philosopher and a man of exceptional 
intellectual attainments, but was also a man of action 
inspired by the great sense of religious mission.
A great deal of diversity existed within Hinduism 
in spite of the common agreement regarding fundamentals and 
the acceptance of certain doctrines by all the groups and 
philosophical systems. Certain amount of ideological 
agreement, and a serious effort towards a possible synthesis 
was necessary if they were to stand together as one. To 
defend Hinduism against other forces demanded at once a
sense of solidarity, a conscious unity, and some unifying 
principles* That alone could enable Hinduism to hold its 
own against Buddhism, Jainism and other prevalent creeds 
which lay outside its orthodox fold* Sankara must have been 
aware of this when he started his work for the revival and 
reorganization of Hinduism*
The Indian religio-philosophical traditions can be 
viewed in two broad divisions, those that are astika> and 
the others that are nastika, Whereas the former accept the 
principle of Atman, the latter rest on the principle of 
nairatmya* The astika tradition consists of many religious 
groups and ideologies and the astika thought is represented 
by the six orthodox systems of philosophy* The Buddhist 
tradition has proved the most significant and dynamic in the 
nastika group *
The philosophical systems which draw inspiration 
from the Upanishads conceive Reality as the Soul or the 
Atman, and regard it as eternal and immutable* All religious 
groups which accept this viewpoint fall into the astika * 
group. The nastikas take a very different stand* They 
disregard the authority of the Upanishads and deny the 
existence of an inner and immutable unifying principle of 
Reality* According to the Buddhists, everything is
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discontinuous, separate and momentary, and to regard Reality 
as otherwise is only an illusion horn out of wrong belief or 
avidya. Whereas according to the Upanishadic tradition, 
bondage arises out of the ignorance of the self and a wrong 
identification of the Self with the non-self, according to 
the Buddhist, avidya or ignorance is born out of wrong belief 
in the Atman.
Although all systems of philosophy and all the 
religious groups which accepted the principle of Atman and 
the authority of the Vedas could be grouped together as 
astikas, unity of their thought and belief could be regarded 
as more of an implicit than an apparent fact. Each thought 
system had evolved its own metaphysics and had followed a 
separate course of development. Starting from a common 
source, the different schools of philosophy had thus drifted 
apart. Many religious groups existing within the astika 
fold had their own sectarian loyalties and distinct 
traditions too, which were not always directly derived from 
the Vedic background and which they had retained in spite 
of their acceptance of the Yedic authority and the Upanishadic 
principle of the Atman. Each religious group was bound to 
be zealous of its separate identity, and each thought system 
of its own particular standpoint.
But in spite of their mutual differences and their
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separate identities, they were in complete agreement on two 
points. The common "bonds of the astika systems lay in their
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common acceptance of certain underlying philosophic axioms 
on the one hand, and their firm acceptance of the gruti on 
the other. In so far as they "believed in an eternal and 
immutable entity, the Atman, and they accepted the authority 
of the Vedas, there was no scope for difference of opinion 
amongst them. On the question of the ultimacy of the Atman 
and the £?r.utia they formed a composite group against the 
nastikas, who took a totally different position on these 
issues*
&aAkara was faced with the task of upholding the 
astika position against that of the nastikas. This could be 
achieved by highlighting the points of mutual agreement 
amongst the astikas and by making them aware of their main 
difference with the nastika group. £&dkara therefore, 
strongly emphasised the two factors which could keep the 
astikas linked together, their common adherence to the ffruti 
and their underlying philosophical unity on the question of 
the Ultimate,
Sankara drew a clear line of division between the 
astikas and nastikas, and made a case for the unity of the 
astika systems on grounds of their common adherence to the 
Vedas, Describing the Bauddhas, the Lokayat^s and the Jainas
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as those 1 who hold it as an established conclusion that the
Vedas are not author it at iven , he called upon all those who
accepted the authority of the Vedas to refute their systems
by means of logical reasoning* Similarly he pointed out the
philosophical unity of the astikas by explaining that they
all agreed in their final understanding of the Ultimate 
2Reality. Furthermore, in the light of this £>aftkara strongly 
emphasised the oneness of the Being who, he explained, is 
variously understood by various philosophical controversial­
ists in their several systems of philosophy", but who is 
indeed "the one and the only Brahman".^
.Although in such explanations of the essential unity 
of that Being, &a:nkara was only repeating an old and familiar 
idea of the Vedas,^ this idea must have carried a new 
meaning in an atmosphere of fully evolved philosophical 
diversities and multiplicity of cults and practices. Such 
an approach could help in viewing the mutual philosophical 
differences in the right perspective, and might set the 
forces of synthesis to work. It might also direct the
1 • Sarva-Siddhanta-Sangraha of S'ahkaracharya, ed* 
by M. Rangacharya, Madras, 1909, 1.25 •
2* Ibid., passim .
3* Ibid.* 1*1.
U. Rig-Veda, I.164.U6; X.llU.5.
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people*s attention to certain points of fundamental 
similarityo
Whereas the ultimacy of the Vedas was always 
maintained hy the astika schools, and the idea of the 
essential oneness of the Reality was easily acceptable to 
them, much greater effort was required on the part of 
J?ankaracharya to formulate a thought system which would 
cement all the astika schools into a more positive and 
definite philosophical unity. Out of all the orthodox 
systems of philosophy perhaps he saw a greater potential in 
the Vedanta as a cementing force for achieving such a 
synthesis.
Because of the very nature of its development, 
Vedanta had remained closest to the Upanishads, and was more 
suitable as a meeting ground for all the philosophical 
systems which were directly rooted in them. It had taken 
shape as^result of a continuous effort to give a systematic 
form to the philosophy contained in the Upanishads* As the 
Upanishads did not exist in the form of systematised 
treatises, different interpretations were always possible, 
and the system of Vedanta therefore, though directly rooted 
in them, always enjoyed a certain amount of flexibility. 
Various points of view were always possible within its 
framework, and yet its close connection with the Upanishads
could always be retained.
The work of systematically explaining the philosophi­
cal contents of the Upanishads was first undertaken by 
Badarayana. But this first exposition of the Vedanta was 
offered in the form of Sutras, which on account of their 
cryptic nature, could be differently interpreted. Thus, in 
the course of its development, Vedanta was explained in 
different ways and had remained flexible enough to 
accommodate a wide range of differences without losing its 
substantial unity, which was formally based on the Vedanta- 
SUtras of Badarayana, On account of this flexibility,
Vedanta had also developed a great capacity for assimilation 
of other influences. For example, it had not been shy even 
of the influence of the opposite forces of the nastika group, 
and long before Sankara, Vedanta had absorbed some of the 
Buddhist concepts as well.
An earlier Vedantin, Gaudapada, shows a considerable
1influence of Buddhist thought, A similar phenomenon is
1 , According to Chandradhara Sharma, Gaudapada represents 
the best that is in Nagarjuna and Vlfsubandhu. Radhakrish- 
nan describes the Karika of Gaudapada as an "attempt to 
combine in one whole the negative logic of the MadhySmikCs 
with the positive idealism of the Upanishads1' and states 
that Gaudapadafs "liberal views enabled him to accept 
doctrines assocaited with Buddhism and adjust them to the 
Advaita-Vedanta",
Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, 
Rider & Co., London .1960, p. 239»
So Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p 0^-65,
seen in Sankara, who clearly included in his system of 
Vedanta certain Buddhist elements such as the doctrine of 
Maya and the value of monastic ism. This ability of Vedanta 
to incorporate the strong influence of Buddhist philosophy 
was perhaps its additional strength. It could help in 
extending its influence and popularity in view of the 
predominant impact of Buddhism on Indian life and thought.
astika systems. He used it as a medium to transmit a 
unified philosophy, complete in itself, fundamentals of 
which would be acceptable to all the astika groups. He 
established it now on a stronger footing in relation with 
the other systems of philosophy. He crystallised it and 
gave it a new shape through his clear cut philosophy of 
Advaitavada or non-dualism. At the same time he argued and 
proved that out of all the systems of philosophy it was 
Vedanta which stood closest to the meaning and the wisdom 
of the Vedas.
Gankara discusses the auxiliary limbs (angas). the secondary 
limbs (upangas) of the Vedas, and the supplementary Vedas
the
Gankara used/Vedanta as a platform for unifying the
In his introduction to Sarva-Siddhanta-Sadgraha,
fourteen branches of knowledge
1 • Sarva-Siddhanta -Sangraha, 1.2.
the
mentioned under them, he regardq/Mimansa, which is devoted
to the enquiry into the meaning and aim of all the Vedas, as 
1 -the highest* The Purva-Mini ansa, he explains deals only with 
rituals or Karma, whereas the Uttara-Mimansa is divided into 
two parts - one dealing with the deities (Pevata-Kanda)* the
i
«v - a Pother with Jnana or wisdom (Jnana-Kanda). The explanatory
commentary written on the Jnana-Kanda is described by SaAkara
the
as Vedanta* Although Sankara connects/MImansa as a whole
with the "meaning and aim of the Vedas", he regards only the
Jnana-Kanda of Uttara-MImansa as Vedanta, the end and the aim
of the Vedas * As far as other systems of philosophy go,
the
Sankara points out that they all culminate in/Vedanta. 
According to him, the conclusions of all the other systems 
tend towards the same as those of Vedanta.^"
Sankara’s desire to create a philosophical synthesis 
of the astika sohools in terms of Vedanta can be clearly 
seen in the opening and the concluding remarks of his Sarva- 
Siddhanta~San.graha* He mentions at the outset that "the 
Brahman, who is differently understood by different 
controversialists of philosophy, can be realised in the
1. S ar v a - S iddh ant a «*S aAgr aha, 1.16,17 .
2. Ibid.3 I*20a
3. Ibid., I.22*
A. Ibid., XIIa.
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1Vedanta." He concludes his account of the different systems 
of philosophy and religion with the remark that "he who hears 
in the proper order these well abridged conclusions of all 
the systems culminating in the Vedanta becomes the knower of
p
things and a learned person in the world."
Sankara not only established an infallible position
the
for/Vedanta as the main purport of the Vedas and a meeting 
ground of the fundamentals of different philosophical 
trends, but was also able to give it a new dimension as a 
philosophical system in itself. The systematisation of 
Vedanta by Sankara in terms of Advaita created a thought- 
system "which in consistence, thoroughness and profundity, 
holds the first place in Indian philosophy". According to 
Thibaut, "the doctrine advocated by Sankara is, from a 
purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all 
theological considerations, the most important and 
interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil; neither 
those forms of the Vedanta, which diverge from the view 
represented by £>aAkara nor any of the non-Vedantic systems, 
can be compared with the so-called orthodox. Ved’anta in 
boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation0 £>a3ikaraTs
1. Ibid., 1.1.
2. Ibid., XII, 99.
3. Thibaut, quoted. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, ibid., 
Vol.II, p p .
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treatment of/Vedanta was .thus unique* In the words of 
Radhakrishnan his Advaita-Vedanta stands forth complete as 
a philosophy ’'needing neither a "before nor an after”*
(h ) gahkara's Challenge to Vaishnavism
The superiority of Vedanta, thus established by 
Sankara not only affected the relative position of the other 
orthodox systems of philosophy but had serious repercussions 
on Vaishnavism too* The Vaishnavas were a religious group, 
astika in nature but held together mainly on the basis of 
the worship of a common deity, Vishnu* They had no distinct 
and exclusive thought system of their own comparable to the 
six classical schools of philosophy. Vishnu-worship 
constituted the very essence of their religion, and their 
formal theology had evolved as a result of the influences
p
of the prevailing systems of philosophy* That the 
Vaishnava thought on the whole had drawn freely from all 
the astika philosophical schools is clear from the speculat­
ive parts of their scriptures which show that such an
1 . Ibid., p.M-l-6*
2* This can be seen in the important literary texts of the 
Vaishnavas such as the Bhagavat Purana and the Vishnu 
Purana * It may be added here however that the Vaishnava 
Samhitas also, when they consist of four parts, one°of 
which is called the Jnana^pada, show similar influences*
assimilative process was going on from an early stage. In 
the pre-£ahkara period, however, the Vaishnavas had relied 
more definitely on the Sankhya philosophy for the development
of their theology, and the deity Vishnu was upheld hy them
** # 1 in the Sankhya terminology as pure Sattva,
The growing popularity of Saftkara's philosophy and
the new status acquired hy Vedanta came as a challenge to
the Vaishnavas, Vaishnavism had always had a great following
and had served as one of the main astika strongholds against
the nastika group till now. When Sankara used Vedanta as
the touchstone for testing the validity of all astika
systems of thought and was successful in establishing it as
the meeting ground of all the theistic groups, it became
increasingly important for the Vaishnavas also to explain
the
their religious beliefs in terms of/Vedanta if they were to
1 • Sarva-Siddhanta~Sangrahat Chapter XI,
2, Prabodha^Chandrodaya, an allegorical and popular Sanskrit 
play of the 11th century, gives a clear indication of 
this, Vishnu-bhakti is represented in this play as the 
repository of the true sraddha and dharma at a time when 
the Upanishad was undergoing a period of crisis. It is 
Vishnu-bhakti which finally brings about a meeting of the 
Upanishad and viveka who had got separated from each 
other. The atheists find it difficult to combat Vishnu- 
bhakti and it is she who finally succeeds in gaining* 
victory for viveka,
Krishna Mishra, Prabodha».Chandrodaya, Chowkambha Vidya 
Bfiavan, Banaras, 1955> Acts II, III, V, VI,
maintain and uphold their former position. An absence of an 
independent philosophical system exclusively their own, and 
their reliance on the principles of Sankhya in their theology, 
are clearly indicated in Sankara’s observations on them in 
his Sarva-Siddhanta-Sahgraha, It will not be wrong to 
mention here that no special religion or doctrine of Bhakti 
is attributed to the Vaishnavas by Sankara in this work.
In the Sarva-Siddhanta-Sahgraha, Sankara does not
deal with the Vaishnava Siddhanta separately but gives an
account of their doctrines and beliefs in his discussion
on the Veda-Vyasa-Paksha, where he mentions Vishnu-worship
and the supremacy of the deity Vishnu as recognized by the 
1BhagavataSo The system of Veda-Vyasa is described by
Sankara as the essence of the Vedas as given out by Veda
Vyasa in the Mahabharata, He also explains that their views
were derived from the Sankhya system by the believers of the 
o
Vedas. As is clear from this, ^ahkara had fully recognized 
the astika nature of the Vaishnavas. Nevertheless, in view 
of Sankara's challenge, the Vaishnavas. had now to explain 
their religious beliefs in terms of Vedanta if they were to 
maintain and uphold their former position.
Although Sahkara had not raised any objections to
1. Sarva--Siddhanta-Sah.graha, XI, 55? 55, 59? 66,
2. Ibid., XI. 1.
189
Vishnu-worship and had given his general sanction to the
religious modes of the Vaishnavas, his impersonal and
monistic view of Reality was obviously at variance with
1their essential beliefs,, First and foremost, the Vaishnavas
9 *
worshipped Vishnu and his avataras as personalities. No
amount of theological manipulations to explain Vishnu as the
Brahman could change this basic position of the Vaishnava
religion. Similarly, certain religious modes closely linked
with the temple-culture and idol-worship were an integral
2part of Vaishnavism, They were an easy accompaniment to 
the anthropomorphic view of the deity Vishnu, £>ahkara1 s 
position however, was basically opposed to this. His concept 
of the jflirguna Brahman was not at all compatible with the 
personal image of the deity. Nor could his non-dualistic 
explanation of Reality be conducive to idol-worship, But 
an essential dualism and a sense of otherness between the 
Deity and the devotee were a necessary counterpart of 
personality cults such as that of Vishnu-worship• If God 
was to be worshipped as a person, He must be regarded as
1 • Br ahm a - Su t r a -Bha shy a, II, 2* JLj-2-W-W
2, The Pancharatra Samhitas, for example, lay great stress 
on temple-building*(mandira-nirmana) and image-making 
(pratishtha-vidhi). Detailed accounts of these can be 
found in'the Kriya-Pada of the Samhita literature.
P. Otto, Schrader, Introduction to the Pancaratra and the 
Ahirbudhnya Samhita, Adyar Library, Madras, 1916, pp*22ff•
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definitely other than the devotee. How could the non- 
dualism of £>ahkara provide for this?
(c) The Vaishnava Response,
In face of Sankara’s challenge therefore, the task 
before the Vaishnava theologians was twofold. Not only was 
it necessary for them to explain their religious beliefs 
through the system of Vedanta, but it was equally important 
for them to assert the essential elements of the Vaishnava 
tradition with a fresh vigour. The personality of Vishnu
and of his avataras had now to be reinstated in the language
■ ■" 1 ■ ■■ *
of the Vedanta, irrespective of Sankara’s impersonal 
representation of God, Similarly, provision had to be made 
within the framework of Vedanta for the deity as a clearly 
separate entity against SankaraTs non-dualistic view of 
Reality. Neither the worship of Vishnu nor that of his 
avataras could have full significance without the sense of 
the otherness of the personal deity. The personality of 
Vishnu and that of his avatara Krishna had to be synchronised 
somehow with the Vedantic Brahman. At the same time this 
personal image of the Vaishnava God had to be placed in 
logical relationship with the Vedantic principles of GodTs 
immanence and of the unity of individual souls and God,
This emphasis on the Vaishnava elements can be
clearly seen in the four systems of Vaishnava Vedanta.
Neither bhakti nor theism, but Vishnu-bhakti and Vaishnavism
7 * t>
are the real points of difference between E>aftkara and the 
Vaishnava acharyas. The latter worked within the framework 
of Vedanta and did not so much aim at negating the Vedantic 
concepts of the unity of the Brahman as safeguarding the 
fundamentals of the Vaishnava religion. However, the 
Vaishnava acharyas show ready adjustments and compromise 
with the Advaita Vedanta in so far as their Vaishnava
t
beliefs are not superseded and to the extent that they find 
themselves in a position to retain their Vaishnava bias in 
relation to it. Each Vaishnava system of Vedanta, as well 
as the general nature of the progression of the Vaishnava 
movement from Ramanuja to Vallabhacharya shows this.
Although Ramanuja objects to S^ankara^ non-dualism 
and qualifies it, he does not entirely oppose it. Like 
Sankara he also conceives Reality as a unity. As the term 
itself indicates, the Visishtadvaita of Ramanuja lays as 
much stress on the non-dualistic nature of Reality as it 
does on the difference which qualifies it. The inseparable 
unity of matter, souls, and God constitute the Brahman of 
Ramanuja. The main disagreement between Sankara and 
Ramanuja, is that whereas Sankara’s Advaita is an undiffer­
entiated monism, RamanujaTs advaita is visishta, or qualified.
Qualifying Sankara’s monism, Ramanuja lays down 
three ultimate realities (tattva-traya): God (isvara), Soul 
(chit) and matter (achit). But he also establishes the 
principle of an internal relation of inseparability 
(apr4thaka~siddhi) amongst them, which serves as the pivot
9
1on which his whole philosophy runs. Soul and matter are 
distinct from God, but are not separate from Him. They are 
attributes (prakara) of God. They are the controlled 
(niyamya) the supported (clharya) the parts (ansas) and the 
accessory means (desha). God is their substance (prakyiti). 
controller (niyanta), support (adhara)» whole (adsl), 
and the principal end (seshi). He is free from all 
internal (sajatlya) as well as external (vijatlya) 
differences because there is nothing similar or dissimilar 
which is external to or other than Him. ■ Ramanuja!s 
Absolute is therefore an organic unity - a concrete whole 
(Visishta) consisting of interrelated and interdependent 
subordinate elements which cannot exist by themselves in 
separation from the substantive element (Viseshya)* The 
distinction and the supremacy of God or Isvara is thus 
established by Ramanuja within the non-dualistic unity of
1. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, George Allen 
& Unwin, London, 1932, p.399ff.
2. Chandradhar Sharma, ibid., p.3^7*
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the Ultimate Reality.
Like Ramanuja, Madhva also "believes in the three
distinct entities of matter, soul, and God. But he does not
support Ramanuja’s principle of inseparability. On the
contrary, Madhva dwells more on the principle of difference
and separation amongst them. Madhva clearly rejects
^aAkara’s monistic Vedanta and offers his own which is
clearly dualistic. He puts forward a clear and fundamental
difference "between soul and God. Against Efaftkara’s
description of the jiva as the pratib m b  a of Brahman,
Madhvafs dualism or Dvaitavada provides for the bimba-
pratibimba relationship between the two. Although Madhva
acknowledges Brahman as the independent source of Reality,
he states that the consciousness and the activity of the
jiva cannot be experienced without dependence upon the
Brahman. The bimba-pratibimba relationship according to
1Madhva cannot be annulled and must remain eternal.
But in spite of this dualism, Madhva also leaves 
some room for unity between the Brahman and jiva. He 
substitutes the idea of identity of &aftkara and that of
/ p
inseparability of Ramanuja with his own idea of ahsatva.
1, BoN.Ko Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya. Bharatiya 
Vidya Bhavan, Bombay,1962, p. 216 ff,
2. Ibid., p. 227.
Madhva regards jiva as similar to Brahman to the degree that
the former possesses the letter’s characteristics of reality,
consciousness and bliss. Speaking in this strain, Madhva
sometimes identifies the jiva with the Brahman and describes
a free soul as akin to God. So much so, that on these
also
grounds sometimes the followers of Madhva/claim their
position to be monistic.1
Like Ramanuja and Madhva, Nimbarka also conceives
Reality in three parts - God, Soul and matter. But his
Dvaitadvaita Vedanta is really a dualistic monism. Nimbarka
accepts the difference as well as the non-difference between
the Brahman and the individual souls, and between Brahman
and the phenomenal world. According to him soul and matter
have no independent existence and are not different from
God. Individual souls are not the rays of Brahman
individualised, as suggested by the Vivartvadins, but are
essentially of the nature of knowledge (jflana - svarupa).
Matter and souls are not attributes of God, but they
2
constitute parts and power of God.
Vallabhacharya takes a completely monistic stand.
His Guddhadvaita or pure monism explains the whole universe
1. K, Narain, An Outline of Madhva Philosophy. Udayana 
Publication sT,"A1TahabadT^96^ 2, p .'TT23"•
2. Chandradhar Sharma, ibid., p. 376 ff.
as Brahmano Neither the individual souls nor the inanimate
world has any separate existence. God is the whole and the
individual is a part thereof. According to Vallabha, the
relation between the two is that of the spark and the fire.
The universe is neither an illusion nor a manifestation of
Brahman, but is its natural emenation. God is the one
supreme inner ruler of the universe (antaryamin)» The
material world is only a manifestation of His aspects of
existence and knowledge. Brahman as bliss remains obscure
in the material world, states Vallabha, but from His nature
as Bliss, spring forth the antaryamins who are the residing
1deities of the souls and are as numerous as the souls.
Thus in spite of their differences with Sankara, 
the Vaishnava acharyas show some agreement and compromise 
with his advaitavada. On the whole they acknowledge the 
oneness of the jiva and the Brahman or of soul and God. As 
a group occupied with the task of developing a different 
view of Vedanta from that of Sankara in spite of seriously 
modifying his views they seem to gravitate more towards the 
non-dualistic than a dualistic view of Reality. Each one of 
them had put forward his. system of Vedanta in refutation of 
Sankara, but out of the four Vaishnava acharyas, it was 
only Madhva who took a clearly dualistic stand. Ramanuja
1. S.N. Dasgupta, ibid., Vol.IV, p. 331£‘£<>
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and Nimbarka were content with modifications of non-dualism. 
Vallabhacharya went to the extent of evolving his own non­
dualism, though different from that of Shankar a. It is 
therefore wrong to regard these systems of Vedanta as 
assertions of the sense of dualism and otherness between man 
and God for the propagation of bhakti or devotion.
The more serious difference between £>a:dkara and 
the Vaishnava acharyas lies in the uniform insistence by the 
latter on a personal view of God, All of them uphold 
Isvara or God as perfect personality (Purushottama) and 
describe Him in terms of good qualities (saguna). But 
although the categories of Isfvara and Purushottama are the 
same as that of Brahman in the Vaishnava acharyas, their 
views in this respect are absolutely different from that of 
Sankara who always regards Brahman in its final form as 
nirguna and impersonal.
In their personal view of God however, the Vaishnava 
acharyas were asserting only their Vaishnava bias. The 
worship of the personal deity Vishnu and of the deified 
personality of Krishna was an integral part of Vaishnavism. 
It was necessary to keep the supreme position of these 
personalities intact if Vaishnavism was to retain its ownc
character while speaking the language of Vedanta. In the 
Vaishnava-Vedanta, the concept of the Purushottama provided
ample scope for bringing in the anthropomorphic view of God,
which was a vital part of the Vaishnava religion. Ramanuja
and Madhva installed and exalted Vishnu in their Vedanta as
Purushottama and the Brahman. Similarly Nimbarka and
Vallabha concentrated a great deal on the personality of
Krishna in theirs. But this emphasis on God as a person,
and on Vishnu and Krishna, was for the purpose of upholding
the Vaishnava religion. These personal conceptions of God
the
were not evolved in/Vaishnava-Vedanta for the propagation of 
any
/bhakti religion or doctrine,
iv. Bhakti in the Vaishnava Acharyas.
(a) Ramanuja
Both the Upanishadic and the Vaishnava elements are 
present in RamanujaTs scheme of §adlffha. Inspired by one, 
he lays stress on contemplation) individual efforts, and 
internalised forms of devotion. Guided by the other, he 
gives full recognition to overt and ritualistic modes of 
worship followed by the Vaishnavas. On the one hand Ramanuja 
emphasises the importance of dhyana, jnana, and yoga. On 
the other he talks of the path of complete surrender, devoid 
of all these as sufficient. But on the whole he recognizes 
the path of self effort, contemplation and jftana as the
1
higher one and identifies it with bhakti.
Rajnanuja lays down two categories of sadhana, that 
of hhakti and prapatti. They are defined differently and 
are recommended for different types of aspirants. Neverthe­
less one is definitely declared to he higher than the other. 
The path of hhakti is recommended for the three upper castes, 
and only the path of prapatti is left open for the sudras. 
Whereas meditation, knowledge, and spiritual experience are 
declared essential for hhakti, the mere act of surrender is
considered as sufficient for those who follow the path of 
2prapatti. Considering this distinction made hy Ramanuja 
between hhakti and prapatti, it is wrong to interpret his 
hhakti as the path of simple surrender opposed to that of 
jfrana.
Ramanuja does not describe hhakti as a form of faith 
or doctrine, hut describes it in very clear terms as an act 
of constant memory. In this context memory is explained hy 
Ramanuja as meditation or dhyana. According to him it is 
this memory or smriti which adopts the nature of, and 
culminates in an immediate intuitive perceptior or 
pratyakshata. Those who are attached to this state, obtain
1. Hiriyanna, ibid., pp. klO ff.
2. Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, pp. 705-6.
See also Chandradhara Sharma, ibid., pp*352ff.
liberation on account of their intense love for the object 
of their memory. In other words, Ramanuja's bhakti is 
aimed at and results in a kind of intuitive knowledge. 
Therefore, if in the context of spiritual endeavour or 
aadhna, jflana is correctly understood in the sense of 
spiritual knowledge derived from personal experience, 
Ramanuja's bliakti must be considered synonymous with it.
Thus Ramanuja defines bhakti as an experience which is the 
result of devout meditation, is accompanied with love, and 
is also a kind of knowledge.
Ramanuja is generally described as the chief 
protoganist of the path of bhakti against that of ‘jnana.
But this is a mistaken judgement. As shown above, bhakti 
is described by him as a particular kind of knowledge or
o
jflan a~ visesha, to which one is infinitely attached. 
According to him, it is this knowledge which leads to the 
extinction of all other interests and desires.
(b) Nimbarka.
Although Nimbarka views bhakti from a more emotional 
angle, and describes it as Madhurya and rasa, it is the
1. Jo G-onda, "Het Begrip Bhakti", ibid., pp.651 ff.
2. S.No Dasgupta, ibid.., Vol. Ill, p 0l6l0
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intuitive perception of the Brahman, Brahmas aksha tkara,
which remains the ultimate aim of his sadlma. According to
him the end of spiritual endeavour is to attain the feeling
of oneness with God and to ahide in Him as a part of His 
1' energy • This can he achieved only through bhakti, Both
thought and devotion are required in it, because the nature 
of the Brahman is revealed only through a process of 
spiritual realisation. According to Nimbarka, meditation 
on the nature of God and participation in Him as His
2constituent is the same as continuous devotion for Him, 
Nimbarka does not see any conflict between *3nana 
and bhakti. He does not only relate bhakti with knowledge, 
but regards the two as interdependent. According to him, 
liberation is caused by knowledge which is brought about by 
God's grace, which itself is due to devotion.-^ In a way 
Nimbarka regards knowledge as superior to bhakti^ because 
his bhakti at once requires the knowledge of the Supreme 
Reality as well as that of the individual soul.
Nimbarkafs bhakti does not exclude the element of
1. S.No Dasgupta, ibid., Vol.Ill, p.UlU.
2, Ibid., p.415*
3# Chandradhara Sharma, ibid.5 P«376.
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individual endeavour either. On the contrary, the latter is 
considered necessary for the attainment of Brahma-^nana and 
Brahma-Sakshatkara * Neither the idea of GodTs grace nor 
that of prapatti eliminate this from his thought, Nimbarka 
recognizes prapatti as a means of salvation and states that 
those who show it are favoured by God who engenders bhakti 
in them* Nevertheless, he maintains that it is only through 
the efforts of the devotee himself that God is moved to 
grant His grace, Prapatti or surrender to Him has value 
only in so far as it arouses bhakti and finally leads to the 
intuitive perception of the Brahman, But it is the latter 
which always remains the ultimate end of NimbarkaTs bhakti*
(c) Madhya •
Madhva describes bhakti as a state of loving
attachment born out of the knowledge and regard for the
object of devotion. The knowledge and correct understanding
of the greatness of God is necessary for bhakti because
devotion, in order to be meaningful, must be founded on a
1firm and adequate knowledge of the object of devotion.
Since the purpose of bhakti is to manifest the true relation 
of jlva to Brahman, it is the knowledge of God alone which
1. S,No Dasgupta, iMd., Vol.IV, pp.317-18. 
See also B,N,K, Sharma, ibid., pp. 293 ff*
can produce the feeling of love and absolute dependence on 
Him.1
Thus there is no antagonism between devotion and
knowledge in the philosophy of Madhva who regards jftana as
a direct constituent of bhakti, and bhakti a combination of
knowledge and love. The principle of interdependence between
the two is established by Madhva in very explicit terms. Not
only this, but he goes even further and establishes the
superiority of knowledge over bhakti. This is evident in
the
the categories and/gradations made by him of bhakti, bhaktas,
moksha and IsVar a -p r asada. According to him, different
2
souls are capable of different kinds of devotion. Madhva 
mentions three stages of bhakti, that which precedes 
Paroksha-JInana, that which follows it, and that which comes 
after direct realisation and wins the absolute grace 
(atyarthaprasada) of God.*^ The final and highest stage of 
bhakti is reached only when the true relationship between 
tjiva and Brahman is realised, and the grace of God comes to 
the devotee only when he attains a stage of direct realisa- 
tion. It is also clear from these gradations that in spite
1. So Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p.7U7*
2. BoNoK. Sharma, ibid., p,292.
3. Ib ido, p.296.
of his emphasis on the principle of Divine Grace, Madhva
did not in any way minimise the importance of individual
1effort in spiritual endeavour.
These aspects of MadhvaTs bhakti, existing within
the framework of his dualistic Vedanta, support our contention
that the term bhakti was at no stage used by the Vaishnava
acharyas in its present meaning. If we accept the current
definitions of bhakti, at least Madhva, as an exponent of
the Dvaita-Vedanta, should have drawn a more clear line of
demarcation between the path of devotion and that of
knowledge. But even the dualistic philosophy of Madhva does
not make it necessary for him to make such a division between
bhakti and $Tana. The accepted definition of bhakti however
vitiates our understanding of Madhvafs exposition of it.
Some studies of his philosophy, such as those of K. Narain
and B.K.N. Sharma, suffer seriously from this defect. In
order to conform to the existing view of bhakti, these
scholars quote freely from the Bhagavata-Purana and other
Vaishnava works to define bhakti in general, and they then
judge Madhva*s bhakti in their light, instead of basing
2their understanding of it on Madhva*s work alone. That
1, In the words of B.N., K« Sharma, !,Madhva ’ s peculiar
doctrine of intrinsic gradation of fitness among various 
orders of souls enables him to correlate the different 
forms of devotion to different orders of s e l v e s i b i d . ,
p.292.
2. Ibid., See Chapter XLVIII.
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Madhva should have given greater importance to knowledge in
spite of giving locus-standi to bhakti is noted rather
1apologetically by both Narain and Sharma. On the one hand 
therefore, an exaggerated view is taken of the place of 
bhakti in its present meaning in Madhva, on the other, great 
surprise is shown why he did not create a superior place for 
bhakti in relation to jllana. This attitude is obviously due 
to the acceptance of the present fixed and artificial 
definition of bhakti and judging Madhva*s bhakti in its 
light, instead of accepting it on its own face value.
(d) Vallabha.
Of the four Vaishnava acharyas, Vallabha deserves 
our special attention from the standpoint of the current 
ideas, about bhakti, for it is his exposition of bhakti which
1. In order to make the bhakti of Madhva compatible with the 
current concept of bhakti, Sharma feels the need for 
introducing his discussion on Madhva1s bhakti by quoting 
Jayatirtha instead of Wladhva himself. He explains 
apologetically that the "point in Madhva!s insistence on 
mahatmya jfiana as one of the constituents of Bhakti is 
that a blind and ignorant devotion is of no philosophical 
worth4'. Similarly, Narain observes that "it would 
unmistakenly occur to us that bhakti in his system could 
not acquire that supreme status as was expected from a 
doyen of the bhakti .movement"• Narain tries to explain 
away the importance attached by Madhva and his followers 
by suggesting that this was due to "the fear that the 
futility of knowledge as a means to liberation would 
establish the futility of their labour in writing works 
on ph ilo sophy".
B.N.K. Sharma, ibid., pp.287 and 289; K.Narain, ibid., 17U.
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conforms/most to them. A clear and definite emphasis on a 
personal God, complete reliance on emotions and on GodTs 
grace, and a separation from the path of knowledge are the 
chief characteristics of the path of Vallabhacharya, which 
is known as the Fushti-Marga.
In his Bhakti-Vardhanl, Vallahha describes prema 
(love) as the seed of bhakti. He defines bhakti as an 
overwhelming affection for God, accompanied by a full sense 
of his greatness. Amongst the followers of Vallabha, bhakti 
is generally interpreted as a combination of love and service 
Bhakti as seva can exist for the name (nama-seva), as well 
as for the form (rupa-seva)„ Seva or service may be of the 
'body (tanuja) of material wealth (vittaya)» or of the mind 
(manasa) • The bhakti of the Vallabha school has an intensely 
emotional angle. The seven stages of bhakti^ mentioned by 
Vallabhacharya himself - of bhava, prema, pranaya. sneha, 
raga, anuraga and vyasana - indicate purely emotional 
states of love. According to him the devotee attains the 
highest state of bhakti only when his love for God assumes 
the nature of a passion (vyasana)•
Jnana or knowledge does not have much significance
1. ScNo Dasgupta, ibid., Vol.IV, p.355* 
2* Ibid.» p.3^7* 
3. Ibid.. p.356.
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in the emotionalism of Vallabhafs bhakti. Similarly no
importance is attached to individual effort in his Pushti-
marga, They are not necessary for "bhakti nor for salvation.
According to Vallabha, the devotee must depend entirely on
GodTs grace or Pushti,for according to him bhakti is itself
%
a product of pushti. Bhakti is arotised and the sins are
©
destroyed through the grace of God, and the same ends which 
are otherwise achieved through Jflana, karma and upasana, 
can be attained through the pushti-marga.
A completely personal image of God, as seen in 
Krishna, completes the pattern of Vallabhafs bhakti. Since 
Krishpa is recognized as the Supreme Deity by Vallabha, 
Krishna-worship forms the nucleus of his religious inspirat­
ion. A great importance is attached to the life and
personality of Krishna, particularly to the accounts of his
which
childhood in the Vallabha School in/ love, service and 
surrender are conceived and understood only in relation to 
the personal deity Krishna.
Although these aspects of Vallabha!s devotionalism 
conform to the current ideas about bhakti, it must be 
remembered that even Vallabhacharya does not offer any 
single and fixed definition of bhakti limiting it to his 
own views, Vtfhen he elaborates on bhakti, he does so to 
emphasise his own pattern of it, that of Pushti-bhakti. The
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general connotation of the term "bhakti however, is not 
limited by him. On the contrary, the variability of* its 
character according to the nature of the object towards 
which it is directed, is duly recognised by Vallabha.
Although he himself is in favour of the Pushti-bhakti and
o
recommends it in terms of K^ishria-worship and an emotional
approach to religion, he gives full recognition to the bhakti
1directed to the Nirguna Brahman. This is clear from the 
division made by Vallabhacharya between Pushti-bhakti and 
Maryada-bhakti.
According to Vallabha, the souls are either Godly 
or demonic. Each acts according to his own nature. Whereas 
the latter remain excluded from gadlma, the former are always 
capable of bhakti. Vallabha divides the Godly souls into 
two categories - those who follow the path of Marvada -
2bhakti and the others, who follow the path of Pushti-bhakti. 
This distinction is explained by Vallabha as that of Pushti - 
marga and the Maryada-Marga. We have already mentioned the 
salient features of the former. The latter however, is 
described by Vallabha as the Vedic path in which bhakti is 
attained by Karma. .Iflana and up as ana, and in which liberation 
can be attained only through individual effort.
1. Ibid.. pp. 35U-56o
2. Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy. Central 
Book Agency, Calcutta, 1952, Vol.II, p. 718.’
Thus Vallabha gives us two alternate categories of 
bhakti, the Mary ad a -bh ale t i and the pushti-bhakti. Whereas 
the former is described as a constituent of the Vedic path, 
compatible with jfiana and self-endeavour, the latter, it is 
said, can be cultivated entirely through a loving dependence 
on GodTs grace. The distinction of these two categories of 
bhakti becomes still more clear when Vallabha explains that 
those who follow the Maryada-bhakti, attain the Akshara 
Brahman, but those who practice the pushti-bhakti, attain 
the Puru sh o 11 am a or the Supreme Person,
The above analysis shows that the Vaishnava acharyas 
were not evolving any conceptional system of bhakti to give 
it the status of a doctrine. It also shows that they had 
no uniform and restricted definition of bhakti to work with. 
Moreover, the bhakti of the Vaishnava acharyas does not 
conform to its current definition, for they do not regard 
it as incompatible with jfrana and divorced from the path of 
self-realisation.
Thus the Vaishnava acharyas were not expounding any 
special religion of bhakti against Sankara!s path of jftana. 
Their differences with Sankara were due to their sectarian 
loyalty to Vaishnavism and their systems of Vedanta were 
in the nature of a Vaishnava defence against the challenge 
of SankaraTs Advaitavada. As shown above, bhakti is not
absent in Sankara and he does not uphold the path of
intellectual and abstract knowledge against that of bhakti. 
Certain corrections are therefore called for in the current 
view of the Bhakti Movement in relation to Sankara and the 
Vaishnava acharyas.
CHAPTER IV
KABIR AND THE CURRENT CONCEPT OP BHAKTI : A REAPPRAISAL
The fixity and the general currency of the present 
theories about bhakti and the Bhakti Movement place a 
serious limitation on attempts at an adequate understanding 
of the exact nature of Kabir !s religious and intellectual 
position. The tendency to judge and analyse him in the 
light of an artificial definition of bhakti has led to many 
misconceptions about him. Kabir fs religious faith, which 
is rooted in his personal spiritual experience does not 
arise out of any formally fixed ideology or doctrine of 
bhakti. What is found in his verses, not only does not fit 
in with the current view of bhakti but clearly contradicts 
it.
Kabir believes not in a personal but an impersonal 
God. His bhakti does not depend upon a dualistic view of 
Reality but rests on his keen awareness of the essential 
oneness of things. Furthermore, the emotional intensity of 
his devotionalism does not rule out the path of self- 
knowledge or jfiana. Although Kabir shows no respect for 
scholasticism, he attaches great importance to jfiana in the 
sense of self-knowledge which he regards as the highest 
spiritual end.
But all these aspects of Kabir*s thought are not
weighed properly in their own right and are not accepted at 
their face valuec Instead of ascertaining his position 
directly from his verses, enquiries into his thought and 
religion are invariably undertaken in the light of a fixed 
definition of bhakti. His devotional ism is therefore, 
interpreted sometimes as love for a personal God, and his 
bhakti as an antithesis of the path of knowledge or jnana. 
Again, for the same reasons, to the extent that bhakti is 
identified with Vaishnavism, Kabir as a bhakta. is represented 
as a Vaishnava without taking cognizance of the fundamental 
difference between his standpoint and that of Vaishnavism.
As pointed out earlier, similar difficulties are 
caused in the assessments of Kabir when the various vital 
currents which shaped the medieval religious renaissance in 
India are collectively viewed as a Bhakti Movement in the 
light of the present restricted meaning of bhakti. Without 
going into the general implications of the term, and 
rejecting its wider meaning, Kabir, a nirguna bhakta is 
easily placed in line with the Vaishnava bhaktas. The 
origins of his religious inspiration are then sought in 
Vaishnavism and the source of his bhakti is traced back to 
the medieval Vaishnava acharyas, although he has very little 
in common with them. These attitudes create obvious 
difficulties in tracing the antecedents of Kabir and his 
nirguna school.
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However, Kabirfs Nirguna school constitutes a 
distinct bhakti tradition* Its strong emphasis on the idea 
of an impersonal God, the evidence of Advaita philosophy 
and Yoga in it, and its emphasis on Self-knowledge and 
reasoning do not detract from its essential character of 
"bhakti. That such factors can accompany bhakti is a 
position not difficult to take, if the word bhakti is under­
stood in its broader meaning, and not as a special religion 
or cult.
It must be pointed out here that no set and 
restricted definition of bhakti was current in the medieval 
period. This is quite clear from the Bhakta-Mala of 
Nabhadas which is the earliest known account of the medieval 
bhaktas to be found in a single work. Nabhadas takes a 
very general view of bhakti and does not regard it as any 
fixed doctrinal position. Nor does he restrict it to Vishnu- 
worship and the Vaishnava religious modes alone. The Bhakta- 
Mala includes a variety of religious personalities of
different philosophical viewpoints in its list of bhaktas.
1The Advaita Vedantin ^aftkara, the Vaishnava commentator of 
the Bhagavata Purana, Sridhara, and the Vaishnava acharyas,
1. Nabhadas, Bhakta-Mala) 2 Volumes, Banares 190ij--9j 
Ghhappaya 37".' (Abbrev. Chappaya: Ghh)
2* Ibid.) ChhoUO.
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Rtoanuja^ Madhva, Nimbarka etc*1 are all listed together as 
bhaktas* Similarly, the medieval nirguna bhaktas like
p h
Kabir, Pipar and Raidas are mentioned along with the
8 6 Vaishnava devotees such as Tulsidas^ and Surdas.
That Nabhadas should not represent bhakti in purely
Vaishnava terms is all the more significant when we know
that he himself was a Vaishnava and find his Vaishnava
O •
sympathies otherwise so clear in his work. Furthermore, 
bhakti is not treated here as a religion based on a sense of 
the otherness of God. Nor is the sense of duality between 
the bhakta and Bhagavan accepted as a necessary pre-requisite 
of bhakti."^ Similarly, knowledge and philosophical thought 
are nowhere represented as antagonistic to bhakti. On the 
contrary, Nabhadas pays tribute to the bhakta JfranesVara of
q
Maharashtra for his profound thinking, and describes bhakta
1. Ibid., Chh • 2k.
2. Ibid., Chh. 55.
3. Ibid., Chh. 61.
4-. Ibid., Chh. 5k.
5* Ibid., Chh. 12k.
6. Ibid., Chh • kl.
7. On the contrary Nabhadas points out the oneness of bhakta, 
bhakti, and Bhagavat , ibid.» doha 1.
8. Ibid., Chh. k3*
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Kilhadeva of G-ujerat as one who strengthened the viewpoint
1of Sankhya-yoga* Similarly yoga is also not regarded hy
Nabhadas as incompatible with bhakti, for he speaks also of
2the yogic excellence of bhaktas like Krishnadas.
There is no indication in the Bhakta-Mala of any 
contradiction between bhakti and the non-dual1stic philosophy 
of Sahkaracharya either• That Nabhadas* list of bhaktas 
includes the name of Cankaracharya is a fact which has 
hitherto been completely ignored by scholars in their 
researches on bhakti and the Bhakti Movement. This fact 
however, deserves our special attention particularly when 
the medieval upsurge of bhakti is so often and so clearly 
explained as a reaction against the"cold intellectualism"of 
&aAkara and as a path separate from that of jhana or 
knowledge* The inclusion of &a:dkara in the Bhakta-Mala is 
in itself the strongest possible proof that there exists 
no antagonism between jfiana and bhakti, and that bhakti is 
completely compatible with £faftkaraTs ideology*
To the extent that the general nature of bhakti, so 
clearly seen in Nabhadas, is recognised and accepted, there
1* Ibid*, Chh.35.
2. Ibid*, Chh.33*
remains no cause to question the unity of the Bhakti- 
Movement and the medieval bh&tas. But if bhakti is equated 
with Vaishnavism and is understood in terms of specific 
doctrines and sets of beliefs, a clear and definite division 
between the Vaishnava bhls&tas like Tulsidas and the nirguna- 
bh&ctas such as Kabir becomes necessary* The two groups 
that they represent would then stand apart, for they 
advocate different ideas and attitudes. Whereas the worship 
of Vishnu and his avataras is of fundamental importance to 
the Vaishnava bh&tas, the nirguna bhaktas consider the 
Nirguna Brahman alone as the object of worship. To one, 
the sense of the otherness of God remains important for 
bhakti, to the other, the understanding and realisation of 
His non-otherness is the first step to it* For one, love, 
supplication, and surrender to the deity are the modes of 
reaching out to Him in worship, for the other, the love and 
passion for self realisation, and the constant effort of 
the self for it, are the only means of attaining Him. But 
since bhakti is common to both and continues to be under­
stood in a restricted meaning, which it has artificially 
assumed, there is a constant effort in scholarship somehow 
to hold the two groups together, in spite of taking note of 
their differences. Whenever the distinction between the 
two groups is taken into account, the basic points of
disagreement which distinguish the nirguna from the 
Vaishnava bhaktas are either completely ignored or are some­
how explained away in order to maintain the perfect 
compatibility between the nirguna bhaktas and the present 
definition of bhakti.
Consequently, Kabir, a nirguna bhakta, has not been 
studied with the freedom that a sound academic enquiry 
requires. He is invariably approached from the standpoint 
of certain pre-conceived notions about bhakti. However, the 
exact nature of his thought, the true source of his religious 
inspiration, his impact on the life and the thought of 
medieval India, and the immediate antecedents of his school 
cannot be properly ascertained without the necessary freedom 
from this fixed position. Therefore, a closer look at Kabir 
as a bhakta in relation to the current theories about bhakti 
is necessary for a correct evaluation of his personality and 
thought.
The object of the following analysis of the nature 
of Kabir !s bhakti, his concept of God, his attitude to 
jnana and the Advaita ideology, and his position in relation 
to Vaishp.avism is to seek a rectification of some of the 
current misconceptions about him. After disassociating him 
from Vaishnavism, and from the ideology which is attributed 
to him on account of the existing views about bhakti, an
attempt is made to trace the antecedents of his nirguna 
school against the total background of the religio- 
intellectual climate of his age.
(i) Kabir * s Bhakti
It is wrong to relate Kablr's devotional ism to the 
present standardized definition of bhakti and the ideology 
attached to it. Regarding him as a Vaishnava, attributing 
to him a belief in a personal God, and representing him as. 
an upholder of the path of bhakti as opposed to jftana and 
the Advaita Vedanta have led to only a gross misinterpre­
tation of his thought. Kabir was always pointing out the 
meaninglessness of the differences of religious doctrines 
and practices. His position therefore can hardly conform 
to a sectarian tradition, Vaishnavism, with which bhakti is 
so completely identified today. Similarly, his bhakti, 
which is clearly directed towards an impersonal and nirguna 
God, does not conflict with monistic Vedanta.
That Kabir’s bhakti is not opposed to jfiana and is 
directed not towards a personal but towards an impersonal 
God, and that it rests not on a sense of otherness, but on 
one of the final oneness of God and man, will become clearer 
in our subsequent discussions. At this stage however, we 
shall concern ourselves with the two remaining major aspects
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of KabirTs devotion, which are equally incompatible with the
that
current definition of bhakti„ Firstly,/Kabir's bhakti does 
not appear as a doctrine or a religion; and secondly, that 
Kabir does not describe bhakti as a simple and easy path of 
surrender•
Although Kabir speaks fervently of bhakti and bhakti
remains the main inspiration of his poetry, he never
expounds it as special religion or doctrine and does not
formally outline its nature« Nor does he describe it as a
fixed form of belief <> On the contrary, he repeatedly points
out the impossibility of describing and explaining the
exact nature of the spiritual experience which he regards
as both the means and the end of bhakti.
Kabir uses the word bhakti in its basic and intrinsic
meaning, in the sense of a bhava or feeling, and implies by
it a mental attitude, and not a formal belief. He very
often uses the phrase bhava-bhakti in the sense of devotion.
Bhava-bhakti, explains Kabir, can be known only through
personal experience. It is not a matter of verbal
exposition, nor can it be explained and known through
1argumentation and hearsay. God must be worshipped through
1. kathanift badnin sab janjal, bhava bhagati aur Ham niral, 
kathai badai°sunain sab koi, kathen na hoi kiyeh ho^«
Kab 1 r Granthavali » ed4 Shyam Sunder Das, Hagan 
Pracharani Sabha, Kasi, 7th ed., 1959, P*13U 
(Abbrev* KG)
1 ’k*10
this bhava-bhakti he cause/worshipful acts of devotion and
o
other religious performances can have no meaning without it* 
For Kabir bhakti is not a path of passive surrender, 
but is an arduous process requiring self knowledge and 
courage and a constant effort towards self-realisation* 
According to him only the brave and the valiant can tread 
the path of bhakti* Those who are devoid of courage, are 
unable to cope with it, for bhakti is like the sharp edge of 
a blade* One who wavers or trembles is bound to cut himself* 
Only the one who is able to stand firmly on it can attain 
liberation with safety* Mounted on the steed of love with 
the sword of knowledge in his hand the devotee can conquer 
death*-'
1* bhava bhagati sHn Hari na aradha, janam maran ki miti na 
sadha KG p. 209*
sach sil ka chauka dijai, bhava bhagati ki seva kijai.
KG *, p. 210*
2* kya jap kya tap sanjamah, kya tirath brat asnan
jo pain jugati na janiye, bhava bhagati Bhagavan. KG*p*110*
3* bhagati duheli Ham ki, nahi kayar ka kam, 
sis utare hathi kari, so lesi hari nam* 
bhagati duheli Ram ki, jaisi khande ki dhar* 
je dolai tau ka'fi padai, nahih tau utarai par. 
bhagati duheli Ram ki, jaisi agani ki jhal. 
daki pade te ubare, dadhe kautigahar.
Kabir ghocLa prem ka, chetani chadhi asavar*
gyan shacLag gahi kal siri, bhali’machai mar. KG* p.62*
Thus bhakti is not just a simple act of faith for
Kabir, but is a reasoned and an individual act of spiritual
striving. According to Kabir bhakti is caused by and
attained only through divine love which is not easy to find*
The devotee must strive for it and remain constantly
occupied with it* The divine love does not grow in the
fields, nor is it sold in the public places* Whether a king
or a commoner, only he who holds it dearer than his own life
1can obtain it* The door that leads to bhakti is narrow
and difficult, and the house of God*s love is not within
easy reach* Only he who is ready to surrender everything
2and lay down his life has the right to enter it* The wine
of divine love is not easy to receive* The one who serves
■3
it asks for your very life before pouring it out to you, 
for there are so many who wait, but only he who can lay 
down his life for it will be able to drink of it.^ The ways
1. prem na khetaun nlnpajai, prem na hati bikaya*
raja paraja jis ruchai, sir de so le°jaya. KG* p*62.
20 Kabir yahu ghar prem ka, khala ka ghara nanhi
sis utarai hathi kari, so paise ghar mahhi. ibid*
3* Ram rasayan prem ras, plvat adhik rasal.
Kabir plvan dulabha hai, rnangai sis kalal. KG. p#l^.
k* Kabir bhathl kalal ki, bahutak baithe aya*
sir saumpe sol pivai, nahln to piya na jaya* ib id *
of love are not easy, nor can the heloved he found with 
easy laughter. The search for him involves pain and suffer­
ing, and only he who knows the anguish of separation can
1hope to find him.
Since hhakti is for Kabir a matter of feeling and
experience, and not a matter of any fixed or formal
religious belief or doctrine, he clearly points out the
2possibilities of its different modes of expression. God 
can be felt and realized in various ways^ and the modes of 
his worship assume different forms.^ But Kabir*s recognition 
of the different manifestations and modes of bhakti does not 
minimize the definiteness of his individual preference and 
views. Kabirfs own bhakti is rooted in mysticism and 
clearly arises, and takes shape from his personal spiritual 
experience. The beliefs with which he supports this pattern
1. hansi haAsi kamta na paiye, jini paya tini roya.
Jo hahsenhi hari milai, tau nahin duhagani koya.
haAsi khelauA hari milai, tau kauna sahai sharasan. 
kam krodha trishnaA tajai, tahi milai Bhagavan.
KG, p.8.
2. bahut bhagati bhausagara, naniaA bidhi nahnah bhav.
jihi hiradai srihari bhetiya, so bhed kahuA kahuA thauA.
KG. p.86.
3* bhav bhagati puja aru pati, atamaram mile bahubhaAti.
KG. p.204«
anek jug bandigi bibidh prakar ki,
anti gunn ka guAn hiA hamanhln. KG., p.134*
of bhakti are in complete harmony with Gankara's Advaita**' 
Vedanta and his nirguna ideology. Kabir professes bhakti 
in the above sense, clearly and definitely, as the desired 
finality in spiritual endeavour* He has no patience with 
the other ways, which he regards as mistaken and meaningless. 
Very often he raises a loud voice against the external forms 
of devotion which are observed in the name of bhakti. He 
condemns and ridicules those who have no knowledge of the 
true nature of bhakti but are called bhaktas, and pride 
themselves in it. Such people only distort the true nature 
of bhakti, says Kabir
(ii) KabirTs Concept of God.
Belief in a personal God is sometimes attributed to 
Kabir to prove his position as a bhakta in the light of 
the existing definition of bhakti. But there is clear and 
definite testimony in the verses of Kabir to his uncomprom­
ising belief in the impersonal nature of God*
Kabir's God is nirguna, impersonal and immanent.
1. thori bhagati bahut ahankara,
aise bhagata milain apara. KG>> p.115*
2. Kabiran bhakti bigariya, kankar patthar dhoy.
Kabir Saheb Ka Bijak, ed. by Hans Das Shastri and 
Mahabir Prasad, Kabir Grantha Prakashan Samiti, 
Harak, Zila Barabanki, (Uttar pradesh), 1950, p.114 
(Sakhl 251)>(Abbrev. Bi1.)
1
He always describes Him as nirguna,* and very often uses
p
abstract and impersonal terms in order to name Him. This 
image of God is consistently upheld and supported by Kabir 
through a monistic view of Reality which is fully in keeping 
with the ideology of the Advaita Vedanta. In fact Kabir 
very often uses the epithet Brahman to convey his idea of 
God. He also makes it obvious that his belief and devotion 
are directed towards the impersonal and the nirguna. He 
states very clearly in one place, that his verses, which 
are regarded by people as mere songs are in fact an 
expression of his own ideas about the Brahman.^
Kabir of course had no scholastic interest in the 
controversies so strongly current in theology and metaphysics 
to determine the finality of the saguna or the nirguna 
character of God and of the dual or the non-dual nature of 
that Reality in relation to the phenomenal world. He 
regarded these undertakings as futile and meaningless. 
Nevertheless Kabir constantly pointed out and stressed the
1. teri nirguna katha kahi syoA kahiye, aisa kol viveki
KG, P * 233*
2. Kabir freely uses the terms Brahman, Atman (as atam), 
and tatva (as tat, tatu and tatt) for God.
3. sakal maAd maiA rami rahya, sahib kahiye soy. KG. p.52. 
See also fcG. p.128 (pada 180); Bi,j p.30 (sabda7)*
4* tuma jini janauA git hai, yahu nij Brahma bichar
keval kahi samajhaiya atam sadhan sar re. KG. p.80.
truth of the nirguna nature of God in his own direct and 
non-scholastic manner,
1
According to Kabir God has no form and no shape.
He defies every description and it is difficult even to give
2
Him an exact name. How then can He he described and 
accepted as a person? How can He he identified with
•z
personalities such as Rama and Krish^ia^ and how can His
nature he fully grasped through philosophical expositions?^
It is impossible to define His exact nature through the
written word,^ and those who try to do so through the spoken
6word get worn out by speaking endlessly about it. The 
biasing glory of the Brahman can be known only through a 
personal encounter."^
1. nati sarup baran nahiA jakai, ghati ghati rahyau samai.
* p.128.
2, vako nam kah kahi lijai, vake baran na rupa. Bln, v*kS
(Sab da A8) •
3* Bijak, p.15, Ramaini U5j P»l8, Ramaini nos. 5^ -~5*
Bi.iak, p. 11, Ramaini 30.
5. sat samaftd ki masi karauft, lekhani sab banaray, 
dharati sab kagad karaun, tau Hari gun likhya na jay.
KG, p.5U.
6, bolana kasauA boliye re bhai, bolat hi sab tattu nasal,
bolat bolat bacLh bikara, so boliye jo parai bichara.
BIj p ♦22 (Ramaini 70)
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But in spite of these unambiguous assertions by
Kabir of his belief in an impersonal God, scholars have very
often manipulated his verses to show the presence of the
concept of a personal God in them. However, the main
arguments put forward in support of such a stand always rest
on an initial acceptance of Kabir as a Vaishnava, The
Vaishnava bias for a personal deity is easily connected with
him and he is then described as a worshipper of Rama the
avatara of Vishnu, KabirTs frequent usage of the name of
Rama in his verses is mentioned and analysed to strengthen
these arguments. But a closer examination of Kabir as a
Vaishnava, and of the occurrence of the name Rama in his
poetry, does not justify these views. On the contrary, it
further substantiates Kabir1 s impersonal image of God,
Kabir uses the name Rama for God only in a symbolic
sense. He uses it always as an epithet for the Ultimate
Reality, which is nameless and undefinable, KabirTs Rama
1therefore is the same as the Atman and the Brahman, Kabir 
very often uses the terms, Atman, Brahman, and Rama in close 
conjunction with each other and the oneness of their meaning
1, kahai Kabir svad jab paya, bank nali ras khaya.
aftmrit jharai brahma parakasai, tab hi milai Ram raya,
KG, p.136.
1stands out very clearly in his verses. Kahir 1 s Rama
2  ^pervades all, and resides within man. He is the one whom
the four Vedas, the Smritis, and the Pur anas try to under­
stand, "but whose mystery is never solved.^- According to 
Kahir, this Rama can he found within oneTs o-wn self.^ The 
mystery of the name of Rama, he explains, requires serious 
thinking and an act of intellectual discrimination.^
Thus Rama can he regarded as the object of Kahirrs 
devotion only in the sense of the Nirguria Brahman and in 
the sense of the Atman. Rama as a personal deity and an 
incarnation of Vishnu has no significance for Kahir. There
1. atma Ram na chinhain santau, kyun rami lai Ram raya.
KG, p.125.
hrahm khojat janam gavayau, soi Ram ghat hhitari payau.
KG, p.172.
kya hvai tere nhai dhoih, atam Ram na chinhan soi,
KG, p.175.
2. ekamek rami rahya sahani main, to kahe hharamavau.
KG, p .92 *
3. soham hahsa ek saman, kaya ke guhn aftnahi aim. KG, p.93* 
k* KG, p.92, Pada no.49.
5o Ram nam hhaju Ram nam hhaju, cheti dekhu man mahih ho.
B1 ,i» p.76, (Kahara 5).
6. Ram nam sah ko kahai, kahihe hahut hichar. KG, p.48.
Ram kahan mahi hhedu hai tamahi ek hicharu. KG, p.221. 
Ram nanv tatsar hai, sah kahd upades. KG, p74.
Also see p.79* Pada 5.
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is no ambiguity about this in Kabir 1 s verses. On the
contrary he makes it quite clear that his Rama is not the
1 2 same as the avatara of Vishnu, He did not marry Sita,
and he was not born in the house of Da^atha, and he did not
bring about the fall of Ravana.^ The Rama who did that was
a mortal like anyone else. How could he be the immutable
and eternal Reality which must remain free from birth and
death?^* Those who worship God as the unborn and the
unmanifest cannot worship Him in the form of a person, for
R
God is never born and can have no human parentage. Nor 
does He act like a living mortal.
(iii) Kabir and jflana
As a bhakta, Kabir attaches the greatest importance
1. Dasarath sut tihuA lokahift jana, Ram nam ka maram hai ana.
Bi_i, p.66 (Sabda 110).
2. Sirjanhar na byahl Sita, Bl.j, p.31 (Sabda 8).
3. naA J'asarath ghari autari ava, naA LaAka ka rav saAtava.
KG, p .208•
U. das autar I sari maya, karat a kai 3 in pnja.
kahahiA Kabir sunahu ho santo, upajai khapai so duja.
By, p • 31 (Sabda 8). 
kahaAhi Kabir muva nahi soi, jake avagavan na hoi.
Bi (j, p.U5 (Sabda k5 )•
5* Kabir ko svami aiso thakur jakai mai na bapo re.
KG, p.276.
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to jfiana. According to him jfiana is the highest state,
to attain which the devotee sets out in his spiritual 
•5
quest-' and which alone can finally lead to spiritual 
excellence.^" True enlightenment and awakening of the
spirit is not possible without $iana,^ for God must "be known
6and worshipped through it.
Thus bhakti and jftana go together in Kabir1s thought. 
In his scale of values, true hhakti cannot exist without 
jfiana, and jfiana can have no meaning without "bhakti. The 
true guru or spiritual preceptor is the hestower of hoth 
jftana and bhakti and he who discovers the spiritual truth
1. gyan ratan ki kothari, chunbak dihhau tal.
parakhi age kholiye, kunji bachan rasal. BI j, p.115*
(sakhi 25k) •
raj binan kaisau rajaput
gyan bina :$pkat avadhut. KG, p.111.
2. kahai kabir sunahu re santau,
agam gyan pada mahin. KG, p.82.
3* KG> p.81, pada 8-10.
JLu pahdit logah kau byavahar. gyanavaAta kau tattva bichar, 
jakai jiy jaisi budhi hoi. kahi Kabir janaiga sol.
KG, p.268.
5* gyan hin chetai nahin suta. KG, p.198.
6. kari sanmukhi jab gyan bichari,
sanmukhi pariya agani mahjhari. KG, p.203* 
gyan na sumiryo nirgun sara,
bipathain birachi na fciya bicharan. KG, p.209«
1is "both a jfrani and a bhakta. The feeling of love or
•prema in Kahir is also an accordant accompaniment of
o
Brahma".jfiana, or the knowledge of the Brahman*
It must he made clear here that when Kahir speaks
of the supreme finality of jfiana, like Sankara,^ he also
implies hy it the knowledge hased on spiritual experience
and not the knowledge derived from hooks* The world can he
deluded hy the written word and the real essence of religion
can he lost in the increasing hulk of learned writings.*'*'
Ceaseless verbal expositions of religious themes can
destroy the real meaning and substance of religion and such
articulations can he a serious handicap to thought.*^ Kahir
therefore has very little respect for those who are well 
the who
versed in/scriptures hut/do not really know the truth of
1* kahafthi Kahir sunahu ho sahto, jo yah pada arathavai. 
sol pandit sol gyata, sol hhagat kahavai. BI j,, p.i-i-8
ISabaa 55)
2. prem pallta surati nali kari, gola gyan chalaya.
brahma agni le diya pallta, ekai chot dhahaya. KG, p.17$*
anahad bajai nljhar jharai, upajai brahma giyan. 
abagati afttari pragatai, lagai prem dhiyan. KG, p.13*
3* Vide supra, p.
lw kagad likhi likhi jagat bhulanah, manahlh man na samanan.
KG, p.88*
5. bolanah ka kahiye re bhal, holat holat tat nasal.
KG, p.96.
1personal spiritual experience.' He ridicules the learned
pandit who repeatedly recites the Vedas hut is not aware
2of the inner Reality that resides within his own self.
According to Kahir the man who knows the spiritual truth
through his own experience is truly a man of knowledge
%
even if he has no scholastic learning to his credit* 
Sometimes extremely learned men struggle and aspire for 
this knowledge and are yet unahle to grasp its reality.^ 
Although Kahir shows very little regard for 
scholastic learning he attaches great importance to a 
rational approach to religion and religious practices. He 
strongly advocates the exercise of reason for ascertaining 
religious truth and insists on a thoughtful quest for the 
essential and the fundamental. Kahir upholds the intellect­
ual faculty of discrimination or viveka as the chief guide 
in the spiritual quest. He not only recommends its
1* sumriti heda puran padhai sahh, anahhau hhav na darasai.
Bx,i, p.3U (Sabda 1U).
2* padhi padhi pandit heda hashannaih, hhitar huti hasat na 
3aAnaino° K&, p. 90.
3o masi hinu dvat kalam hinu kagaj, hinu acchar sudhi hoi. 
sudhi hinu sahaj gyan hinu gyata, kahhahiA Kahir jan sol.
Bln. p.35 (Sabda , 16)
k* had had gyani munivar thake, pakari sakai nahin kol.
Bin, p*59 (Sahda , 86).
exercise^" hut also pleads for its recognition and enjoins
o
that oheisance should he paid to it. The unawakened, he 
says, are hound to get lost. Only those who have the power 
of discrimination in them can remain safe.*^
Kabir !s reasoning takes him away from the religious 
fixity of doctrine and practice to the truth of personal 
spiritual experience, which he very often describes as 
jfiana. This does not clash with his hhakti, which always 
leaves full scope for individual reasoning. According to 
Kahir the devout and the knowing man must always use the 
touchstone of thought and reason in his quest for self- 
realisation^ because the knowledge of the Brahman requires 
serious contemplation. The real jftani is he who can think
R
for himself. Kahir addresses the human mind as the store­
house of intellect, and pleads with it that it should think
1. re re man budhivant bhaMara, ap ap hi karahu bichara.
KG, p. 199.
2» kar bahdagl bibek kl, hhesh dhare sah koy. Bid, p. 118
(Sakhi, 29U).
3. sansai sah jag khahdhiya, sahsai khandhai na koy.
saneai khahdhe so jana, sabda hiveki hoy. Bin, p.100
(Sakhi, 88).
!+• hastu kahin khojai kahiA, kyauA kari avai hath.
gyani soy sarahiye, parakh rakhai Bath. BIj, p.llU
(Sakhi Zk6)
3. kathata bakata surata sol, ap bichare so gyaAni hoi.
KG, p.90.
for itself and discriminate "between truth and falsehood, 
and between the essential and the non-essential. In the 
multitude of various hues and currents of thought and belief, 
one must learn to know and recognize truth through one’s own
p
intellect and reasoning. What can the scriptures yield if 
one does not know how to draw their essence from them. No 
path can be of any use if the traveller himself fails to 
tread upon it with thought and care.^
Kabir*s recommendation of reason and discrimination 
carries the force of personal conviction also, for he often 
cites from his own experience in such contexts. He explains 
that he did not go out anywhere to seek the truth, but 
found it all by himself through his own reasoning and 
contemplation. Truth then appeared on its own, he explains,
1. re re man budhiva&t bhaftdara, ap ap hi karahu bichara.
KG, p.199.
2. nana raftg taraAg hai, man makaraAd asujh*
kahanhi Kabir pukari kai, >akil kala le bttih. Blj, p.100
(Sakhi 9k).
3. bed kiteb dui j^ ahd pasara, tehi ^aftde paru apu bichara.
Blj, p . i|l 
T§abda 32).
i+. rah bichar1 kya karai, pathik na chalai bichari.
apan marag cntmdi kai, firai ujari ujari. Bi,j, p.109
(Sakhi 191).
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1and freed him from all his doubts®
(iv) KabirTs Monism®
According to Kabir there is only one Reality which 
pervades the entire universe* Nothing is separate and
p
other than that, for it is that which is in all, and every 
existing thing subsists in it, "Wherever I see" says Kabir, 
"I find only that Reality, for it is that which abides in 
everything*"^ This all pervading spirit and universal 
Reality is the God of Kabir,
According to Kabir God lives in man like the pupil 
in the eye.^ Only those who do not realize this truth and 
do not accept the innate unity of things and the oneness of
1, karat bichar manahlA man upajl, naA kahIA gaya na ay a. 
kahai kabir saAsa sab chut a, raAt rat an dhan paya,
KG, p.85*
bhal budhi kachu gyan nihara, ap ap hi kiya bichar5.
. apan main je rahyau samal, nedai dftri kathyau nahlA jal, 
take chlnheA parachau pava, b&ai samajhi tasun man lava,
KG, p.200,
2, e sakal brahmanda tain puriya, aru duja mahi than jl, 
main sab ghat antari peshiya, jab dekhya nainn samann jl*
KG, p.86,
3* jahan jahaA dekhoA tahaA tahaA sol, sab ghat raha samal.
Bjtjj p.39 (RamainI 27)*
A* jyuA nainuA maiA put all, tyuA khalik ghat maAhiA®
° KG, p.73*
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man and G-od look for Him outside themselves*1 As the deer 
wanders in the forest and continues to smell the grass in 
search of the musk which rests within it, in the same 
mistaken way the ignorant man looks around and wanders in
p
search of the God who resides within his own self. But 
this is a futile search, for there is no Reality other than 
the great Self. That which is bodiless abides in the body.^ 
The feeling of otherness in relation to God is due to the 
lack of knowledge. This ignorance is caused by the evident 
differences of form and appearance. All men are made of 
the same clay, although they appear in different foirnis.-'
But they are essentially the same, for of whatever shape and 
design be the ornaments, it is known that they are wrought
1. herat herat he sakhi, rahya Kabir hiray. 
bund samani samad main, so kat heri jay. 
herat herat he sakhi, rahya Kabir hiray.
samahd samana bund main, so kat herya jay. KG, p.15*
2. kasturi kuhdali basai, mrig dhftfujai ban mahhi. 
aisain ghati ghati R a m  hai,*duniya dekhai nahhin.
KG, p.72.
so saftin tan main basai, bhranmyau na jaftnaih tas. 
kasturi ke mrig jyuh, pbiri |Uiri sunghai gfias. KG, p.73®
3* brahma khojat janam gavayau, soi Ram ghat bhitari payau.
0KG, p.172.
kc base apahdi pahd maih, ta gati lashai na koy. KG, p.15*
5. mati ek bhesh dhari nanan, sab rnaih brahma samanaft.
KG, p.150.
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out of the same goldo^
The true and steadfast aspirant therefore gets rid
o
of all sense of duality. He sees and recognizes the one­
ness of things. He gets coloured with the colour of the 
great Self and becomes aware of the Self within. That in 
which the individual exists and has his being, exists and 
has its being in the individual. To know this is the 
highest knowledge, and this knowledge can bring salvation.^- 
Performance of religious acts is of no value without this 
consciousness. According to Kabir, bhakti can have no 
significance unless the bhakta is able to recognize the God 
who resides in the Atman. When the bhakta knows and 
recognizes this, there remains no distinction between God
6and his devotee, for the bhakta then merges in the Bhagavan. 
The self then merges in the great Self in the same manner
1 * gahana ek kanak te gahana, in mahh bhav na duja.
Blj, p .i-t-0(Sabda 30)
2. Kabir sol surivah, man sun mahdai jhujh,
panch payada padi le, duri karai sab duj. KG, p.6l.
3 9 apanen bichSri asabarl kijai sahaj kai paidai pav jab 
dijai. KG, p.86.
PP. 124-5, pada no. 169.
5* kya jap kya tap kya brat pujeu jakai ridai bhab hai duja.
KG, p.239.
6° pp.ll4"*5, see padas 136-8,
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1as water merges into water when it is added to it,
Kabir describes his own experience of1 Brahma-jhana 
in the same manner, "I could myself then see the self and 
recognize It”, he explains "for having got introduced to
p
this Self, I could merge myself in my Self”, There 
remains no sense of duality in this act of meeting for what 
is outside is then known inside. This, he adds, is not 
possible without contemplation of the Self* Nor is it 
possible without constant effort and total dedication of 
the empirical self towards this end in a spirit of devotion. 
The knowledge of God as the great Self which abides within 
man, comes neither easily nor frequently* This Self resides 
within everyone, but it makes itself known only to the 
fortunate few*^
The question of the incompatibility between Kabirfs 
monistic beliefs and his bhakti need not arise in view of
1. jamaih ham soi ham hin main, nir mil eh jal ek huva.
KG, p.125.
2. apai main tab apa nirapya, apan paih apa sujhya* 
apai kahat sunat puni apanan, apan paih apa bujhya* 
apanaih parachai lag! tarl, apan pai ap samahnth. 
kahai Kabir je ap bicharai, miti gaya avan jahnah*
KG, p ,80,
3. jo bahar so bhitar janya* bhaya bhed bhupati pahichanya.
KG, p.267.
sab ghati mera sahiyah, shnih sej na koy,
bhag tinhauh ka he sakhi, jihi ghati paragat hoy* KG, p.45*
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the nature and implications of nirguna-bhakti0 As discussed
earlier, the sense of an axiological otherness between man
and God is irrelevant to nirguna bhakti. The consciousness
of duality necessary for a feeling of love and devotion can
exist within the individual himselfo In an act of devotion
the devotee can be conscious of a higher as well as a lower
self, both existing within him. In the act of nirguna bhakti,a
bhakta is required to surrender his empirical self to his
higher Self* The feelings of love, dedication and devotion
of one for the other in itself provide the scope for hhakti.
This aspect of the nirguna-bhakti, that it requires
a full awareness of the polarity of the higher Self and the
empirical self existing within one's own self, is made very
clear by Kabir* There is a mirror in the heart, he says,
2but it is so difficult to look into it. You are you, and 
are also the reflection that you see as your own. The man 
of knowledge knows the oneness of the two as well as their 
difference. But the one who is ignorant of this truth is 
like the dog who, seeing its reflection in the mirror, 
tires itself out barking at its own image thinking it to
1 • Vide Supra, pp jfffn
2* hiradayC bhitar arasl, mukh dekha nahih jay.
mukh to tabhln dekhi ho, dil ki duvidha jay. Bij, p.9U
(Sakhi 29)•
1be a reality other than itself.
God can "be very far from you and He can he very
2near, says Kahir. Although He resides in all, He can remain 
far off in the absence of true feelings of devotion. It 
is only hy placing Him before your mind and contemplating 
Him with jfiana or knowledge that you can see Him,^ The 
one whom you search for and regard as the other, in the end 
turns out to he you, and does not remain the other.
Kahir tells us at one place that he himself has given this 
question very careful thought and feels sure that when the
6self recognises the Self, it becomes immersed in the Self.
1. darapan kerl gufa men, sunaha paitha dhay.
dekhl pratima apani, bhunki bhunki mari jay. BI j, p»97
(Sakhi 59)
2* niyar thain duri duri thain niyara, Ram charit na 
janiyain jiyara. KG, p.201.
3. kathyau na jay niyarai aru duri, sakal atit rahya ghat
purl.
jahaA dekhauA tahaA Ram s am ana A, tumha bin thaur aur
nahIA annaA.
jadapi rahya sakal ghat purl, bhav bina abhi-antari duri.
KG, p.202.
4* kari sanmuki jab gyann bicharI, sanamukhi pariya agani
manjharl. KG, p.203*
5. Kabir jako khojate payo sol thaur.
solfiiiri kai tu bhaya jakau fcahata aur. KG, p,217«
6. Kabir sochi bichariya, duja kol nanhi.
apa par jab chinhiyaA, tab ulati samana maAhi. KG, p.48.
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To use his own words: "Having called out to you as you for
so long, I myself have now turned into you and have lost all
sense of my selfhood# Wow that the consciousness of "you"
and "I" is no more in me,I find only you, no matter where
I look’*# As a nirguna bhakta Kahir shows a clear awareness
of the difference of the "Self’1 and the "not self", for he
says, "Mien rI f was, God was not, and now that God is, TI !
2
am not". Thus his bhakti does not require a constant 
sense of dualism and otherness between the Deity and the 
devotee•
(v) Kahir and Vaishnavism.
Because of the false identification of hhakti and 
Vaishnavism, Kahir, on account of his hhakti, is generally 
accepted as a Vaishnava# The antecedents of Kahirfs hhakti, 
for the same reason, are sought in the Vaishnava tradition 
of Ramanuja and an artificial relationship is thus 
established between his thought and the Vaishnava theology#^
1. tuA tAA karata tuA hua mujh maiA rahl na huA#
jab apa par ka miti gaya jit dekhauA tit tuA# KG, p.218#
2o jab maiA tha tab hari nahIA, ah Hari haiA maiA nanhi#
KG, p #13.
ekahi te anaAt hhau, anaAt ek hvai ay#
parachai bhai jab ek te, anaAtau ek samay# BI j, p.103#
(Sakhi 12k)•
3* For an extreme example of the effort to establish a 
compatibility between Kabir and the Vaishnava modes of 
bhakti, see Munshl Ram^ Sharma, ibid*, ppl/+17~527 •
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Whenever Kabir is described as a Vaishnava, the traditional0 '
accounts of a teacher-disciple relationship between him and
Ramananda, and between Ramananda and Ramanuja are put forward
as evidence of his affiliations with the Ramanuja School.
At the same time, the constant occurrence of the name Rama
in his verses is taken as a direct testimony of his
Vaishpava faith.
These arguments however, cannot be accepted as
valid proofs of Kabir*s Vaishpava affiliations. It must
be stated here that Kabir himself has nowhere mentioned
Ramananda as his guru. But even if we accept the tradition
about his being the preceptor of Kabir, there are reasons
to believe that Ramananda belonged to a Vaishnava School
which had drifted away from the tradition of the 3ri
Sampradaya of Ramanuja and was more under the influence of
the northern movement of the Nath^pantha. The nature of
the Vaishnava School of Ramananda and its impact on Kabir,
which are reviewed at a later stage, show that the influence
of Ramananda on Kabir lies not in his Vaishnavism but can
be fixed in certain other contemporary influences, common
to both the Vaishnava School of Ramananda and the nirguna
1bhakti of Kabir. Besides, it is definitely wrong to
Vide Infra, pp
describe Kabir as a Vaishnava merely on account of his
usage of the name Rama for God. As discussed earlier,
Kabir uses the name Rama only in a symbolic sense and not
in the sense of a personal incarnation of Vishnu.
Kabir believes neither in the worship of Vishnu nor
in that of Rama and Krishna. Nor does he show any respect
1for the other for the Vaishnava rituals. In fact his
v
total disregard of these strikes at the very roots of the
Vaishnava beliefs. Moreover, Kabir is not only opposed to
the worship of Vishnu and his avataras, but he condemns
every form of idol-worship, which as is commonly known, is
an integral part of the Vaishnava tradition. Lastly,
Kabir fs staunch belief in an impersonal G-od in itself
leaves no scope for the exaltation of personal deities
such as Vishpu, Rama, and Krishna, whose worship forms the
very basis of the Vaishnava religion.
The ten avataras or incarnations of Vishnu are
2described by Kabir as nothing but maya or illusion. Belief 
in them, according to him, is the result of ignorance which 
is perpetuated on account of the lack of discrimination
1. mathe tilak hathi mala banan, logan Ram khilauna jaharw
KG, p.271.
2. das autar I sari maya, karat a kai jin puja. BI j, p. 31
(Sabda 8)
for the entities which are horn and subject to destruction 
can never he regarded as God. How can the personal 
incarnations of Vishnu, men who were horn and who died, hec r *
identified with God? Kahir therefore rejects the divinity
of each avatara in no uncertain terms, and explains that
the nirguna God must not he confused with Vishnu and his
incarnations. He cannot he the Rama who was horn of
Dasratha, and who killed Havana. Nor can he he the Krishna ' « 0 ♦
who killed KaAsa. He did not become incarnate to hring
about the death of Hiranyaka^ipu nor did he take the Vaman^h
form to test Bali. God could never assume a mortal frame
2and is incapable of acting like a living man.
In fact Kahir!s complete disregard for the popular 
deities Rama and Krishna brings out with greater emphasis 
his uncompromising belief in a nirguna and impersonal God. 
He not only rejects their divinity, hut does not even 
hesitate to treat them on a par with the evil-doers, to 
destroy whom, it is believed, Vishnu had become incarnate 
in them. Kahir is able to speak of Rama and Havana, and
1 . Mathura marigau Krisna guvara, mari mari gaye daso 
autara. Bij, p.18 (RamainI 5k) *
muye Krisna muye karatara, ek na muva jo sirajan hara. 
kahanhin Kahir muva nahi soi, jake avagavan na hoi.
Bij, p.k5 (Sabda 45)*
2. See Bijak p.31 (Sabda 8); ibid., p.2k (Ramaini 75)*
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1of Krishna and Kansa in one breath. They were all mortals,
2
he says, and pleads for the worship of the nirguna Rama 
instead of these deified personalities,)
Although Kahir does not support the Vaishnava 
beliefs as such, in some of his verses he speaks well of 
the Vaishnavas. These verses, which of course are very few 
in number, are always quoted as a proof of KabirTs Vaishna­
vism. But Kabir's appreciation of the Vaishnavas in all 
these instances is of a relative nature. He invariably 
praises them only in comparison with the corrupt ^aktas 
and their evil practices. He does not exalt or advocate the 
beliefs of the Vaishnavas, but shows only a greater regard 
for them as compared with the £>aktas,^ Furthermore even 
this appreciation of the Vaishnavas cannot be regarded as an 
unqualified feature of Kabirfs views about them. He is 
often very severe in his criticism of the Vaishnava rituals, 
and shows an open contempt for the practising Vaishnavas
1 , Hiranakus Ravan gau KaftsS, Krisna gaye sur nar muni 
bahsa. Bin, p<>15 (Ramaini 45) •
2, nirguna Ram nirguna Ram japahu re bhai
abigati ki gati lakhi na jal. KG, p.92«
ye tatu Ram japahu re pranl, BI,j, p. 36 (Sabda 19)
3* baisnofi ki chhaparl bhall, 
nan sashat ka bad gauru
sashat banbhan mati milai, baisanaun milai chandal.
KG, p.46.
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1who otherwise fall short of the higher ethical standards.
In view of all this, it is surprising that scholars
2 3 hlike R.G-. Bhadarkar, H.Go Raychaudhur i, S. Radhakrishnan
5
and R 0Co Maoumdar^ should place Kahir in the Vaishnava 
tradition without any reservations. Even the Hindi scholars, 
in spite of their direct knowledge and familiarity with 
the works of Kahir, continue to describe him as. a Vaishnava
¥ o
and struggle to prove his Vaishnava loyalties in order to 
keep his position as a hhakta compatible with the standard 
definition of hhakti.
(vi) The Antecedents of KahirTs Nirguna School
Kahir*s Nirguna School represents a particular 
pattern of medieval devotionalism. It need not therefore 
he approached necessarily from a Vaishnava angle to fit the 
current definition of hhakti. A closer look at the Bhakti- 
Movement shows that it was not confined to Vaishnavism alone. 
The flowering of the Vaishnava-Vedanta and the Vaishnava
1 . baisanaun bhaya tau ka bhaya, bujha nahift hahek. 
chhapa tilak banay kari, dagadhya lok anek. KG, p. 1+0.
2. RoG« Bhandarkar, ibid., p. 66-j-v
3. H,Co Raychauduri, ibid., p . 2.
S« Radhakrishnan, ibid., Vol.II, p*670.
5. RoC. Majumdar, History and Culture of the Indian People. 
ibid., Vol.VI, p .562, also in The Cultural Heritage of 
India, Swami Ramakrishna Centenary Memorial, Vol.Ill, 
n.d., p.35.
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poetry forms only one part of the medieval devotionalism.
It cannot cover and explain the whole of the Bhakti-Movement* 
Certain other existing religio-philosophical traditions were 
also asserting themselves with a fresh vigour at this time. 
They too were stressing the importance of religions devotion 
in accordance with their own "background of "beliefs and 
practices. In so far as Kahir is concerned, forces other 
than Vaishnavism contributed more than Vaishnavism itself 
in shaping his school of nirguna hhakti,
Kahir was not a systematiser and was completely 
non-sectarian in his outlook. The antecedents of his 
thought and beliefs, therefore, cannot he traced hack to 
any one system of philosophy or sectarian theology.
Influences proceeding from different sources, astika as 
well as nastika, gave life and shape to Kahir’s religion, 
Nevertheless Kahir cannot he regarded as merely an eclectic 
thinker, for certain special characteristics of thought and 
approach mark out his religious beliefs as a distinct 
tradition in its own right. He repeated all such philosoph­
ical views which lent strength to his own ideology, and 
openly condemned those which were not in keeping with it.
He emphasised the religious spirit hut had totally rejected 
every religious form. The sources of Kahir’s inspiration 
therefore can he determined only in the light of the
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predominant and characteristic features of his own stand­
point ,
As shown above, an essential spiritual monism and a 
strictly impersonal view of God constitute the fundamentals 
of the philosophical position of Kahir* A broad based 
Advaita ideology can be found throughout his works, and by 
whatever name he calls his God, he always conceives Him as 
nirguna* As far as the methods of actual spiritual endeavour 
or sadhna are concerned Kabir recognises the general 
principles of yoga and advocates self-effort for the attain­
ment of spiritual ends. The highest values of religious 
life upheld by Kabir lie clearly in the realm of mysticism, 
for according to him, personal spiritual experience alone
must be regarded as the finality of the active religious 
1modeso In all these respects, Kabir is in line with the 
astika traditions of the Hindus and lays strong emphasis on 
certain essentials of the Hindu religion and philosophy.
At the same time, Kabir!s approach is also marked 
with a freedom of thought and reasoning which makes him 
unique as a religious thinker* Although both his philosophy 
and faith are deeply rooted in the astika soil, his constant 
and open attacks on all formal religious beliefs, doctrines,
1 . karm dharm kachhuvo nahin uhavan, na uhan mantra na puja.
Bijo (Sabda k3)
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1and rituals, are reminiscent of those levied hy the 
nastikas against the orthodox religion* Excepting the 
essential truth and ultimacy of the Spirit, nothing escaped 
the questioning and criticism of Kahir, and no religious 
form, whether of ritual or doctrine was regarded as 
infallible hy him. The vitality and freedom of individual 
reasoning which we find in Kahir, carry with them a clear 
echo of the nastika traditions.
KahirTs religion strikes us as an expression of a 
medieval astika tradition, which shows evidence of an inter­
mingling of the astika and nastika elements. A simplified 
monistic philosophy, a reformed order of yoga^a rationalistic 
and critical approach to religion^and an antipathy for 
established religious form and ritual constitute the main 
characteristics of this new astika tradition. It is astika 
in nature in so far as it upholds the ultimacy of the Atman 
and derives its inspiration from the monistic Vedanta and 
yoga. At the same time the critical modes of reasoning and 
the irreverential attitude which mark this tradition show 
a clear impact of the nastika tradition.
There are reasons to believe that as a result of 
their mutual interaction on each other, the differences
hijak pp.8-9 (Ramaini 22), p.29 (sabdai-j-); p.32 (sabdalO); 
p .37~(sabda 22); p .^0 (sabda 30); p ^57 (sabda
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between the astika and nastika. tradition was becoming less 
fundamental during the medieval period. Certain philosophi­
cal precepts and modes of religious discipline were now 
finding equal acceptance amongst the astika a as well as the 
nastikas„ A monistic view of Reality in the field of
Siddhanta and the practice of yoga in that of sadlyaa, were
1common to both. Similarly a rejection of religious authority
and ritual, a complete disregard for scholasticism, and a
definite articulation of religious finalities in terms of
mysticism and personal spiritual experience, mark the
significant movements of both the astika and the nastika 
2
groups. The expanding common grounds, of thought and 
practice brought them nearer together and had resulted in 
an interpenetration of thought and approach, miring this 
period of confluence, if certain astika values were 
assimilated by the nastikas, the critical and unorthodox
1. For examples of monistic thought in the medieval Buddhist 
and Jaina literature, see Doha-Koda, edited by Rahula 
Sankritayana, Bihar Rashtra Bhasha Parishad, Patna 1957, 
p.85^ doha 1 and 2; p«89, doha 15 and 16; p.95* doha 32 
and 3k I p*157, doha 1+9«
See also, Pahuda-Doha, of Muni Ramsimha, ed. by Hiralal 
Jain, Karanja Sain Publications Society, Karanja (Berar) 
1933, dohas 39, kO, 1+1, 122, 139, 17^.
2. See Doha-Kosa, ibid., p»93> doha 26; p.l6l, doha" 60; 
p d 63, doha 63 and 67; p.255, doha Ik and 25; p.259, 
doha 26; p 028l, doha 11; p.291, doha 18,
See also Pahuda~Poha, ibid, d o h a s  8, 7, 19, 22, 2l+, 37, 
59, 67, 69, 7o, 97, 98, 109, 116, 126, 135, 161-63, 180, 
217.
approach of the nastikas also had a great impact on the 
astikaSo
The new astika tradition which took shape as the 
result of this intermingling, has a lot in common with the 
later movement of nirguna hhakti. /V-/ It can explain the 
combination in Kabir of the sincerity of his orthodox belief 
in the ultimacy of spirit, which is astika in nature, and the 
severity of his unorthodox criticism of existing religious 
formalities which carries a nastika flavour, N-Philosophi­
cally, this new tradition was rooted in monistic thought, 
and in the field of spiritual endeavour, it advocated 
contemplation and yogic discipline. Resting on the 
principles of the basic and innate truth of mysticism, it 
emphasised the use of reason and freedom of thought in 
religion. A movement was thus afoot long before its spirit 
and message could take a more definite and popular form in
the nirguna bhaktas like Kabir.
There Is literary as well as sectarian evidence of 
the existence of such an astika tradition in the medieval 
period. Its sectarian manifestation can be seen in the 
Natha-Pantha, one of the most popular and active ascetic 
groups. The precepters of the Katha-Pantha preached a 
monistic philosophy in a simple and popular form, laid
stress on yoga, and at the same time opposed the formal and
ritualistic patterns of* religion. The same characteristic 
features are indicated m  the Yoga-Va s i sh th a , which is 
neither a sectarian work nor a systematic exposition of any 
particular philosophical doctrine, hut is a religious text 
written in a popular style, advocating yoga and a nirguna 
ideology* Although the Natha-Pantha was astika in its 
beliefs, to the extent that the antecedents of the precepters 
of the Natha-Pantha are inter-connected with that of the 
Sahajayani Siddhas, they had a nastika background. Similarly, 
■k*16 Yoga-Vasishtha is fully in keeping with the astika 
traditions in so far as it enjoins a belief in a monistic
and nirguna view of reality and emphasises the importance
[
of jhana and yoga* But the Yoga -Vafeishta strongly 
condemns many established beliefs and practices, a thing 
with is associated more with the nastika tradition.
But although the Natha-Pantha reiterated the astika 
beliefs related to Hinduism, its origins can be traced back 
to the movements of the Buddhist siddhas, the beginnings of 
which were first seen in the Vajrayana and the Sahajayana,^* 
The names of Matseyendranath and of his disciple Gorakhnath,
1, Hajari Prasad Dvivedi, Nath a Sanrpradaya, Hindustani 
Academy, Allahabad, 19507' pp*6bff,
Prabodha Ohandra Bagchi, Kaula 3nana Nirnaya, Calcutta, 
193A, Introduction,
Dharma Vira Bharati, Siddha Sahitya, Kitab Mahal, 
Allahabad, 1955* passim.
"both of whom are regarded as the most important of the
preceptors of the Natha-Pantha, are connected with the
tradition of the Sahajayani siddhas also* They represent
a stage of change in the Siddha tradition which ultimately
brought about the transformation of the Buddhist siddhas
into the Natha-Pantha* The predominance of the non-Buddhist
elements in Matsyendra and Gorakhnath shows that the
Buddhist siddhas had greatly assimilated the Brahmanic 
2influences* Separate from its allied Buddhist traditions 
of the nastika fold, and free from the corrupting tantrik 
influences, the Natha pantha served as a powerful ascetic 
movement from the eleventh to the fifteenth century. The 
intermingling of the astika and the nastika forces, and 
the emergence of an astika tradition equipped with the 
vitality of the critical and unorthodox attitude of the 
nastikas, stands out very clearly in the growth of the 
Natha-pantha.
Although the medieval nirguna saints cannot be 
connected with the Natha-pantha in any narrow sectarian 
sense, nevertheless this system seems to be the most
1. Dvivedi, ibid., pp.iH and £j-8ff.
2. S.B. Dasgupta, Obscure Religious Cults, Revised Ed., 
Calcutta, 1962, pp.226-29.
For Advaita influence in the Natha Pantha, see Dvivedi, 
ibid., pp * 69, 76*
preponderant of sectarian influences on the nirguna bhaktas
like Kablr. Kabir’s advocacy of yoga and his frequent
recourse to yogic terminology reiterates the Natha ideology.
His revolt against the formal and ritualistic religion, and
his incessant emphasis on the basic spirit and essentials
of religions is the same as that of the Natha teachers.
Many parallels can be found between Kablr and Gorakhnath.
Both Kablr and Gorakhnath take a monistic view of Reality.'1'
Both rely on the truth of personal experience and point out
2
the meaninglessness of scholastic knowledge in religion.
Both recommend the path of Self-knowledge and describe it 
x
as Jfaana. Like Kabir, Gorakhnath also considers the formal 
differences of religion as unimportant.^"
The Vaishnava influence on Kabxr which is recognised 
because of his association with the Vaishnava guru Ramananda,
1. For comparison with Kabir, see Gorakh-Bani, edited by 
Pitambara Butta Badathval, Hindi Sahitya Sammelan,
Prayag, i960, p.25>*Bani 70; p.29,B83; p.6ii, B.191* P*71*
B 218; p,l88, B 22; p.l92,B p.215* B32* The same in 
Machhinder's teachings to Gorakh, ibido, p.188, B 22;
p.192 B 50.
2. Ibid., p.3, B 6; p.5, B 13; p.21, B 59; P*42., B 119; p.57* 
B 167; P*72, B 223; P.77* B 2^8; p.81, B 26U; p.82, B 270; 
p.170, B k; p.172, b 11,
3. Ibid.. p.6U, B 189; p.65, B 195;
For the position of the Natha-Pantha on JfXana, see 
"Gyan-Tilak" and ,f‘2hana-I)vipa-Bodhan, ibid,,pp.207 ff 
and 227 ff respectively.
4. Ibid., p.25* B 68 and 69; p#33* B 96; p.175* B 9*
is also interconnected with that of the Natha-Pantha. The
Vaishnava school of Benaras to which Ramananda Belonged was
very much influenced By the Natha-pantha. The works of Both
1Ramananda and his guru Raghavananda Bear its stamp. The
connecting link Between KaBir and Ramananda therefore is
not Vaishnavism, But lies in the influence of the popular
northern movement of the Natha-pantha, an influence common
to Both KaBlr and the Vaishnava school of Ramananda* The
interconnection Between Vaishnavism and the Natha pantha, and 
Between f
/ Vaishnavism and Kablr s nirguna school also Becomes clearer
when we examine the antecedents of the Vaishnava school to
which Ramananda Belonged.
Ramananda represents a distinct Vaishnava tradition
different from that of Ramanuja with whose &ri-sampradaya
he is so often connected on account of the traditions which
place him in the continuous line of teachers and disciples
connected with that school. However, it needs to Be
a
recognized more fully that/Vaishnava tradition was taking 
shape in the north, which while still retaining its 
Vaishnava affiliation, had drifted away from the Ramanuja
1. See Ram anand ki Hindi Rachnayeh, edited By PitamBara 
Dutta Badathval, Nagari Prachar«ani SaBha, Kasi, 1955*
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school. This new Vaishnava tradition did not attach
o
importance to caste distinctions in matters of religious
pursuits and had readily thrown open the higher paths of
spiritual endeavour to all, irrespective of their caste.
Different in its approach from the more common expressions
of Vaishnavism, it does not seem to regard the simple worship
of the personal deity Vishnu and the performance of the
characteristic Vaishnava rituals as self-sufficient in
themselves. On the contrary it laid great stress on yogic
discipline in the field of sadhana and on a strictly monistic
2view of Ultimate Reality in the field of siddhanta. In
1. It is generally recognized that the Ramannuoa?s Sri 
Vaishnava Sampradaya was later divided into two schools, 
the northern school known as Vadagalai, and the southern 
school known as the Tiftgalai. important ideological 
differences can he found between these two schools, both 
of which are traditionally connected with the 3rl 
Sampradaya. Ramananda belonged to the northern school 
of Raghavananda. It seems that these two had not only 
drifted away from the southern tradition of the Alvars, 
the immediate antecedent of the Sri sampradaya, but were 
also greatly influenced by the popular but non-Vaishnava 
movement of the north, that of the Natha Pantha.
For the differences between the Vadagali and the 
Tihgalai branches of the £Sri Sampradaya^ and for those 
between the school of Ramananda and Ramanuja^ see, 
Pitambara Dutta Badathaval, ibid., pp.21-2.6.
2. These conclusions are based on the study of the Siddhanta
Panchmatra of Raghavananda, and that of Rama-Raksha,
Yoga-Chintamani and G-yana-Tilak of Ramananda. RamanandaTs
pada. in the ASi-G-rantha has also^been taken into account.
For these texts, see Ramananda Ki Hindi Rachnayen, ibid.,
■ 11 " 11 m ' ........... . .iHnnmnij ■ i    ii V t i  -i m 1—  “*
and the/Adi-G-rantha. ^
some important respects therefore this Vaishnava tradition
had taken a very different position from that of Ramanuja.
Although a greater credit is given to Ramananda in this
connection, the beginnings of it can to some extent be
traced back to Ramananda's guru Raghavananda, the key figure
in this development.
Our knowledge of the life and thought of Raghavananda 
1is very meagre. Nabhadas places him in the tradition of
-  -  2Ramanuja, putting him as the fourth in line from him.
According to him, Raghavananda had gone to live at Kasi
where he tried to instil bhakti amongst all kinds of people
irrespective of their caste and asrama. Perhaps in the line
of Ramanuja's £>ri Sampradaya,Raghavananda was the first to
settle down at Kasi separately in his own right, and the first 
to
/assume a different attitude on important questions like 
the caste. In his chappaya on Raghavananda, Nabhadas makes 
only a brief and passing reference to the immediate 
successors of Ramanuja, such as Devacharya and Hariyananda, 
and does not make any observations about them which might 
suggest any noticeable change in the traditions of the
1. Pitambara Dutta Badathval, see nSwami Raghavananda aur 
Siddhanta PanchmatraV in: Yoga^Pravaha» Kasi-Vidya-PItha, 
Benares, 19M$0
2. Bhakta-liala , fc&idw- Chappaya 30.
£>rl sampradaya. But he mentions Raghavananda as the one 
who decided to stay at Kasi and who extended equality to all 
castes in spiritual matters.
It must he remembered here however that Ramanuja
had thrown open only the lower path of prapatti or surrender
to the lower castes but had recommended the higher path of
bhakti for the high castes only. This fundamental difference
between Ramanuja and Raghavananda can be explained only on
grounds of the latter having moved to the north and having
come under the direct influence of the religious movement
of the north, that of the Natha-pantha which was unorthodox
in its approach in this respect but was a very active and
1influential religious group. Ramananda, who is more well 
known than his guru, Raghavananda, belonged to this Vaishnava 
school of Ka^i. It is not surprising therefore that he 
should have attracted such a large number of his celebrated
1. The traces of the Natha Pantha can be found in Bengal, 
Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Sindh, Gujarat, Rajasthan and 
Maharashtra. But there are reasons to believe that this 
movement, in its origins, was essentially a northern 
movement. The medieval religious thinking and movements 
of north India show a greater influence of the Nathas 
when compared with the southern counterparts. According 
to Dr. Ghurye the south shows a much lesser impact of 
the Natha Pantha.
G.S. Ghurye, Indian Sadhus, The Popular Book Depot, 
Bombay 1953, P*155>
disciples from the lower castes
'idle Yoga-Vasishtha can he viewed as a significant
9
literary expression of an important aspect of medieval 
religious life. As pointed out earlier, one vital current 
of the period is found clearly marked with monistic beliefs, 
reformed practice of yoga and a rational approach towards 
formal aspects of religion. The evidence of it, is shown 
above in the Natha-pantha. The same elements are found in 
the Yoga-Vasishtha. Here also is seen an astika tradition 
equipped with the vitality of the unorthodox approach of the 
nastikas.
The Yoga-Vasishtha is not a sectarian work, nor is 
it a systematic exposition of any particular philosophical 
doctrine. It does not technically outline any system of 
philosophy or metaphysics, nor is it meant for a limited 
circle of the very learned. Nevertheless it is philosophical 
in its approach and content, and is written more in the 
nature of a popular religious text, meant for a much larger 
audience. Certain essentials of the religio-philosophical 
thought of the Hindus are conveyed here not in a scholastic 
but a simple and straightforward manner, understandable 
even by men of lesser learning. This aspect of the Yoga-
1. The most prominent of them are Kabir, Raidas, Dhana, and 
Sehlu They are all mentioned by Nabhadas as the disciples 
of Ramananda <, See Bhakta-Mala, Chhappaya 31»
Vasi.shtha can be taken as an indication of a popular 
movement in favour of its teachings.
The ideology of the Yoga-Vasishtha is unorthodox in 
some respects and cannot be confined to any particular 
philosophical system or sect. At the same time it rests on 
certain fundamentals of Hindu religious thought, particularly 
those related to the classical Vedanta and Yoga. If the 
Yoga-Vasishtha attacks the traditional formalities of 
religion and states the importance of individual reasoning 
against religious authority, it also stresses upon the 
beliefs in the ultimacy of the Atman and the monistic nature 
of Reality.
A similar approach characterises Kabir1s religious 
position and many parallels can be found between the 
passages of the Yoga-Vasishtha and the verses of Kabir. 
Perhaps he was the product of the same forces which are in 
evidence in the Yoga-Vasishtha. The following analysis of 
the philosophy of the Yoga-Vasishtha brings out some points 
of similarity between the two.
In general, like Kabir, the author of the Yoga- 
Vasishtha upholds a monistic and nirguna ideology with the 
help of a supporting philosophy of mysticism. The finality 
of personal spiritual experience in religion is emphasised 
by both, and both advocate the rejection of irrational
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authority and the use of individual reasoning in matters
pertaining to religions
A simplified and popularised form of monistic
philosophy forms the "basis of Kabirrs religious thought.
The same is the case with Yoga Vasi shtha, according to which
the being of the world is bound with the being of the spirit
1
and has no separate existence from it. There is nothing
2which is not present in the Great Self, and the world
exists in the Brahman in the same way as the tree in the
3 IIseed, and as. the butter in the milk. The Yoga-Vasishtha
describes the Brahman as the unmanifest and without names5
in the same manner as Kabir. Even those who know it fail
to describe it. Therefore the use of different names to
6describe the Ultimate Reality is unnecessary and meaningless. 
From this position of the Yoga-Vasishtha Kabir had to take 
only one step forward in order to say that the different
1. The Yogavasistha of Valffliiki, with the commentary,
Vasisthamaharamay^atatparyapraka^a, edited by Wdsudev 
Laxman Sastri Pansikar, Kirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1937s 
III.l4.75, also VI.Tdo lU.8."
2. Ibid., III.100*5*
3. Ibid., III.100.11.
2|. Ibid., Via.9.27; also ibid., Via.2,52; III.lU.73*
5* Ibid., VIbo 52.27.
6. Ibid., Via. 78.32-3U.
2'3d
names used for God toy the Hindus and Muslims also could not
mean two different things*
The importance attached toy Yoga-Vasishtha to
personal spiritual experience is also the same as that found
in Kabir. According to the Yoga-Vasishtha the final proofs
lie only in direct apprehension, and the direct cognition
alone can serve as the ultimate source of knowledge.^ The
2Self alone is the reality at the root of the universe, and
the nature of the Self cannot toe realized without its direct
experience. It is further explained in the Yoga-Vasishtha
that the Self can toe experienced only through intuition^
and that there is nothing greater than the divine experience
which is immanent in its nature and arises only when the ego
and the mind get completely dissolved. This reality
cannot toe described in words tout can only toe experienced 
6from within, God should not toe sought outside, for He
1. Ibid., II.19.16; III.U2.15; Vito 52.29.
2. Ibid., Via. 76.39.
3. Ibid., V.6U.53.
U. Ibid., V.73,15.
5. Ibid., V.6U.5I.
6. Ibid., V.6U.52.
resides within everyone and one’s hody itself is His temple.
Those who leave this God residing within, and look for Him
outside themselves are like fools who leave the gem and run
1after pieces of glass. A clear echo of the same ideas can
he found in Kablr. His way of explaining them also is
very often the same.
Similarly the role of the Self in religious and
spiritual endeavour as. laid down hy the Yoga*-Va si shtha is
upheld hy Kabir in the same spirit. The Self is the most
important. It is through the medium of the Self that
experience can make knowledge valid. But the self which
2sees itself in its calm mind can he attained only through 
one’s own efforts and cannot he realized through external 
agencies or methods. Scriptures cannot make one realize 
the Self, if the individual attempt to interpret one’s own 
experience and intuition is missing.
In a scheme of ideas such as found in the Yoga- 
Vasishtha, a greater stress is naturally laid on individual 
reasoning and choice than on external authority and 
injunctions. God can he found only through knowledge, and
1. Ibid. 9 V.8*li-u
2. Ibid., Via. 118.In
3. Ibid., VIb. 197.25,28,29.
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not through performances cf any hind. Living in a forest,
1performing penance * going on pilgrimage, and Lathing in the
2sacred rivers can he of no avail* Neither the scholarly 
study of scriptures nor the worship of any particular god, 
however powerful he may he, can he of any help without one 's 
own personal effort. Even the god Vishriu cannot hestow 
self knowledge on one who does not exercise his own thought.^" 
According to the Yoga-Vasishtha, reason must serve as the 
guiding light for the true aspirant. A rational man should 
value the works of even an ordinary person if they are 
conducive to the advancement of knowledge and are logical, 
and should he ready to throw away even those of the great 
sages if they fail in it. A reasonable statement, even that 
of a child, should he accepted while an unreasonable one 
should he discarded like straw, even if it came from the 
creator himself. This freedom of thinking and expression 
which is so predominant in the Yoga-Vasishtha hears an 
extremely close resemblance with Kabxrfs general approach
1. Ibid., VIb. 199.30.
2. Ibid.* VIb. 197-16.
3* Ibid., V.M+.l; VO10P 10, 13, 16, 17*
k. Ibid., V ,ii3.10.
3. Ibid., II.18.2,3*
and reasoning* The performance of ritualistic religious 
acts is denounced hy Kabir in the same manner, and he lays 
a similar emphasis on the importance of individual reasoning 
for the understanding of religious truths, and of self­
effort for the attainment of spiritual ends*
On the testimony of the Yoga-Vasishtha, it can 
perhaps be stated that at the time of the composition of 
this popular religious text, the ideology of nirguna bhakti 
had found wide acceptance amongst certain sections of the 
Vaishnavas. In the evolutionary process of the penetration 
of the philosophical influences in popular Vaishnavism, the 
Yoga-Vasishtha represents a stage higher than that of a mere 
identification of Vishnu with the nirguna brahman* In the 
Yoga-Vasishtha, Rama, the avatara of Vishnu, asks for 
instructions in Yoga from Vasishtha and listens to the 
glories of the Nirguna Brahman from him. The personality of 
Rama is thus reduced to a secondary position, and is that of 
a recipient rather than of a giver of knowledge, a situation 
very different from the one in the Bhagavad-G-ita, where it 
is the personality of Krishna, again an avatara of Vishnu, 
which occupies the central position in the narrative, and 
serves as the transmitter of spiritual knowledge.
The personality of Rama in the Yoga-Vasishtha is 
clearly superseded by the injunctions of jhana and yoga
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since the position of Rama in this work remains only that of 
a listener. The constant use of the figure of Rama through- 
out the narrative can only he explained in two ways. Either 
his name was heing used to win Vaishnava sympathies and to 
receive a Vaishnava hearing, or the nirguna ideology had 
found such a complete acceptance amongst the Vaishnavas that 
the personality of Rama could easily recede into the back­
ground in such a text. In either case the nirguna ideology 
acquires a sanctity for the Vaishnavas in the Yoga-Vasi shtha 
through the authority of the discourses between Rama and 
Vasishtha. If Rama himself accepted the knowledge of 
Vasishtha, why not the Vaishnavas who were his devotees?
Nirguna bhakti must have been fairly widespread 
amongst certain Vaishnava groups of the north. Not only can 
this conclusion be drawn on the basis of the narrative form 
of the Yoga-Vasishtha, which is in the form of a discourse 
between Rama and Vasishtha, but there are also certain 
passages in it which indicate this more clearly and 
definitely. The bhakti of Prahlada, as described in the 
Yoga-Vasishtha, is a significant illustration of this.
Prahlada who is revered as one of the great Vishnu 
bhaktas and who is represented as a devotee of Narayana, 
and the account of whose Sagufea bhakti we find in the 
Bhagavata-Purana, is represented in the Yoga-Vasishtha as a
nirguna bhakta who attains the real knowledge (ta11va- jflana)
of the oneness of Narayana and the Nirguna Brahman. As
Prahlada is worshipping the personal image of Vishnu in all
1its glory and Beauty of form, the realisation comes that
2Vishpu is the same as the Atman and that it is the reality
existing within himself, which has assumed the external form
of the deity for him as Vishnu.^
Again when Prahlada performs puja for Vishpu, makes
his offerings to him accompanied by rituals characteristic
of the Vaishnavas modes of worship^ praising the Lord Vishnu
in various ways, Vishnu himself appears before Prahlada to
explain the need for viveka and vichara, and enjoins upon
Prahlada to continue with his spiritual endeavours until he
can attain the state of Brahman. Having received this
injunction from the Bhagavan himself, Prahlada uses his
own thought power (vichara) and discrimination (viveka) to
6understand Ultimate Reality. Thereafter he dwells upon the 
supreme reality of the Self and its universal oneness. He
1. Ibid., V.31.375 32.1.
2. Ibid., V.31.39.
3. Ihid.. V.32.2.
b. Ibid.. V.32. 8-16.
5. Ibid.. V.3U.3.
6. Ibid., V.3i4»8ff.
7. Ibid.. V .3i-l-.ll2-115.
realises that the ultimate Reality which is explained in
different ways through the doctrines of Vedanta* the systems
of logic, and the songs of the Puranas, is essentially the 
1same* At the end of this account of Prahlada, Vasishtha' t
points out that whatever Prahlada had attained was attained
p
by him through his own efforts and not by any other course. 
Vishpu is only that which is the Atman of all, and that which 
is the Atman of all i& itself Vishnu? Atman alone had caused 
Vishpu bhakti in Prahlada. Having realised that there was 
no difference between himself as Atman and Vishnu, he 
obtained Atman 3hana through his own power.^
If the above is accepted as an indication of the 
possibility and prevalence of nirguna bhakti amongst certain 
Vaishpava sects, it can serve as a clue for understanding the 
viewpoint of the Vaishnava guru Ramananda. Ramananda is 
always classed as a Vaishnava. But if there exists a 
tradition proving him as a Vaishpava,there also exists a 
clear evidence of a nirguna ideology in his verses. Some 
of which hear a close resemblance with the Natha literature
1. Ibid.. V.35.2-10.
2. Ibid.. V.43.4.
3. Ibid.. V.43.6.
4. Ibid.. V.43.7-8.
as well. The most prominent of the nirguna bhaktas of the 
medieval period, who did not believe in Vishnu-worship, are 
known to us as the disciples of Ramananda. There are only 
two explanations possible in this connection. Either there 
were two different Ramanandas who are wrongly referred to as 
one, or the one traditional Ramananda was a strong protagon­
ist of a nirguna ideology in spite of his formal affiliations 
with the Vaishnava sect. The traditional accounts of the 
teacher-disciple relationship between the Vaishnava guru 
Ramananda and Kabir can be accepted only in the light of the 
second alternative.
In view of the lack of sufficient data, nothing 
definite can be said about KablrTs personal associations 
and his immediate sources of inspiration. Nor can we know, 
with authenticity, the exact nature and extent of the 
influence of any one sect on him. The above attempt there­
fore to ascertain the antecedents of Kabir?s Nirguna School 
was not to connect him with a particular sect or thought 
system, but was only to show the avenues in which we can 
look for the sources of his inspiration. We were trying to 
establish that Kabirfs thought and religion cannot be 
explained in terms of Vaishnavism but can be understood only 
against the background of a monistic and nirguna ideology.
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CONCLUSION
Certain firmly established views about "bhakti and 
the Bhakti Movement have heen repudiated in the foregoing 
chapters. It has heen shorn that "bhakti is neither a cult 
nor a doctrine and that a fixed belief in a personal God, 
an antagonism to the path of jhana, and the rejection of a 
monistic view of Reality are not its necessary pre-requisites.
The validity of the identification of bhakti with 
Vaishnavism has also been questioned. It has been pointed 
out that the whole of the Bhakti Movement cannot be viewed 
in Vaishnava terms, alone. We have suggested that the total 
manifestation of medieval bhakti cannot be traced back to
Cojtnot
the inspiration of the Vaishnava acharyas, and that it^be 
regarded as a reaction against Sankara's Advaita Vedanta.
There is clear evidence of bhakti in Sankara and many of the 
medieval bhaktas of the nirguna school lend full support to 
the essentials of monistic Vedanta and strongly advocate a 
belief in an impersonal God. Taking this position about 
bhakti and the Bhakti Movement^we have re-examined Kabir 
and his antecedents to show the absence in him of those 
beliefs which are generally attributed to him on account of 
the current definition of bhakti.
Bhakti is not a religion. It does not fall in any
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of the categories "by which different religions and religious 
doctrines are denominated and distinguished within the 
totality of Hinduism, It does not stand for any dharrna, 
mata, or siddhanta hut is a constituent of sadhana. It 
suggests only a bhava or condition - in other words, only a 
devotional attitude of mind and heart. Since it does not 
pertain to any religious tenets but is indicative of only a 
religious attitude, variations and distinctions can be 
caused in its form and manner because of the difference of 
sectarian beliefs and the disagreements in the doctrinal 
approach to the question of the nature of God, In the total
complex of Hinduism, bhakti, in the sense of devotion, forms
a part of various religious traditions, and is not confined 
to any one sect. Thus not only is it wrong to call it a 
religion, but it is equally wrong to restrict it to the 
Vaishnava faith.a
There is no incompatibility between bhakti and the
nirguna ideology of the Advaita Vedanta. In Hinduism, an
impersonal concept of God and a non-dualistic view of 
Reality in no way exclude the possibilities of bhakti, On 
the contrary they provide the necessary philosophical 
framework for the recommended path of Self-realisation, 
which forms an essential part of the Hindu view of religious 
devotion.
Bhakti is not antagonistic to ^hana either. In the 
authoritative religious texts the two are always found as 
accordant accompaniments to each other. In fact their 
mutual interdependence is very often emphasised. The current 
misconception that bhakti is opposed to Jnana is obviously 
the result of a false interpretation of jhana. Whenever 
bhakti and jhana are described as antagonistic to each 
other, the latter is invariably understood as intellectual 
and abstract knowledge. But in the Hindu literature, 
whenever the term jnana is used in relation to spiritual 
endeavour and is described as the highest value, it always 
carries the meaning of Self-knowledge, derived from personal 
spiritual experience.
The current theories which suggest that bhakti is a 
religious conviction, that it is not possible without a 
belief in a personal God, and that it is opposed to jhana 
and the Advaita Vedanta, are of recent and artificial 
formation. So is the equation of bhakti with Vaishnavism.
The beginnings of these theories which outline the principles 
of the "bhakti religion", and which ultimately identify 
bhakti with Vaishnavism can be traced back to certain western
o
scholars of the nineteenth century. The Hindu Scriptures 
do not support these views. Even such texts as the Bhagavad- 
Gita, the Bhag av a t a-Purana and the Bhakti-Sutras of Narada
and £>ahdilya do not bear them out, although these are always 
cited to substantiate them. In none of these texts do we 
find the suggestion that bhakti is possible only for a 
personal God. Nor do we find any divergence between bhakti 
and jhana^and between bhakti and the Vedanta. The Bhagavad- 
Gita describes the jhani bhakta as the highest amongst the 
devotees. Sahdilya refers to the Brahma-Kanda as the Bhakti- 
Kand a 9 and the Bhagavata-Purana,, in spite of its strong 
Vaishnava bias, gives full recognition to the bhakti for the 
Nirguna.
The nucleus of the modern theories about bhakti can
be found in the writings of Albrecht Weber. The ideas
initiated by him were further developed by scholars like
Monier-Williams and George.A. Grierson. Weber had identified
bhakti with Krishna-worship. He was interested mainly in the
question of the influence of Christianity on this particular
religious tradition of India. Although the researches of
R.G. Bhandarkar finally resolved this question by proving
the pre-Christian existence of the cult of Krishna-wor ship,
its identification with bhakti had become a settled fact.
Even Bhandarkar could not question it in spite of his
awareness, though rather uncertain, that the spirit of the
upasana of the Upanishads was akin to that of bhakti.
However, because of its initial identification with Krishna * . *
worship, bhakti, soon became in the academic circles an 
equivalent for Vaishnavism. It was later discussed by 
western scholars not in terms of Christian influence, but as 
an expression of Hindu theism. They now saw in the worship 
of Vishnu and of his avataras Rama and Krishna, the signs of 
a "monotheistic religion’^ distinct and separate from the 
religion of the Upanishads. They also suggested that the 
theistic religion of bhakti was opposed to the ideology of 
the classical Vedanta and the path of Jhana.
But most of these ideas propounded by the western 
scholars in connection with bhakti seem to be the result of 
their search for a Hindu parallel which could fit the 
definition of a theistic religion according to their own 
standards of Judgement. Their theories on bhakti rest on 
two fundamental principles, the principle of a clear division 
between religion and philosophy^ and the principle that theism 
is possible only in the context of a belief in a personal 
God. These principles however are easily understandable 
against the western background. But they are not applicable 
to Hinduism.
The principle of division between religion and 
philosophy is clearly the result of the long period of 
conflict between the two in Europe and their final separation. 
Similarly^the ultimacy of a personal God in the academic
273
definition of theism is determined hy the nature of a 
Christian concept of God. Because of the incompatihility of 
the Christian faith in the Biblical God and the impersonal 
explanations of God offered hy modern philosophy, the personal 
nature of God was hound to receive great emphasis in the 
explanations ahout theism. But in the Hindu traditions, 
religion and philosophy have always remained interconnected 
and an impersonal view of God has never heen regarded as a 
negation of theism.
The application of the ahove principles in the study 
of Hinduism has resulted in many misconceptions. Not only 
has it led to the formulation of certain fallacious theories 
ahout hhakti, hut has also heen the cause of some wrong 
postulations ahout the nature of Hindu theism and monotheism. 
However, the recognition of the presence of religious 
devotion and theism only in the worship of a personal deity, 
and the rejection of all philosophical influences as non- 
theistic and non-devotional^/ hastocaused serious misjudgements 
ahout the Bhakti Movement and the nirguna hhaktas like Kah'ir. 
The artificial definition of hhakti hased on these principles 
makes it more difficult to evaluate them correctly.
The current view that the Bhakti Movement was a 
reaction against the intellectual ism,f of Sankara and that 
its doctrinal hase was provided hy the Vaishnava acharyas,
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needs correction. It has led to a misrepresentation of 
certain vital religious movements of the medieval period.
Some of them were obviously inspired hy the same values which 
had inspired Sankara^and do not share the Vaishnava bias 
which was the most predominant characteristic of the theology 
expounded by the Vaishnava acharyas. Moreover, Sankara 
himself lays great emphasis on bhakti. In fact there is no 
disagreement between Sankara and the Vaishnava acharyas on 
the question of the nature and importance of bhakti. Their 
more serious disagreements arise from the inherent challenge 
of Sankara’s nirguna ideology to the Vaishnava traditions of 
worship which rest mainly on trie~ faith in the personal deity 
Vishnu and his personal incarnations. Whereas the Vaishnava 
acharyas can be rightly regarded as the fountainhead of the 
neo-Vaishnava movement of the medieval period, there are no 
valid grounds for connecting the whole of the Bhakti Movement 
with their religious and doctrinal position.
When the total medieval religious upsurge is 
described as the Bhakti Movement, certain common beliefs are 
attributed to all the medieval bhaktas, irrespective of 
their ideological differences. Their bhakti is commonly 
understood as a simple faith in a personal God, different 
from the beliefs upheld by the Vedantins, and as a path 
opposed to that of jfiana. But an unbiased approach shows
clearly that some of the medieval bhaktas were staunch 
supporters of the idea of an impersonal G-od and of the 
essential teachings of the Vedanta, A monolithic view of 
the Bhakti Movement, therefore, can he taken only if bhakti 
is understood in its intrinsic and wider meaning. If however 
bhakti is viewed in terms of specific doctrinal beliefs, 
then the division between the nirguna and the saguna bhaktas 
and their ideological differences must be recognized more 
definitely, and they must be treated as entirely separate 
groups. No efforts should then remain necessary to establish 
the compatibility of the two, A correct understanding of the 
nirguna bhaktas like Kabir is not possible without such an 
approach,
Kablr’s position strikes us as the antithesis of the 
current academic definition of bhakti. He rejects the idea 
of a personal G-od and takes a completely monistic view of 
Reality. He emphasises the importance of jfrana and advocates 
that religious faith must always be accompanied by individual 
reasoning. Furthermore, his ideology bears no particular 
resemblance with that of the Vaishnava acharyas, and his 
open attacks on the beliefs in the divinity of the avatar as 
strikes at the very roots of the Vaishnava beliefs. But
c
these aspects of his thought are not seen clearly because of 
the preconceived notions about bhakti. Freedom from this
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fixed position is therefore necessary for a better under­
standing of his teachings and of the impact of his personality 
on the medieval religion and thought„ Perhaps the more 
fundamental aspects of the religious and philosophical 
position of Kabir can be explained only after that* His 
belief in the equality of man, his faith in the oneness of 
all religions, his emphasis on reason, and his complete 
disregard for ritual and tradition deserve a more serious 
examination.
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